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ABSTRACT 
This thesis aims to investigate a series of problems of 
electoral behaviour that were first studied using the social-
psychological approach to political science. These problems are 
voter turnout, the surge and decline of electoral participation, the 
role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. 
They are particularly relevant to the study of New Zealand local 
elections mainly because local elections provide the only opportunity 
for the New Zealand voter to vote for the party leader and the other 
members of his ticket. It is argued that these problems can be explained 
using both social-psychological theories and rational choice theories 
based on the economic approach to political science. The problems are 
examined using data collected at the 1974 Christchurch City Council 
election. A survey research project was carried out in the North ward 
of Christchurch City just prior to the 1974 election, and a post-election 
analysis of the master roll of electors was carried out for West and 
Pegasus wards. The findings reveal that voter turnout was quite closely 
related to psychological variables but less so to sociological and 
political variables. The variations in voter turnout and the partisan 
division of the vote in the 1968, 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council 
elections are explained with reference to psychological variables and 
economic variables. Party identification is shown to be a major 
influence on voting behaviour. There are strong relationships between 
voting in a local election and voting in a parliamentary election. 
Personal voting and coattail voting in the 1974 election are investigated, 
and some explanations for straight and split ticket voting are suggested. 
:In conclusion the thesis argues that social-psychological and rational 
choice theories can together provide explanations for electoral behaviour. 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Two fundamental theoretical tasks facing students of electoral 
behaviour are to explain the voting decisions of individual voters 
and to explain election outcomes. To perform these tasks psephologists 
use various theories of electoral behaviour, for as yet there is no 
simple 'theory' of elections. Instead there are many theoretical 
interpretations of the electoral process dealing with voter choice, 
electoral outcomes, the composition of the electorate, and so forth. 
A basic assumption of research into these topics is simply stated: 
1 
"An election is a multivariate phenomenon". In other words, it is 
more complicated than a simple sununary of individual preferences for 
parties A and B. To understand how elections are won and lost, one 
must consider not only the influence of parties, _personalities and 
issues on the voter, but also the influence of such institutional 
arrangements as election laws. Of course it is extremely difficult 
for any one study to unravel all the various influences which operate 
on voters' choices and election outcomes. Studies normally concentrate 
on the possible influence of just one or a few factors using appropriate 
theories. 
1. Richard Rose, "Comparability in Electoral Studies", in 
Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Behaviour : A Comparative 
Handbook (New York : Free Press, 1974), p. 8. 
2. 
Research into individual voting decisions and election 
outcomes has tended to centre around two alternative general theories 
which can be labelled the 'social and psychological determinism' and 
'rationality' theories of voting. Theories of social and psychological 
determinism imply that to a large extent social and psychological 
characteristics structure the vote. In contrast rationality theories 
imply that individuals are free to use individual perception and 
motivation in making their voting decisions. The key question is: 
'Does the voter choose the candidate or party which best represents 
his interests,or does he merely respond to given socio-economic 
circumstances and environmental and psychological factors?' Kenneth 
J. Arrow argued that since there are so many alternative parties, 
personalities and issues facing the voter,it is impossible for him to 
act rationally in casting his single vote. 1 Early voting studies in 
the United States attempted to predict preferences by relying primarily 
on either socio-economic variables2 or psychological variables. 3 A 
major advancement in voting research was made with the 'Funnel of 
Causality' model in The American Voter. This model focussed a range 
of social, psychological and political variables leading to the voting 
decision, but still said little about the voting decision being a 
1. Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New 
York: John Wiley, 1951). 
2. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, 
Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 
Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1948). 
3. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter 
Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954). 
. 1 h . 1 rationa c oice. In contrast, the findings of v.o. Key, Jr. and 
others aim to show that voters are indeed rational in their voting 
decisions. "Voters are not fools", as Key succinctly put it. 2 
Rational voting is not, however, incompatible with social or 
psychological influences on the vote. For the voter who votes the 
same way as his usual party leaning or as his parents or friends, 
it can be argued that this is a rational means of reducing the 
personal costs of participating, while still expressing a general 
opinion on the government or opposition. 3 
3. 
During the past twenty years students of the electoral process 
have made increasing use of rational choice models, and their findings 
make it clear that a model of voting choice should include rational 
choice theory as well as socio-economic and psychological factors. 4 
The broad aim of this thesis is to apply theoretical concepts of 
1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 
abridged ed., 1964) [1st ed. 1960]. 
2. V.O. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in 
Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (Cambridge,Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), p. 7. See also G~rald Pomper, Voters' 
Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behaviour (New York: 
Dodd Mead, 1975) • 
3. Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality as Bases 
of Party Identification", American Political Science Review 
LXIII (1969), 5-25. 
4. See, for example, Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957); William H. Riker and Peter c. 
Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", American Political 
Science Review LXII (1968), 25-42; William c. Stratman, "The 
Calculus of Rational Choice", Public Choice XVIII (1974), 93-105; 
Gordon Tullock, Toward A Mathematics of Politics (Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press, 1967). 
4. 
rationality to some specific problems of electoral behaviour 
which have important influences on individual voting choices and 
election outcomes. The theoretical concepts are derived from 
public choice theory and the 'economic approach' to political 
science. Public choice theory with its assumption of rational 
political behaviour on the part of individuals has been widely 
acknowledged for providing valuable insights into various aspects 
of the political process. In the economic approach to the study of 
political participation attempts are made to examine the economic 
rationality (in the sense of consistency) with which voters choose, 
at election time, on the basis of their own perceptions of the 
policy stands of the candidates or parties. Party identification, for 
example, is not conceptualised as a traditional attitude passed down 
through generations, but instead as a problem-solving device learned 
from one's parents that is instrumental for the advance of the 
voter's own particular set of values. 1 
The specific problems to be investigated in this study are: 
voter turnout, the surge and decline model of electoral participation, 
the role of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail 
voting. These problems will be examined using survey data from a 
New Zealand local election - the 1974 Christchurch City Council 
election - and it will be argued that they can in part be explained 
using rational choice theory. Although these problems were initially 
1. Goldberg, "Social Determinism", p. 5. 
5. 
studied by advocates of the social-psychological approach, this 
thesis employs rational choice theory in order to apply a different 
perspective to the same problems. The social-psychological studies 
have raised interesting theoretical problems which lend themselves 
to further investigation using rational choice theory. It is 
argued that the problems raised are particularly relevant to New 
Zealand local elections. Their examination should provide a greater 
understanding of the influences upon individual voters' choices·in 
New Zealand local elections and the outcomes of such elections. 
Rational choice models have been applied especially to the 
problem of voter turnout at both the individual level and at the 
level of the political system. Little is known about who participates 
in New Zealand local elections by voting and why. In order to gain 
a greater understanding of local election outcomes,we need to build 
up a picture of the active electorate and also to understand the 
. fl h 1 . h . d th d . . 1 in uences t at ie be in e ecision to vote. 
The theory of surge and decline tries to account for 
1. Theoretical studies on voter turnout include, for example, 
Yoram Barzel and Eugene Silberberg, "Is the Act of Voting 
Rational?", Public Choice XVI (1973), 51-58; Riker and 
Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting", who give 
economic explanations of turnout and Seymour Martin 
Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden 
City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960); Lester W. Milbrath, Political 
Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in 
Politics? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965) who emphasise 
sociological and social-psychological perspectives. 
6. 
variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote 
. 1 . 1 at successive e ections. It is considered particularly appropriate 
to the study of recent Christchurch City Council elections because 
the election results display a similar pattern to that originally 
observed by V.O. Key, Jr. in his research into American presidential 
1 . 2 e ections. 
No discussion of voting would be completewithoutconsideration 
of the role of party. Its importance both as an influence on voting 
behaviour and as an analytical variable have long been recognised 
3 
and recorded. Party politics dominate local elections in New 
Zealand's four main cities although to a lesser extent than in general 
elections. 
Personal voting results from voters' perceptions of the 
personal qualities of the candidates, rather than their party labels 
or the policies they espouse. Studies have shown that an impressive 
1. Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline : A Study of Electoral 
Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the 
Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 3. 
2. V.O. Key, Jr., Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (New 
York: Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), p. 638. 
3. Berelson et al., Voting; David Butler and Donald Stokes, 
Political Change in Britain : The Evolution of Electoral 
Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974) [1st ed. 1969]; 
Campbell et al., American Voter; Campbell et al., Elections 
and the Political Order; Campbell et al., Voter Decides; 
Lazarsfeld et al., People's Choice. 
personality can disrupt traditional party loyalties. 1 New 
Zealand local government elections have in general, traditionally 
been non-partisan and, although the reverse is true in the four 
main cities, there is still a strong feeling that electors should 
'vote for the person not the party'. 
Straight and split ticket voting are possible where an 
election offers the voter a choice between competing teams of 
candidates. Coattail voting occurs when the personal appeal of 
the party leader produces votes for his running mates who are 
then said to be 'riding into office on the presidential (or 
mayoral) coattails'. The influence of personality can lead to 
split ticket voting or coattail voting. Studies using the social-
2 psychological approach have raised interesting questions and 
1. Campbell et al., American voter, chap. 2; Walter De Vries 
and V. Lance Tarrance, The Ticket-splitter : A New Force 
in American Politics (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 
1972); David Mervin, "Personality and Ticket Splitting in 
U.S. Federal and Gubernatorial Elections", Political 
Studies XX! (1973), 306-310; Arthur H. Miller et al., "A 
Majority Party in Disarray : Policy Polarization in the 
7. 
1972 Election", American Political Science Review LXX (1976), 
753-778. 
2. Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis 
of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political 
Science Review LI (1957) 293-312; Warren E. Miller,"Presi-
dential Coattails : A Study in Political Myth and 
Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368; 
Malcolm C. Moos, Politics Presidents and Coattails (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1952); Charles Press, "Voting 
Statistics and Presidential Coattails", American Political 
Science Review LI! (1958), 1041-1050. 
8. 
problems regarding ballot-splitting and coattails which are quite 
relevant to the study of multi-candidate local elections in New 
Zealand. In most New Zealand municipal elections voters have the 
opportunity to vote for a number of councillors as well as for 
mayor. This is the only chance the New Zealand voter has to split 
his ticket and vote for two or more parties in one election. In 
parliamentary elections each elector has only one vote. Voting for 
the local mayor and council in New Zealand is thus analogous to 
voting for the president and congress in the United States. 
As well as providing some insight into general theoretical 
problems of electoral behaviour,this thesis aims to describe and 
explain electoral behaviour at three levels: (1) New Zealand local 
elections, (2) using Christchurch City as an example,and (3) giving 
special attention to the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. 
Some general characteristics of local government elections in New 
Zealand will be described; a closer look will be taken at 
Christchurch City Council elections: the parties, recent trends, 
and the influence of personalities. Attention will, of course, be 
focused mainly on the 1974 election, the influences on the voters, 
and the election outcom·e. 
Christchurch City has been chosen as the object of this study 
for two main reasons. It is the city I have lived in for twenty-
four years and through observation and previous study of its 
elections I have a strong interest in its politics. The second 
reason is the availability of data; a survey research project 
had been carried out in the city just prior to the 1974 election 
9. 
under the supervision of Mr Nigel Roberts of the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Canterbury, and I was able 
to use the raw data from this survey. Christchurch is a 
particularly good city in which to carry out this study. It is 
typical of New Zealand's four main cities in that its politics 
are dominated by two main parties - a Citizens group and the 
Labour Party. Elsewhere in New Zealand party politics in local 
elections are quite rare. The 1974 election in Christchurch was the 
first occasion a ward system of voting had been tried out in a 
major New Zealand city for many years. 
Studies of local government in New Zealand generally are 
sparse, but it is in the field of local elections in particular 
that New Zealand political scientists lack precise knowledge of the 
electoral processes going on around them. City administrations have 
come and gone or perpetuated forever without any detailed analysis of 
the democratic processes that permit such a state of affairs. 1 
1. Two theoretical studies have been published using data from 
New Zealand local elections. See John C. Blydenburgh,"The 
Effect of Ballot Form on City Council Elections", Political 
Science XXVI (July 1974), 47-55; "Innovation in New Zealand 
Local Body Election Campaigns", Political Science XXIV 
(September 1972), 57-62. 
Some limited analyses have been proved by G.W.A. Bush in a 
number of short articles surveying local election results 
from all parts of the country~ See G.W .A. Bush "Cogitating 
on the 1974 Local Body Election Results", New Zealand 
Local Government X (December 1974), 3-6; "Local Body 
Elections", New Zealand Local Government IV (1968), 293-295; 
"Local Elections : Democracy or Farce?", New Zealand Local 
Government VII (1971), 330-335; "Local Election Trends : 
What the Figures Tell", New Zealand Local Government VIII 
(1972), 550-555; "1968 Local Election Trends : The Evidence 
of the Statistics", New Zealand Local Government VI (1970), 
202-204; "1974 Local Body Trends : What the Figures Reveal", 
New Zealand Local Government XII (July 1976, August 1976), 
21-35, 33-38. 
10. 
Recently, however, local elections in New Zealand's two largest 
cities, Christchurch and Auckland, have been the subject of research 
projects that have explored different facets of electoral behaviour 
and political participation at the local level. 1 Studies in 
Christchurch have examined the elected personnel of local 
2 government, the history, organisation and decision-making of 
h h h h ld f f h . d 3 t e party t at as e power or most o t e post-war per10 , 
4 
and spatial elements in voting patterns. As can be seen relatively 
1. For the Auckland studies see G.W.A. Bush, Decently and in 
Order: The Government of the City of Auckland 1840-1971 
(Auckland: Collins for Auckland City Council, 1971), chap. 
13; "Informal Voting in a New Zealand Local Election", 
Historical and Political Studies I (1970), 84-88; Labour's 
Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local Body Elections 
{Auckland: Department of Political Studies, University of 
Auckland, 1974); "The 1968 Auckland City Mayoralty 
Contest", Political Science XXII (December 1970) ,23-42; "The 
Non-vote in a Local Body Election'', Political Science XXIV 
{September 1972), 45-56; 23-42; Ewen C. Marjoribanks, 
"Spatial Variations in Voting in Five Selected Auckland City 
Council Elections : 1953, 1956, 1959, 1971 and 1974", M.A. 
thesis, University of Auckland, 1975. 
2. Gerard Cheyne, "Christchurch - The Men Who Govern : A Study 
of Councillors and Board Members", M.A. thesis, University 
of Canterbury, 1966; Austin Mitchell, Politics and People 
in New Zealand (Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969), 
chap. 11 "Who Runs Local Government : Christchurch". 
3. David A. Hyslop, "The Christchurch Citizens' Association: 
History, Organisation, and Decision-making", M.A. thesis, 
University of Canterbury, 1973. 
4. R .J. Johnston, "Local Effects in Voting at a Local Election", 
Annals, Association of American Geographers, LXIV (1974), 
418-429; "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 
Christchurch City Council Election", Political Science, XXIV 
(April 1972), 49-61; "Spatial Patterns and Influences on 
Voting in Multi-candidate Elections : The Christchurch 
City Council Elections, 1968", Urban Studies X (1973), 
69-81. 
11. 
few studies of Christchurch City Council elections have been made; 
this was the first time survey research had been used to analyse 
a particular election. 
Analysis of voting behaviour at local elections is an 
important task for three main reasons. Firstly, while it is 
realised that there is little evidence that voters can directly 
affect public policy through voting, 1 elections do play the 
important role of deciding which party or persons will become the 
government and thus hold political power. Elections are an 
opportunity for the masses to render judgement on the past 
political conduct of the government and opposition. It is not 
always clear what issues a new government is conunitted to, but 
nevertheless the efforts of politicians and commentators to read 
some clear mandate into election results signify that elections 
are assumed to have the function of identifying citizen interests. 
Elections are also important as a symbolic ritual identifying and 
linking the voter with his party, his social group and the 
community. 2 Secondly, to understand the forces that are acting to 
1. Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass 
Publics", in David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and 
Discontent (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-261; 
Robert E. Dowse and John A. Hughes, Political Sociology 
(London: John Wiley, 1972), pp. 325-327. On the role of 
elections see also David Butler and Dennis Kavanagh, The 
British General Election of February 1974 (London: ~­
Macmillan, 1974), chap. l; Thomas R. Dye and L. Harman 
Zeigler, The Irony of Democracy : An Uncommon Introduction 
to American Politics {Belmont,Calif.: Wadsworth, 2nd ed., 
1972), chap. 6. 
2. See Murray Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana, 
Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1964). 
12. 
produce a specific election outcome we need to explain inter alia 
voting behaviour. That is,we need to examine the voters' 
perceptions of the candidates, parties and issues, how they 
evaluate them, how they react to them and why. The third reason 
relates to the importance of local government and local elections. 
Strong local government is a healthy sign that access to the 
decision-making channels is close to the people in their local 
political communities and that power is not over-concentrated within 
the central government. The study of voting behaviour at local 
elections in New Zealand is important if we are to further our 
knowledge of why certain people gain greater access to the decision-
making channels by being elected to local authorities. Christchurch 
City Council elections are important because the distribution of 
benefits from the council depends in part on the party in power. 
Recent city council elections have shown that who gets elected 
affects the allocation of resources in terms of both geography and 
class. Each party with a majority on the council likes to feed the 
areas and groups that it hopes will give it electoral support in the 
future. This explains why the Citizens Association tends to neglect 
the eastern working class area of the city and talks of benefits for 
the business community,_ while the Labour Party - when it was in power 
- built an expensive sports stadium in the eastern suburbs and 
promoted an active social welfare policy. Local elections are 
important because they select the decision-makers who then decide 
on the distribution of resources and this distribution changes 
when the party in power changes. 
13. 
In the remainder of this introductory chapter the back-
ground to Christchurch City Council politics and the 1974 
election is described,and in Chapter II the research design is 
presented. In Chapter III developments in the study of electoral 
behaviour are discussed and the theoretical approach is outlined. 
Chapter IV analyses voter turnout with Chapter V looking at the 
associated problem of the surge and decline of turnout. Chapter 
VI examines the role of party,and Chapter VII investigates the 
importance of personalities in voting, ticket-splitting and coat-
tail voting. Chapter VIII contains conclusions. 
BACKGROUND 
New Zealand has had some form of local government since 
1840. 1 Local government in the context of the New Zealand political 
system means the body of elected local governing authorities to 
which Parliament has delegated some administrative, executive and 
limited legislative powers to deal with matters that can best be 
administered at a level below the national level. All sovereign 
power, however, rests with Parliament; every local authority 
derives its powers from Parliament. New Zealand local authorities 
have fewer major functions than those in many overseas countries. 
They do not provide education or police services, for example. 
Functions undertaken by local authorities in New Zealand are 
various ranging from town planning, water supply and drainage, 
pensioner housing, civil defence, recreation and environmental 
1. "Report of the Local Government Committee", Appendices to 
the Journals of the House of Representatives (Wellington: 
Government Printer, 1945), I. 15, p. 3. 
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health to traffic control, airports, harbours and energy 
di 'b . 1 str1 ution. Territorial local authorities are those 
responsible for a broad range of functions in the district within 
their jurisdiction. They at present fall into two main categories -
municipalities and counties, with new categories envisaged in the 
Local Government Act 1974. Special-purpose (or 'ad hoc') 
authorities differ from territorial authorities in that each is 
charged with only one major function. Only rarely do the 
boundaries of ad hoc authorities coincide with territorial 
authority boundaries. The number of local authorities in 
2 
existence at 30 November 1974 was 1 952. This total includes 136 
city and borough councils and 105 county councils while the vast 
bulk are mainly ad hoc authorities. The need for local government 
reform in New Zealand has been widely recognised for the past 
3 
century, but, with the exception of the 1972-75 Labour Government, 
successive governments have lacked the courage to overcome 
resistance to change. W.B. Sutch summed up the history of local 
government reform in New Zealand when he called it a history of 
4 defeat. 
1. J.H. Gray, An Outline of Local Government in New Zealand 
(Christchurch: Hillside Publications, 1976), pp. 44-49. 
2. N.Z. Department of Statistics, New Zealand Official 
Yearbook 1976 (Wellington: Government Printer, 1976), 
pp. 50-51. 
3. See John Roberts, "Local Government", in Ray Goldstein and 
Rod Alley (eds.),La.bour in Power : Promise and Performance 
(Wellington: Price Milburn for N.Z. University Press, 
1975), pp. 150-160. 
4. W.B. Sutch, "Local Government in New Zealand : A History of 
Defeat", in R.J. Polaschek (ed.}, Local Government in New 
Zealand (Wellington: N.Z. Institute of Public Administration, 
1956) • 
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Local government elections in New Zealand are held 
triennially with all elections for each authority taking place 
on the one day. Ward systems are uncommon so that almost all 
local authority members are elected 'at large' on a first-past-
the-post system. For example, when there are nineteen vacancies 
the nineteen highest polling candidates are elected. The 1974 
elections were conducted under the Local Election and Polls Act 
1966, the Municipal Corporations Act 1954 and the Counties Act 
1956. In general the franchise extended to all persons aged 
eighteen years or over who possessed either a rating qualification 
or a residential qualification in the district of the local 
authority concerned. Ratepayers (property owners) were enrolled 
automatically by the local authority when they bought property 
in the local authority district. They did not have to be resident 
in the district. Residential electors were obliged by law to apply 
for enrolment if they had resided in New Zealand for one year and 
in the local authority district for three months. They also had 
to be British subjects. Every qualified elector was eligible to 
seek election to a local authority. There was provision for 
postal voting and for polling to be spread over a few days prior to 
polling day. Turnout at local elections in New Zealand is generally 
1 low: the national average at the 1974 elections was 50 per cent. 
Party politics are not a predominant feature of New Zealand local 
government elections. Except for the major cities nearly all 
local authority members stand as Independents. Where parties do 
1. N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority 
Elections 1974", Wellington, 1976 (mimeo), Table 17. 
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exist the tight party discipline characteristic of parliamentary 
politics is rare. Party affiliations did not appear on the ballot 
papers for the Christchurch City Council elections in 1974, although 
they did in the Auckland and Wellington City Council elections. 
Within the Christchurch Urban Area in 1974 there were as 
many as ten territorial local authorities providing local 
1 government for 292 520 people. Christchurch City is the largest 
of these local authorities; its 1974 population was 170 6002 
which made it the largest city in New Zealand. The number of 
electors on the 1974 electoral roll was 98 039. 3 The city council 
consists of the mayor and nineteen councillors. Party politics 
have dominated Christchurch City Council politics for many years; 
there has not been an Independent elected to the council since 1933. 
Two main parties contest the elections: the Citizens Association 
and the Labour Party. 
The Citizens Association was established in 19114 to 
''counter the intrusion of a disciplined Labour party into local 
1. New Zealand Official Yearbook 1975, p. 62. The local authority 
districts which are wholly or partly included in the Christ-
church Urban Area are: Christchurch City, Eyre County, 
Heathcote County, Kaiapoi Borough, Lyttelton Borough, Mount 
Herbert County, Paparua County, Rangiora County, Riccarton 
Borough and Waimairi County. 
3. Christchurch City Council, District Electors' Roll for the 
City of Christchurch 1974 (Christchurch: 1974)0 
4. Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", Po4. On the Citizens 
Association, see also: Cheyne, "The Men Who Govern"; Warren 
Po Head, "A City Decides : The General Election of 1966 in 
Christchurch", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 1~67, 
pp. 270-272. 
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politics. 111 One of its objectives is "to rouse and direct 
resistance against use of the civic administration for furthering 
sectional interests." 2 As Austin Mitchell has noted: "This 
3 
might be reworded as 'to oppose the Labour party'". The 
Association consists mainly of businessmen,and its activity is 
directed principally towards winning elections with far less 
emphasis on organisational and membership aspects. The Association 
has been at pains to point out that: "We are not a political 
party, but an association whose only interest is the good of the 
city and whose sole function is to promote sound independent 
candidates for the local body elections. 114 Claims such as this 
have not dampened the feeling that the Citizens Association is 
merely the National party in disguise. In Cheyne's 1965 study all 
but one of the Citizens councillors were members of the National 
5 Party. Of the 1974 Citizens candidateb three had stood as National 
Party candidates for the parliamentary elections and two others 
had been active members. 6 Even the President of the Association 
once said that "while it is not tied up with the National Party its 
views were generally along the same lines. 117 The National Party 
1. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 301. (Labour candidates 
first contested the 1909 Christchurch City Council Election. 
Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", p. 2). 
2. "Rules of the Christchurch Citizens Association", quoted in 
Hyslop, "Citizens' Association", p. 18. 
3. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 301. 
4. M.O. Holdsworth (Chairman, Christchurch C,itizens Association) , 
quoted in Christchurch Star, 9 July 1974, p. 1. 
5. Cheyne, "The Men Who Govern", chap. 4. 
6. Christchurch Star, 11 July 1974, p. 1. 
7. E.B.E. Taylor, Address to Annual Meeting of the Christchurch 
Citizens Association, 27 April 1970r quoted in Christchurch 
Star, 11 July 1974, p. 1. 
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does not control the Citizens Association. Any connection that 
exists is at the individual level and not at the formal organisational 
level. The main reason why National has not stood candidates in 
local elections is probably because its interests are already well 
represented by people who identify with the National Party's aims 
and policies and who are National Party members. 
The Labour Party is a local version of the parliamentary 
party. As such it has a wider range of membership than the Citizens 
Association,and there is influence from the affiliated trade unions 
in matters such as candidate selection. Local body membership is 
often regarded by Labour councillors and candidates as a stepping 
stone to Parliament. Wflile Labour lacks the financial backing of 
the Citizens Association, there is more emphasis on loyalty and 
service to the party. In contrast to the Citizens Association whose 
organisation really dnly comes into existence to contest elections 
every three years, the Labour Party organisation is in permanent 
day-to-day existence. As a nationally-based political party Labour 
has had to continually justify its role in local government,for 
there is a strong feeling that political parties should not 
nominate candidates fo~ local elections. 
Citizens have been more successful in winning election to 
the city council than have Labour. From 1947 until 1971 Citizens 
members held a majority except between 1950 and 1956 (see Table 1.1). 
Labour candidates have had to struggle to gain a foothold on the 
council,and once there they have had to fight to maintain their 
position. Labour has won only three council elections since World 
TABLE 1.1 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS ON CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL: 
1947-1974 
YEAR COUNCIL MAYORALTY 
Citizens Labour 
1947 14 5 Cit 
1950 7 12 Lab 
1953 9 10 Lab 
1956 12 7 Lab 
1959 19 0 Lab 
1962 12 7 Lab 
1965 12 7 Lab 
1968 16 3 Cit 
1971 8 11 Lab 
1974 11 8 Cit 
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War II. In mayoral elections, on the other hand, Labour has done 
consistently well. Christchurch had a Labour mayor for twenty-one 
of the twenty-seven years between 1947 and 1974. That Labour has 
been able to win the mayoralty so frequently while Citizens have 
controlled the council demonstrates that ticket-splitting has been 
a commonplace political phenomenon. Voters have been quite 
prepared to vote for a Labour mayor while at the same time splitting 
their ballots to vote for Citizens councils. It appears that voters' 
local party identifications have been weak enough to allow this 
kind of behaviour to occur. This history of ticket-splitting 
suggests that Christchurch City Council elections offer a fruitful 
area for research into the phenomenon. 
20. 
Prior to the 1968 election the Labour candidate, the popular 
Sir George Manning, had won two elections with large majorities -
yet voters simultaneously split their tickets to re-elect 
Citizens councils. In 1968 Manning had retired, yet the mayoral 
election was largely decided once again on personalities. This 
time it was the Citizens candidate Mr A.R. Guthrey, a prominent 
businessman, who strongly defeated anageing former Labour Cabinet 
Minister,Mr Jock Mathison (Table 1.2). The swing was also away 
TABLE 1.2 1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS 
CITIZENS LABOUR TWO PARTY 
Votes % Votes % SWING 
1968 23 273 64.3 12 910 35 . 7 
1971 23 212 48.0 25 121 52.0 16.3% 
(to Labour) 
1974 29 482 52.0 27 237 48.0 4.0% 
,,., (to Citizens) 
from Labour in the council election for they managed to win only 
three seats (Table 1. 3) • 
TABLE 1.3 1968-1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS 
CITIZENS LABOUR TWO PARTY 
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats SWING 
1968 337 973 56.5 16 260 213 43.5 3 
1971 380 877 49.0 8 397 184 51.0 11 7.5% 
(to Labour) 
1974 106 639 53.5 11 92 754 46.5 8 4.5% 
(to Citizens) 
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For the first time in years the 1971 election gave the 
voters a real choice in terms of different party policies. Rarely 
do policies capture the electorate's attention in local elections, 
but in Christchurch in 1971 there were two specific, exploitable 
issues couched in everyday language. These were the proposed road 
through Hagley Park and the venues for the 1974 Commonwealth Games. 
Both issues were perceived and easily understood; there was a 
deep intensity of feeling about the road through the park and the 
differences between the parties were clearly defined. The 
Citizens were for the road and wanted the Games at an existing 
smaller stadium, while Labour was against the road and wanted to 
build a big new Garnes stadium in the New Brighton area. Labour 
led by its mayoral candidate, Mr Neville Pickering, won the election, 
with Guthrey, the sitting Citizens mayor and seven Citizens 
councillors defeated (Tables 1.2 and 1.3). Labour's promise of 
a Garnes stadium and its stand against the Hagley Park road won it 
the election. As the Christchurch Star commented: "Anyone who 
tampers with the park does so at his peril - a fact of life that 
has never before been so evident. 111 
City council elections prior to 1974 were conducted under the 
'at large' system with the city as a whole regarded as one 
electorate. This system had its drawbacks in that voters had to 
1. Christchurch Star, 11 October 1971, p. 8. On the 1971 
election see Andrew MacKenzie, "The Ward System in 
Christchurch City : The 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City 
Council Elections", Stage III essay, Department of 
Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1974. 
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FIGURE 1.1 WARD BOUNDARIES FOR 1974 CITY COUNCIL ELECTION 
SOUTH 
EAST 
Sol,lrce: The Press, 26 June 1974, p. 3. 
choose up to nineteen candidates from a ballot paper containing as 
many as forty-eight. In their manifestoes for the 1971 election both 
parties included promises to implement a ward system of voting for 
the 1974 election. 1 This promise was fulfilled by Labour and all 
voters in 1974 faced the new system of electing three or four 
councillors to represent them on the new council. The city was 
divided into five wards namely: 
(Figure 1.1) . 
West, North, Pegasus, East and South 
Four of the wards elected four councillors each and the 
1. Christchurch Star, 4 September 1971, p. 2. 
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smaller West ward elected three. The mayoral election was 
unaffected by the ward system and was conducted over the city 'at 
1 large' as before. The ward system became a minor issue in the 
election because of the manner in which the ward boundaries were 
drawn. They were determined by a group of Labour councillors who 
refused to allow an independent committee to decide the matter. 2 
The shape of the wards suggested an attempt to gerrymander the 
election; the area of strongest Citizens support was made the 
smallest ward and there were numerous 'wiggly' lines in Labour 
3 
strongholds. 
The 1974 election was contested by full tickets from Citizens 
and Labour. There were . eight Values Party candidates (including a 
mayoral candidate) and three Independents (including a mayoral 
candidate). Voting was spread over four days - from Wednesday 9 
October to Saturday 12 October. In sharp contrast to 1971, the 
1974 election offered no big issues which separated the parties. 
Instead attention was directed to the race for the mayoralty between 
two quite different personalities: the Labour incumbent Mr Neville 
Pickering and his Citizens challenger Mr Hamish Hay. Pickering was 
1. As well as voting for the city council, all electors had the 
opportunity to vote for members of five ad hoc bodies. They 
were the Christchurch Drainage Board, Christchurch Transport 
Board, Lyttelton Harbour Board, North Canterbury Catchment 
Board and North Canterbury Hospital Board. 
2. The Citizens Association councillors were offered one 
representative to Labour's three on a committee of the 
council. They refused. 
3. On the ward system see Andrew MacKenzie, "The Christchurch City 
Council Election of 1974", M.A. (Hons.) essay, Department of 
Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1975, pp. 33-42; 
"Submissions to Christchurch City Council Special Committee 
on Ward System", Christchurch, 1976 (mimeo); "Ward System"; 
David Mitchell, "The voting system that came back from the 
past", Christchurch Star, 14 September 1974, p. 5. 
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a controversial out-spoken mayor while gaining a reputation as a 
'go-ahead' person who wished to see the city develop in a big way. 
In the election campaign he was described both as "a vigorous, 
decisive man with a highly tuned political awareness 11 , 1 and as "a 
2 politically motivated hustler [who had] clawed his way to power." 
In sharp· contrast, Hay's image was very low key; being "neither 
forceful nor thrusting113 his personality was overshadowed by that 
of his opponent. With regard to the policy manifestoes offered by 
the two parties, it seemed like a case of 'Tweedle Oum and Tweedle 
Dee'. If the electors were intending to make intelligent voting 
decisions based on policy differences, then their efforts would 
be frustrated because of the similar positions adopted by the 
parties on almost all the major issues. 4 
The election resulted in a defeat for Pickering and for 
Labour. Hay won by a comfortable margin and Citizens gained an 11-8 
majority on the council (Tables 1.2 and 1.3) • 5 Even Labour's attempt 
1. The Press, 14 September 1974, p. 12. 
2. Christchurch Star, 10 October 1974, p. 8. 
3 • Ibid. , p. 8 • 
4. See Christchurch Citizens Association, Give Christchurch Back 
to the Citizens [Policy Manifesto], Christchurch, 1974; Labour 
Party, An Outstanding Record of Achievement [Policy Manifesto], 
Christchurch, 1974. 
5. For full detailed results see Andrew MacKenzie, A Summary of 
Statistics Relating to the 1974 Christchurch City Council 
Election (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, Department 
of Political Science publication, 1976). (This is reproduced 
as Appendix A) . For an analysis of the 1974 council election 
using aggregate statistics see MacKenzie, "Christchurch City 
Council Election of 1974". 
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to gerrymander the ward boundaries did not save it from the 
swing to Citizens. It seemed that Christchurch voters preferred 
the promises of a steadier and less controversial administration 
rather than the abrasive style of the deposed Mayor. Labour was 
not rewarded for fulfilling its former election-winning promises 
to build Queen Elizabeth II Park and stop the Hagley Park motorway. 
As The Press commented before the election: "The public memory is 
short : its gratitude even shorter-lived. 111 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This thesis draws on rational choice models to help investigate 
and explain problems of voting behaviour using data collected at the 
1974 Christchurch City Council election. These problems are: voter 
turnout, the surge and decline of electoral participation, the role 
of party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. 
Each of these problems was selected for its theoretical significance 
and its relevance to the understanding of local government elections 
in New Zealand. Analysis of voting behaviour at local elections is 
important because of the role elections play in the political 
system, because of the need to explain behaviour in order to under-
stand election outcomes, and because local elections in New Zealand 
select the decision-makers who decide on the distribution of local 
resources. There are a large number of local authorities in New 
Zealand whose elections are conducted under the Local Elections and 
1. The Press, 7 October 1974. 
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Polls and other Acts. Party politics feature only in the major 
cities including Christchurch City where the Citizens Association 
and the Labour Party are the two main parties. Citizens have 
generally always been in power on the city council,and the 1974 
election saw a return to a Citizens majority after three years 
of Labour in power led by the controversial Mayor Neville 
Pickering. 
CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The aim of this chapter is to present the research design 
of the thesis, that is, the sources of data, methods of data 
collection and methods of data analysis. A chapter has been 
devoted to explaining the research design because of the central 
place it occupies in the research process. Firstly the advantages 
and limitations of the main sources of data are pointed out. Then 
the two surveys are described and other sources of data are 
listed. Finally the methods of data a1;alysis are sununarised. 
SOURCES OF DATA : ADVANTAGES AND LIMITATIONS 
Three main methods of studying elections have been pointed 
out by Austin Ranney. One is to employ historical/journalistic/ 
descriptive techniques, the second is to analyse aggregate 
statistics, and the third is to use individual data collected in 
1 
survey research. However, this does not mean that any one method 
is to be preferred over the others. Rather than relying on a 
single 'best' method researchers often use two or more complementary 
1. Austin Ranney, "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate 
Data in the Study of Electoral Behaviour", in Austin 
Ranney (ed.), Essays in the Behavioural Study of Politics 
(Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1962), pp. 93-95. 
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methods. For sources of data this study has used mainly survey 
research with some aggregate statistics. 
Aggregate data describing elections are useful because 
they are generally easily available, it is possible to use them 
in comparative studies, and they are usually the 'hardest' data 
available. The main disadvantage of aggregate data is, of course, 
their extreme crudeness in describing and explaining the 
behaviour of individual voters. The fallacy of ecological 
correlation prohibits the use of aggregate ecological data as a 
substitute for individual level data. 1 This is where survey 
research comes in, for it is in the analysis of individual data 
that political attitudes and partisanship can be measured and 
related to voting behaviour. From individual data survey research 
aggregates the characteristics of the Rample in order to describe 
the population. Survey research is "indispensable in gaining 
information about the human condition and new insights into social 
2 theory." The main advantage of survey research is, then, the 
ability to collect theoretically relevant data on individuals which 
is amenable to rigorous statistical analysis. 3 
1. W. S. Robinson, "Ecological Correlation and the Behaviour 
of Individuals", American Sociological Review XV (1950), 351-357. 
2. Johan Galtung, Theory and Methods of Survey Research (Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget, 1967), p. 149. 
3. For more on survey research see, for example, Earl R. Babbie, 
Survey Research Methods (Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth, 1973); 
Charles H. Backstrom and Gerald D. Hursch, Survey Research 
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963); 
Mildred Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples : Practical 
Procedures (New York : Cooper Square, 1966). 
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There are, however, limits and disadvantages to the use of 
survey research, and possible sources of error should be realised 
in evaluating the research design. Given that there does exist 
a reality, the several stages of the research process can distort 
the 'real truth' into an 'apparent truth' by the time the final 
analysis is completed. The size of the sample and the methods 
used affect the sampling error and the confidence limits. The 
correct questions have to be asked in order to obtain the desired 
information, and in order to avoid certain questions prompting 
answers to other questions,the questionnaire must be suitably 
designed. The interviewer can project his biases into the system 
by his manner, the tone of his voice, and the accuracy with which 
he records the responses. Different respondents can give different 
meanings to the same question by their selective perception. The 
completed questionnaires are coded by the researcher who gives most 
of the information a numerical value to enable computer analysis. 
The researcher can unwittingly impose his own -middle class/social 
science perspective onto reality in designing a questionnaire and 
coding the responses. The authors of Unobtrusive Measures have 
noted: 
"Interviews and questionnaires intrude as a foreign 
element into the social setting they would describe, 
they create as well as measure attitudes, they elicit 
atypical roles and responses, they are limited to 
those who are accessible and will co-operate, and the 
responses obtained are produced in part by individual 
differences irrelevant to the topic at hand." 1 
What comes out of this research process is the social scientist's 
version of reality which hopefully is not too far removed from the 
1. Eugene J. Webb et al., Unobtrusive Measures : Nonreactive 
Research in the Social Sciences (Chicago: Rand McNally, 
1966), p. l. 
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' real truth ' . 
NORTH WARD SURVEY 
The Honours class in electoral behaviour in the Department 
of Political Science at the University of Canterbury chose the 
Christchurch City Council election as its research project for 
1974. Mr Nigel Roberts who supervised the survey kindly made 
available the completed questionnaires. 1 The survey was 
specifically designed to investigate four of the problems to 
which this thesis directs itself, namely: the role of party in 
local elections, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail 
voting. 2 Investigation of the surge and decline model was a 
secondary topic of the survey. The survey was not planned with 
the study of voter turnout specifically in mind, and this is why 
an additional source of data was used to collect information on 
turnout. 
The universe for the survey was the adult population of 
3 Christchurch City aged 18 years and over. The population chosen 
to be sampled was the adult population of North ward aged 18 years 
and over. North was a very good choice for a number of reasons. 
1. The writer of this thesis was not a member of the 1974 
Honours Class and therefore did not take part in planning 
the survey. However, all the coding of the questionnaires 
and subsequent analysis (including computer analysis) 
were completed by the writer. 
2. Just prior to and following the election two preliminary 
analyses of the survey data were published. See "Survey 
gives Mr Hay slender lead on mayor", Christchurch star, 
8 October 1974, p.l; Nigel S. Roberts, "City Elections - what 
they really showed", Christchurch Star, 26 October 1974, p. 6. 
3. For full details of the sample design see Appendix B. 
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Unlike West, Pegasus or South wards it was not obviously an 
area of one particular social class. Rather, North appeared 
to be a cross-section of the city containing some higher status 
neighbourhoods, some lower status neighbourhoods and some that 
were in between. As well as being a social cross-section of the 
city, North appeared to contain a political cross-section in that 
it was obviously neither a Citizens nor a Labour stronghold. It 
was hoped that these factors would mean that the survey sample 
would be representative of the whole city. Before the election 
North appeared to be a marginal ward that could go either way on 
election day. Indeed, it was said that North held the balance 
of power in the 1974 council election. Writing before the 
election I commented: "North is the ward that could determine 
the outcome of the whole election 11 , 1 while the Press observed: 
"The ward has already been labelled by candidates and commentators 
alike as the 'vital' ward. 112 But why was only one ward surveyed 
rather than surveying the whole city? Looking at only one ward 
enables valuable resources such as sample size, time and money 
to be concentrated into one particular area. A close examination 
of one ward should tell us a great deal more than a thinly spread 
survey of the whole city. To paraphrase Nigel Roberts' remark 
about an earlier survey in the Lyttelton electorate, each ward has 
its own candidates, character and problems, and if we are to learn 
1. Andrew MacKenzie, "The Ward System in Christchurch City 
The 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council Elections", 
Stage III essay, Department of Political Science, 
University of Canterbury, July 1974, p. 25. 
2. "Wards with the key to power", The Press, 7 October 1974. 
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more about politics in Christchurch City, we will have to learn 
more about the individual parts that go together to make up the 
whole electoral map of the city. 1 
The number of registered electors in North was 20 277 
2 
which was about the same as in Pegasus, East and South wards. 
The total population of North ward was 34 366 at the 1971 census 
and 34 425 at the 1976 census. 3 In deciding on the sample size 
there are a number of principles available which direct the 
researcher towards selecting an optimum sample size for his 
particular needs. In general, returns by way of increasing 
precision diminish sharply after quite small sample sizes are 
4 
reached. The question for the researcher to answer is how much 
of his resources is he prepared to use for each increase in 
precision. The resources available for the North ward survey in 
terms of personnel, time and money suggested a sample size of between 
200 and 250. A sample between these limits would allow an analysis 
with acceptable precision. The sample size for the North ward survey 
1. Nigel S. Roberts, "Getting It Right", in Brian Edwards (ed.), 
Right Out : Labour Victory '72 - The Inside Story (Wellington: 
Reed, 1973), p. 202. 
2. For full details of the number of registered electors in 
each ward see Appendix A, Table 15. 
3. Christchurch City Council, "Report of the Special Committee 
o!l the Ward System", Christchurch, 10 August 1976 (mimeo). 
4. Bernard Lazerwitz, "Sampling Theory and Procedures", in Hubert 
M. Blalock and Ann B. Blalock (eds.), Methodology in Social 
Research (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968}, pp. 285-287; C.A. 
Moser and G. Kalton, Survey Methods in Social Investigation 
(London: Heinemann, 1958), pp. 146-151; Parten, Surveys, 
Polls and Samples, chap. 9. 
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was chosen to be 240. However, one interviewer failed to carry 
out his set of interviews and the number of completed interviews 
- and thus the sample size - was reduced to 231. This gives a 
sample fraction of about 1 in 100 (i.e. 1 per cent). 
The sampling method was a combination of random, cluster 
and quota sampling techniques. The method of selecting the sample 
cases was a three stage systematic selection. The first stage 
involved cluster sampling, with the random selection of the 
appropriate number of starting points for the interview clusters 
from the North ward electoral roll. Random selection provided a 
spread of clusters throughout the ward. Each starting point 
determined the beginning of a random route along the footpath 
around a block of houses without crossing any streets. Each 
interviewer was required to carry out five interviews beginning 
at each of two starting points. The second stage was the systematic 
selection of dwelling places at each cluster. A random-walk 
pattern was used to select every third dwelling beginning from 
the starting point until five interviews were completed. The 
third stage involved the quota sampling of respondents by sex. 
The interviews were al~ernately with a male, a female, a male etc. 
(All respondents had to be 18 years or over) • If there was more 
than one male or female over 18 years within a household, the 
respondent was randomly selected. If the required respondent was 
not available for any reason (such as no one home, refusal to be 
interviewed, wrong sex or no one over 18), then the interviewers 
missed two dwellings and tried the third. The random-walk pattern 
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and the alternate male/female interviewing procedure were 
followed until the quota of five interviews from each starting 
1 point were successfully completed. The interview questionnaire 
was pre-tested in Pegasus ward on 14 September. All the interviews 
for the actual survey2 were carried out on Saturday 28 September 
which was 11 days before voting began and 14 days before polling 
day itself. It should be remembered that this one survey can 
only give a 'snap-shot' static picture of political opinion on 
this one day during the election campaign. 
This sampling method has its advantages in that the 
resources of personnel, time and money are put to their optimum 
use while preserving the randomness of the sample. By interviewing 
in clusters of dwelling places interviewers do not have to waste 
time travelling around to each house. The random-walk pattern 
and the random sampling of dwellings instead of people helps to 
ensure that all the interviews will be completed in one day, and 
that the interviewers will not have to call ·back if the required 
respondent is not at home. Since all the interviews can be 
completed in one day, the survey date can be close to election day -
allowing some time for analysis prior to the election. The 
1. Certain elements of this sampling procedure are the same as 
those used by the National Research Bureau in their 
regular, national, political opinion surveys. See Brian 
D. Murphy, "Political Polling in New Zealand", in 
Stephen Levine (ed.), New Zealand Politics : A Reader 
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975), pp. 163-167. 
2. Appendix C contains the text of the questionnaire. 
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selection of the sample does not rely on what might be an 
incorrect electoral roll, and therefore interviewers do not have 
to spend time searching for recently deceased people or persons 
who may have shifted. The main disadvantage of the sampling 
method is the quota element which meant that the interviewers 
called at every third house until five interviews were obtained. 
Thus the unavailability of respondents for whatever reason (such 
as no one home, refusal to be interviewed, wrong sex or no one 
over 18 years) was disregarded. (However, the method does not 
mean they have to be. The method can permit call-backs to the 
same house) • It could be that those who refused to be interviewed 
were less interested in politics than those who were interviewed. 
This could affect the representativeness of the sample. 
The method of sampling also means that the possible levels 
of sampling error are hard to determine. Using Parten's sample 
size tables the possible error for a sample size of 231 is between 
6 and 7 per cent with confidence limits of 95 chances in 100 of 
accuracy to within the specified limits of error. 1 However, 
Nigel Roberts has pointed out that: 
"We do know from the results of the election in the 
North ward that the survey seemed to be an extremely 
accurate picture of opinion in the North ward, and I 
would conclude that the quota element in the sample 
(and its consequent disregard of refusals and 
unavailables) did not affect the accuracy and 
reliability of the study. The election results were 
out best guide to the accuracy of the survey." 2 
1. Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, pp. 314-315. 
2. Nigel S. Roberts, Letter to the author, 19 October 1976. 
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A comparison of some of the survey findings and the election 
results illustrates theaccuracy, reliability and validity of the 
survey. The survey findings for the mayoral election and the 
actual results are compared in Table 2.1. Despite the small 
TABLE 2.1 1974 MAYORAL ELECTION AND NORTH WARD SURVEY COMPARED 
CITIZENS·. LABOUR 
Hay Pickering 
% N % N 
Result in Christchurch 
City 52.0 29 482 48.0 27 237 
Result in North Ward 52.4 5 315 47.6 4 821 
North Ward Survey 50.6 83 49.4 81 
sample size the accuracy of the survey is remarkable. Not only is 
it representative of the votes cast in the mayoral election in 
North, but it is representative of the votes cast in the city 
as a whole. There are other indications that the sample in North 
was a very good one. Only 5 per cent of those interviewed intended 
to vote for the Values Party mayoral candidate. He came at the 
bottom of the poll with 3.5 per cent of the mayoral vote. The 
city council candidate best-known to the sample polled the highest 
number of votes in North • The second best-known candidate was 
the only Labour candidate elected. The Values council candidates 
who were almost completely unknown came at the bottom of the poll. 
A comparison of respondents' recall of their voting behaviour in 
the 1971 mayoral election and the result of that election over the 
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city as a whole1 again shows the astonishing accuracy of the 
survey (Table 2.2). 
TABLE 2 .2 1971 MAYORAL ELECTION AND NORTH WARD SURVEY COMPARED 
LABOUR CITIZENS 
Pickering Guthrey 
% N % N 
Result in Christchurch 
City 52.0 25 121 48.0 23 212 
North ward survey 52.0 65 48.0 60 
It is acknowledged that there is a risk that respondents 
may be inaccurate or possibly biased in their recall of their past 
behaviour and that they may change their minds about their intended 
behaviour in the period between the interview and the election. 
However, the comparison between election results and survey results 
shows that these kinds of non-sampling error must have been at a 
minimum. Consequently it is felt that considerable confidence can 
be placed in the findings of the survey. 
MASTER ROLL SURVEY 
The second major source of individual level data was the 
master copy of the 1974 electoral roll which shows whether each 
elector voted in the election. As the North ward survey was not 
1. North ward did not exist as such in the 1971 election. 
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designed to investigate voter turnout and since the intention to 
vote can be overstated in survey interviews, it was thought that 
an additional source should be tapped to provide further data 
on turnout. The idea for this survey came from G.W.A. Bush who 
analysed the entire electoral roll for the 1971 Auckland City 
·1 1 . 1 . d " Counci e ection; and in another study I suggeste that: Computer 
analysis of the master roll would yield a rich return in terms of 
the social characteristics of voters and non-voters. 112 It is not 
widely known that political scientists (or any person) may carry 
out analyses of local authority electoral rolls pursuant to the 
Local Elections and Polls Act. Section 45 of the 1966 Act provided 
that: "Any elector of the district may inspect the master roll at 
the office of the local authority •••• " Computer analysis of the 
entire roll similar to Bush's method was impracticable because the 
computer cards used to compile the roll had been destroyed. It was 
thus decided to sample the roll and record the data by hand. The 
Returning Officer for the election agreed to provide facilities 
for the sampling process which took a number of days. 
The data retrieved for each elector sampled and the 
corresponding coding categories are listed in Table 2.3. 
1. G.W.A. Bush, "The Non-Vote in a Local Body Election", 
Political Science XXIV (September 1972), 45-56. 
2. Andrew MacKenzie, "The Christchurch City Council Election 
of 1974", M.A. (Hons.) essay, Department of Political 
Science, University of Canterbury, 1975, p. 48. 
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TABLE 2.3 DATA RETRIEVED FROM MASTER ROLL AND CODING CATEGORIES 
DATA CATEGORIES 
ward West 
Sex 
Marital Status 
(females only) 
Occupational Status* 
Age 
Electoral 
Qualification 
Voted? 
Place of voting 
Time of Voting 
Special Vote? 
Pegaus 
Male 
Female 
Married 
Single 
Widow 
Professional 
Business 
White Collar 
Farmer 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Student 
Retired 
Student (young) 
Retired (old) 
Resident 
Ratepayer 
Nominee 
Yes 
No 
By polling booth number 
Early (Wednesday to 
Friday) 
Polling day (Saturday) 
Yes 
No 
* Occupational status was coded according to the seven point 
Congalton-Havinghurst scale of occupational status adapted for 
New Zealand by Peter Davis, An Occupational Prestige Ranking Scale 
for New Zealand (Christchurch: Department of Psychology and 
Sociology, Research Project 24, University of Canterbury, 1974). 
See also A.A. Congalton, Status and Prestige in Australia (Melbourne: 
Cheshire, 1969); Cora Vellekoop, "Social Strata in New Zealand", in 
John Forster (ed.), Social Process in New Zealand (Auckland: Longman 
Paul, 1969), pp. 233-271. Students and retired people are not 
included on the scale and are therefore listed separately. 
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As can be seen from this list the master roll contains a great 
deal of infonnation that is useful for helping us understand more 
about participation in local elections. 
The main advantagesof using the master roll are that the 
data are easily available and relatively accurate. The researcher 
does not have to rely on survey respondents' honesty in stating 
their intention whether to vote, nor on their recall of turnout 
in past elections. In this respect the data are as 'hard' as one 
can possibly get and almost certainly more accurate than survey 
research. The master roll is not, of course, a totally accurate 
_list of all those eligible to vote in the city council elections. 
Although the roll was purged in the months prior to the election, 
it is very likely that it still contained the names of dead people 
and other persons who had moved out of the district. It is also 
likely that the roll did not contain the names of many eligible 
electors. The accuracy of the roll is an unknown factor over which 
the researcher has no control, but the advantages of the method 
far outweigh this particular disadvantage. 
The universe for the survey was the total number of 
registered electors appearing on the District Electors' Roll for the 
City of Christchurch (master copy) compiled for the election of the 
city council held from 9 October to 12 October 1974. 1 The roll 
contained the combined rolls for the five electoral wards ordered 
1. For full details of the sample design see Appendix B. 
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alphabetically. The populationschosen to be sampled were the 
electors' rolls for West and Pegasus wards containing 14 956 and 
20 273 names respectively. The entire roll was not sampled 
because - like the North ward survey - it was considered that 
more could be learnt by concentrating resources into smaller 
areas. The sampling of two wards was considered feasible because 
of the availability of the data and the relative ease with which 
it could be collected. North was not chosen because data had 
already been collected from that ward and it was considered wiser 
to use scarce resources to look at other wards. West and Pegasus 
were selected because they are contrasting areas of the city both 
politically and socially. West is the strongest Citizens' ward 
in the city; in 1974 the Citizens mayoral candidate won 68 per 
cent of the votes. Pegasus is the strongest Labour ward in the 
city; in 1974 the Labour mayoral candidate won 60 per cent of 
1 the votes. The two wards also provide a contrast in neighbourhood 
status. West is an area of high status, middle class suburbs and 
Pegasus is an area of lower status working class suburbs. As well 
as being representative of the two wards it was thought that the 
total sample might be representative of the city as a whole through 
being a mixture of both high and low status electors, and Citizens 
and Labour followers. The selection of West and Pegasus along with 
North gives us three different wards (out of five) from which data 
has been collected for this study: a strong Citizens ward, a strong 
Labour ward and a marginal ward. 
1. For more data describing the political nature of the 
wards see Appendix A, Tables 7, 8 and Figure 3. 
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The same principles behind the selection of the sample size 
for the North ward survey were applied to the master roll survey. 
Since the data .could be relatively easily collected,it was thought 
that a larger sample somewhere in the range 1 000 to 2 500 would 
be feasible bringing increased precision to the findings. Another 
important factor influencing the choice of a large sample size was 
the expectation that about 40 per cent of the sample would be women 
with no known occupation. (Instead of having their occupation 
listed in the appropriate column in the electoral roll women usually 
had their marital status in the form Mrs, Miss, or widow). There-
fore,the occupational categories in the analysis would have to be 
sufficiently large to give significant results without these 
'occupation-less' women. The sample size was thus larger than would 
otherwise be necessary. The turnout at the election was 60.5 per 
cent and the division between the voters and the non-voters in the 
sample was thus expected to be 60 : 40. Using Parten's sample size 
tables the appropriate sample size giving an acceptable level of 
error and confidence limits was 1 769. 1 This gives an error of+ 3 
per cent with confidence limits of 99 chances in 100 of accuracy. 
As the sample population consisted of two wards, it needed to be 
divided or stratified into two strata. From each stratum the same 
proportion was sampled so that the total sample would represent the 
1 . 2 proportions of the total popu ation. Given a total sample size of 
1. Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, pp. 314-315. 
2. On stratified and proportional sampling see Leslie Kish, 
Survey Sampling (New York: John Wiley, 1965), chap. 4; 
Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples, chap. 7. 
43. 
1 769 and given that the two subsamples were to be in the 
proportion 20 273 : 14 956 (or 203 : 150),the subsample size for 
Pegasus was calculated to be 1 018 which happens to be 1 in 20 
(i.e.5 per cent) of the ward population. Similarly the subsample 
size for West was calculated to be 751 which is also 5 per cent 
of the ward population. 
The cases comprising each subsample were selected separately; 
that is, the West subsample was drawn first followed by the Pegasus 
subsample. For each subsample the selection method was a three 
. 1 . 1 stage systematic se ect1on. The first stage was the systematic 
selection of pages of the roll. Starting at either page 1 or 2 
(chosen by random selection) every second page was selected. Then 
for the West subsample starting again at page 1 or 2 every fourteenth 
page was selected. Since the West subsample required 751 cases and 
the roll had 1 308 pages this procedure left 3 pages to be selected 
at random. A similar procedure was used to select the pages for 
the larger Pegasus subsample. The second stage was the selection 
of the electors in West or Pegasus wards on each of the pages drawn 
in the first stage. This was easy because - although the entire 
roll was ordered alphabetically - each elector's ward appeared next 
to his/her name. The third stage was the selection of each case 
from the electors in West or Pegasus wards on the page selected. 
Problems arose here because each page of the roll contained 
different numbers of electors from the two wards. During the 
1. The selection method was planned using: Hubert M. Blalock, 
Social Statistics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960); Kish, 
Survey Sampling, chap. 4; Lazerwitz, "Sampling Theory"; 
and Parten, Surveys, Polls and Samples. 
44. 
preliminaries to the actual sampling 50 pages of the roll were 
randomly selected and the number of West electors, for example, 
on each page ranged from 5 to 24 with a mean of 13 and a standard 
deviation of 4.63. It would have been possible to count the 
number of electors from West (or Pegasus) on each page selected 
and then randomly select a case from within this range. However this 
procedure would take too long and a shortcut was necessary. The 
average number of electors on each page Ci) from West and Pegasus 
wards was calculated over 50 pages. A random number (k) was chosen 
so that it fell in the range 1 ~ k ~ x. This number k was to be 
the selection interval for each page; that is, on every page 
selected the kth elector from the appropriate ward would be 
systematically selected as the subsample case. On pages where 
there were less than k electors from the particular ward, the page 
following the selected page was regarded as part of that page and 
counting of electors continued until the kth one was found. 
One of the problems arising from this use of systematic 
selection is that departures from randomness in the sampling method 
can occur through'periodic fluctuations' in the ~rdering of the 
population on the electoral roll. There may be significantly 
more electors from either of the wards on a particular page. 
However, since a large number of pages were sampled it is thought 
1 that any random errors would cancel each other out. In theory 
there are solutions to this problem - such as shuffling the cases, 
1. Kish, Survey Sampling, pp. 120-121. 
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or making a random selection within each page, or drawing every 
kth elector regardless of where pages begin and end - but these 
solutions are not practical and are outweighed by the advantages 
of the method used. The chief advantage of using a systematic 
selection method (that is, choosing every kth sampling unit after 
a random start) is that its application is "easy, 'foolproof' and 
flexible. 111 The selection of 1 769 cases from a list containing 
98 039 units requires a systematic plan that - because of the 
repetitive nature of the sampling task - must be simple to 
operate. Another advantage of systematic selection is that it can 
easily yield a proportionate sample. "A systematic sample over 
an alphabetical list of names will yield about the same proportion 
2 
of names from each letter." 
The aim of this whole process was to obtain a random 
probability sample that is representative of the population. The 
best test of the accu~acy, reliability and validity of the sample 
and sampling method is how well the sample findings compare with 
the population. A comparison of some of the findings from the 
master roll survey with the known statistics for the city as a 
whole and the sample populations show the survey was an extremely 
accurate one (Tables 2.4 and 2.5). Not only is it representative 
of West and Pegasus wards,but the total sample is representative of 
the city as a whole. (Further meaningful comparisons between the 
1. Ibid., p. 114. 
2. Ibid., p. 114. 
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TABLE 2.4 ACCURACY OF THE MASTER ROLL TOTAL SAMPLE 
Voter Turnout 
-
Resident 
- Ratepayer & Nominee 
- All electors 
Electoral Qualification 
- Resident 
- Ratepayer 
- Nominee 
Sex 
- Male 
- Female 
Master Roll 
Total 
Sample 
55.7% 
58.7 
57.0 
56.1% 
43.6 
0.3 
100.0 
50.0% 
50.0 
100.0 
TABLE 2.5 ACCURACY OF THE MASTER ROLL SUBSAMPLES 
West: Electoral Qualification 
- Resident 
- Ratepayer 
- Nominee 
Pegasus: Electoral 
Qualification 
- Resident 
- Ratepayer 
- Nominee 
Master Roll 
subsample 
61.6% 
37.9 
0.5 
100.0 
52.1% 
47.8 
0.1 
100.0 
City 
Total 
54.4% 
61.4 
60.5 
55.9% 
43.4 
0.7 
100.0 
48.2%(1971 
51.8 census) 
100.0 
ward Total 
_ {Sample Population) 
60.3% 
39.2 
0.5 
100.0 
52.5% 
47.4 
0.1 
100.0 
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survey findings and the sample population or the city totals are 
not possible because of the lack of corresponding data) • 
Consequently it is felt that considerable confidence can be placed 
in the findings of this survey. 
AGGREGATE STATISTICS AND OTHER SOURCES OF DATA 
The aggregate statistics used have been the official 
published results of the election, polling booth returns,and 
statistics published by the New Zealand Department of Internal 
Affairs relating to local elections throughout the whole of New 
Zealand. Unfortunately local election statistics are not collected 
and published in New Zealand in the way that general election 
statistics are. To find the results of a particular local authority 
election the researcher must either search newspapers or ask the 
local authority concerned. The Department of Internal Affairs has 
published statistics but only since 1959. 1 These reports first 
dealt mainly with voter turnout in territorial authorities, but the 
1974 report includes statistics from a wide range of local 
authorities and the results of council elections in major cities by 
party affiliation. Appendix A contains a full summary of aggregate 
statistics from the 1974 and other recent Christchurch City Council 
elections. 
Other sources of data for this study included: correspondence 
with C.L. Sugden and M.O. Holdsworth (present and former Chairmen, 
1. N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority 
Elections 1959, 1962 and 1965/1968/1971/1974", 
Wellington, 1967/[no date)/[no date)/1976 (mimeo). 
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Christchurch Citizens Association); interviews with M.W. Atkinson 
(Associate Town Clerk and Returning Officer, Christchurch City 
Council), Vicki Buck (Candidate 1974, Councillor 1975-), N.G. 
Pickering (Mayor 1971-74); newspaper reports; party manifestoes; 
party political advertisements; personal observations of the 1974 
election; the report of the special committee appointed to review 
the ward system in 1976; and the Returning Officer's report on the 
1974 election. 
METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS 
The North ward survey questionnaires and the master roll data 
. were all coded by the writer,and computer analysis was carried out 
also by the writer using the library of computer programmes 
called the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) •1 
In this study the main method of analysis used to find 
meaningful relationships between two or more variables is cross-
tabulation. This is "the most commonly used analysis method in 
the social sciences. 112 The distributions obtained are analysed by 
the chi-square (X 2 ) test of significance which shows whether a 
distribution is due solely to sampling error or whether there is a 
statistically significant relationship. It does not measure the 
1. See Norman H. Nie, Dale H. Bent and C. Hadlai Hull, 
Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1970); Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences User's Manual (Davis, Calif.: Social Sciences 
Data Service, Institute of Governmental Affairs, 
University of California [no date]). 
2. Nie et al., SPSS, p. 116. 
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~ \:rength of association nor can it show causation. 1 It only 
\11dicates that there could be a relationship between two variables 
~\\bject to the confidence levels in the chi-square tables. Chi-
!'ii\.l\\are is appropriate for this study because many of the variables 
\\~ed have only nominal values (that is, the values are merely 
\~bels (eg. Citizens/Labour) without any assumption of ranking or 
~f equal intervals between values) • 2 The second method of analysis 
u~ed is correlation which refers to the strength or degree of 
1~lationship between two variables. A correlation coefficient is 
a single statistic summarising the degree of association or 
covariation between two variables. The correlation coefficients 
used in this study are Spearman rank order correlations (r5) which 
assume that the variables are at least ordinal in scale. As long 
as the variables can be ranked then the Spearman coefficient 
. 1 . 3 closely approximates the Pearson product-moment corre ation. 
Some of the problems that are often encountered in data 
analysis are operationalising the appropriate variables, isolating 
the desired information from the mass of data, and avoiding spurious 
correlations by controlling for third variables. These problems 
are discussed as they .arise. 
1. On causal inferences see Arthur H. Goldberg, "Discerning 
a Causal Pattern Among Data on Voting Behaviour", 
American Political Science Review LX (1966), 913-922. 
2. Blalock, Social Statistics, chap. 15. 
1. Blalock, Social Statistics, chap. 18; Nie et al., SPSS, 
chap. 13; SPSS User's Manual, pp. 89-91. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Survey research complemented by aggregate statistics are 
the main sources of data for this study. Survey research enables 
a close look at individual behaviour, but it is disadvantaged by 
the possible distortion of reality in the processing and 
analysing of data. The North ward survey was a research project 
carried out just prior to the 1974 Christchurch City Council 
election and consisted of 231 interviews using a prepared 
questionnaire. The master roll survey was an analysis of the 
electoral roll to find out more about voter turnout. Other sources 
of data are used as well to provide further information on the 1974 
election. It is considered that these methods provide an out-
standing opportunity for a detailed examination of a New Zealand 
local election. Various sources of data are used but it is the 
North ward survey upon which this thesis relies most for data, and 
the accuracy of the survey has been demonstrated. The research 
design is an important part of scientific method but so too is 
theory which provides a means for organising and explaining the 
data collected in research. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORETICAL APPROACH 
This chapter aims to explain the theoretical framework of the 
thesis. After describing developments in the social-psychological 
approach to the study of electoral behaviour the economic approach 
~to political science is examined. Then a model drawing on public 
choice theory is presented. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 
Early Studies 
Early studies of electoral behaviour were mainly concerned 
with the effects of social group characteristics on the vote. This 
was largely a result of the availability of aggregate data concerning 
a population's social characteristics. Since aggregate analysis 
was limited either to variables that could be associated with 
political subdivisions or to data about the voter that were part 
of the voting record, the demographic and social characteristics of 
the voters naturally became the focus of aggregate analysis. 1 
1. For a summary of early developments in the study of electoral 
behaviour see Angus Campbell, "Recent Developments in Survey 
Studies of Political Behaviour", in Austin Ranney (ed.}, 
Essays on the Behavioural Study of Politics (Urbana, Ill.: 
University of Illinois Press, 1962), pp. 31-46; Peter Rossi, 
"Four Landmarks in Voting Research", in Eugene Burdick and 
Arthur Brodbeck (eds.), American Voting Behaviour (Glencoe, 
Ill.: Free Press, 1959), pp. 5-54. 
52. 
Thus the first studies of political behaviour were principally 
concerned with the voting of men and women, people of different 
age, occupation, class, residence and so on. 1 When survey 
techniques reached the point of development where they could be 
applied to the study of the vote, the studies which were 
conducted tended to emphasise these same variables. Thus the 
pioneering Erie County study of the 1940 United States presidential 
election went so far as to conclude that: "A person thinks 
politically what he is socially; social characteristics determine 
2 political preference." Lazarsfeld et al. investigated the 
sociological antecedents of voting behaviour and found that the 
three most important social indicators of the vote were socio-
economic status, religion and residence which combined to give the 
'Index of Political Predisposition'. A similar conclusion was 
arrived at by Berelson et al. in their 1948 study of Elmira, New 
3 York. However, this heavy emphasis on social structural variables 
by the 'Columbia (or Sociological) School' led to criticism that such 
surveys threatened to take the politics out of the study of 
electoral behaviour. 4 
1. H. Tingsten, Political Behaviour : Studies in Election 
Statistics (London: King, Stockholm Economic Series No.7, 
1937) • 
2. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, 
The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1948)' p. 27. 
3. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, William N. McPhee, 
Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential 
Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). 
4. V.O. Key, Jr., and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and 
Electoral Decision : The Case of Indiana", in Burdick and 
Brodbeck, American Voting Behaviour, pp. 281-299. 
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The first nationwide survey was carried out by the Survey 
Research Centre of the University of Michigan in 1952. 1 In what 
became known as the 'Michigan (or Psychological) School', Campbell 
et al. investigated the psychological influences on the vote. 
They found that of all the variables in the voters' minds, three 
stood out as being of overriding importance in influencing the 
vote. These were party identification, candidate orientation, 
and issue orientation. Campbell et al. concluded that psychological 
variables determine political preference. However the psychological 
approach was criticised by Peter Rossi who justifiably argued: 
"It helps us little to know that voters tend to select 
candidates of whom they have high opinions. Voting 
for a candidate and holding a favourable opinion of 
him may be regarded as alternative definitions of the 
same variable. The more interesting problems start 
where the author's analysis ends. Why does a voter 
develop a favourable opinion of a candidate?" 2 
The Survey Research Centre and "The American Voter". 
The contrasting approaches to the study of electoral 
behaviour by the Columbia and Michigan Schools were later reconciled 
and balanced together by the Survey Research Centre in what is often 
called the 'classic' portrait of the American electorate - The 
Am . 3 erican Voter. Here the authors establish a model of voting 
behaviour in the form of the 'Funnel of Causality' which focuses a 
range of political, psychological and sociological variables 
1. Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The 
Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954)-.~ 
2. Rossi, "Four Landmarks", p. 41 • 
3. Angus Campbell, et al., The American Voter (New York: 
John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964) [1st ed. 1960). 
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leading to the voting decision including social group influences, 
political socialisation, party identification, candidate 
orientation, issue predisposition and personal attitudes. 
Taking the individual's voting act as a starting point, 
the model moves back over time tracing the sociological ante-
cedents of the political variables which affect the vote. They 
assume that the direction of a person's vote is dependent on his 
immediate sense of his perceptions and evaluations of the things 
he sees in national politics: parties, candidate~, issues, and 
contending group forces. From measurements of political attitudes 
~nd their relation to voting behaviour Campbell et al. define six 
dimensions of 'partisan attitude' that can, to a large degree, 
successfully explain individual voting choice. 1 The decision of 
the individual voter to actually turnout on election day is 
explained by reference to the same attitude forces which influence 
partisan choice and a number of psychological variables including 
interest in the campaign, concern over its outcome, sense of 
political efficacy, and sense of citizen duty. These psychological 
factors combine to give the 'Intensity of Political Involvement'. 
Party identification and social characteristics are viewed as long-
term influences on the vote, while attitudes towards candidates 
and issues are short-term factors which can account for shifts in 
voting preference between elections. The authors ask what conditions 
1. See also Donald E. Stokes, Angus Campbell and Warren E. 
Miller, "Components of Electoral Decision", American 
Political Science Review LII (1958), 367-387. 
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lead to the formation of partisan allegiances initially, and to 
answer this they trace over time the influence of social groups 
and categories on electoral behaviour. Finally The American 
Voter attempts to account for the decision of the electorate as a 
whole by shifting attention "from the voter to the full electorate 
and from individual choice to the collective decision. 111 Voting 
is an individual act, yet it is the collectivity of voters that 
makes the electoral decision, and the Survey Research Centre team 
use their knowledge of individual motivation to describe the forces 
on the decision of the total electorate. 
Elections and the Political Order followed The American Voter 
and contains a collection of articles focusing on the aggregate 
properties of the electorate, the party system, the division of 
the vote, and problems of a wider political order. 2 A key question 
which permeates much of the analysis is: How much shift of which 
types of voters relates to which electoral outcome? Later studies 
utilising the theoretical framework established in The American Voter 
have covered the 1960, 1964, 1968 and .1972 presidential elections. 3 
1. Campbell et a_l., American Voter, p. 267. 
2. Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order 
(New York: John Wiley, 1966). 
3. Philip E. Converse et al., "Stability and Change in 1960: A 
Reinstating election", American Political Science Review LV 
(1961), 269-280; Philip E. Converse, Aage Clausen and Warren 
E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality : The 1964 Election", 
American Political Science Review LIX (1965), 321-336; Philip 
E. Converse et al., "Continuity and Change in American Politics: 
Parties and Issues at the 1968 Election", American Political 
Science Review LXIII (1969), 1083-1105; Arthur H. Miller et al., 
"A Majority Party in Disarray : Policy Polarization in the 1972 
Election", American Political Science Review LXX (1976), 753-778. 
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The contribution of the Survey Research Centre to the study of 
electoral behaviour is inunense. Kenneth Prewitt and Norman Nie 
have observed that the Survey Research Centre scholars 
"have made substantial contributions, theoretically 
as well as empirically, to our understanding of 
American political processes •.•• Most of our 
systematic, empirical understanding of voting and 
elections in the U.S. can be directly traced to 
studies by this group. Indeed so many of their 
insights and findings have been absorbed into 
conventional wisdom that it is difficult to 
imagine the condition of our theories about 
American politics if we were to factor out their 
contribution." 1 
Recent Studies 
The Changing American Voter by Norman H. Nie et al. 2 
contrasts sharply with the findings of The American Voter. The 
American Voter along with other studies of the 1950s3 described 
the American electorate as only mildly involved in politics. They 
thought about politics in relatively simple and narrow terms; they 
were allied with one or another of the major parties by ties that 
were more a matter of habit than rational selection; and they were 
1. Kenneth Prewitt and Norman H. Nie, "Review Article : Election 
Studies of the Survey Research Centre", British Journal of 
Political Science I (1971), p. 479. 
2. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, The Changing 
American Voter (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1976) • 
3. For example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic 
Culture : Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Berelson et al, 
Voting; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in 
an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); V. 
o. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1961); Samuel A. Stouffer, Communism, 
Conformity and Civil Liberties : A Cross-section of the Nation 
Speaks Its Mind (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1963). · 
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basically satisfied with the workings of the system. With the aid 
of a series of survey findings from 1952 to 1972 - which enable Nie 
et al. to trace patterns of attitudes and behaviour over time -
the authors depict a changing and increasingly dissatisfied and 
disillusioned citizenry. Voters feel more alienated not only 
from political parties but from politics as a whole. As the nature 
of politics has changed from the 1950s to the 1970s so has the 
public's response changed. The public of the 1970s is much more 
involved, politically aroused, more detached from parties, and 
deeply dissatisfied with the political process. The 'classic' 
portrait of the American electorate as presented in The American 
Voter is drawn largely from a study of the 1956 presidential 
election supplemented by data from the 1952 and 1958 elections. 
Nie et al. suggest that 1956 might have been an unfortunate base-
line - an atypical year with few crucial and divisive issues. The 
studies of the 1950s did not predict the divisive issues of the 
1960s and 1970s: Vietnam, civil rights and Watergate. However Nie 
et al. also point out that: 
"The notion that The American Voter established a fixed 
model of electoral behaviour that could then be applied 
across subsequent elections without consideration of 
the changing content is a nation more to be found among 
the readers of the writers of the 1950s than among the 
writers themselves." 1 
In their reinterpretation of the American Voter's 'classic' 
portrait Nie et al. argue that the dynamics of the electoral system 
depend on the interplay of long-term partisan commitments and 
political issues facing the nation. More weight is assigned to 
1. Nie et al. Changing American Voter, p. 8. 
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political issues in structuring behaviour than in the 'normal 
vote' model of the Survey Research Centre. 
Nie et al. have been joined by other revisionists who 
1 have questioned the adequacy of the social-psychological model. 
They argue that certain components such as issues always were or 
have become more important than generally believed, while other 
components such as candidate personalities, or long-term forces 
such as party identification always were or have become less 
important than generally believed. With v.o. Key, Jr. the 
revisionists maintain that the voter is a reasonably rational 
2 fellow. 
Political Change in Britain can be considered as an 
extension of the Survey Research Centr~ studies. 3 Three fundamental 
kinds of change are considered: changes resulting from the physical 
replacement of the electorate through natural causes, changes 
resulting from the rise and decline of class influence, and 
transient movements in response to events, issues and leaders. 
Butler and Stokes focus on both individual electors and the full 
1. See, for example, Philip E. Converse, "Change in the American 
Electorate", in Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (eds.), 
The Human Meaning of Social Change (New York: Russell Sage, 
1972); Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice : Varieties of American 
Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975); Michael J. 
Shapiro, "Rational Political Man : A Synthesis of Economic 
and Socio-Psychological Perspectives", American Political 
Science Review LXIII (1969), 1106-1119. 
2. V.O. Key, Jr., The Repsonsible Electorate : Rationality in 
Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966). 
3. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: 
Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 
1974) [1st ed. 19691 . 
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electorate. Attention is directed to individual citizens, to the 
place of politics in their world, to their changing political 
responses as they age, to the imagery by which they link 
politics and class, and to their views of the parties and their 
place in the party system. Yet the reasons for behaviour often 
lie in a wider political or social milieu. The consequences of 
individual change can be known only by aggregating the behaviour 
of individual electors to see what is true of the electorate as 
a whole. 
One of the underlying themes running through Political 
Change in Britain is the role played by party identification in 
voter choice and electoral outcomes. Findings about party 
identification in Britain are similar to those reported in the 
United States. In large proportions British voters report always 
having supported the same party, and their voting choices reflect 
long-standing party loyalties. Partisan self-images are acquired 
in Britain similarly to the way they are acquired in the United 
States - through parental socialisation - and their persistence 
and stability result not so much from the age of the voter as from 
the duration of the party tie. Party identity functions for the 
British voter much as it does for voters elsewhere. It is a means 
of "sorting political leaders into the worthy and less worthy, 
and of making judgements on the merits of conflicting party claims 
whose full evaluation could require a lifetime of study. 111 However, 
1. Ibid. I p. 81. 
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it is from the perspective of partisanship that Butler and Stokes 
contribute the most to our empirical and theoretical knowledge of 
elections. They manage to blend into the analysis of partisanship 
two additional factors - the class support for the two major 
parties and the procession of age-cohorts through the electorate. 
The social basis of party support is thus connected with the 
pattern of partisan loyalties in the society. Over time parties 
vary in their mass support because party identifications are 
distributed differently within age-cohort groups, a distribution 
influenced by the political values and arrangements prevailing 
when the age-cohort was socialised and when it came of political 
age. Thus the waxing and waning of party strength is related to 
the movement of age-cohorts into and out of the electorate. 
The Social-Psychological Approach and the Problems to be 
Investigated 
Several important studies which grew out of the social-
psychological approach are used in this thesis to provide the 
theoretical approach to the problems raised in Chapter I. These 
studies are reviewed here in order to provide links between the 
problems to be investigated and the social-psychological 
literature. 
According to the social-psychologists voter turnout in an 
election is the result of the intersection of social and group 
forces and/or psychological factors. The social factors include 
socio-economic status, education and social involvement while 
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th~ psychological factors include political interest, political 
efficacy, sense of citizen duty and psychological cross-pressures. 
Persons are more likely to vote if they have high socio-economic 
status, higher education, a high social involvement and if they 
have a high interest in politics, political efficacy, citizen 
1 duty and are not cross-pressured. Whether these sorts of 
variables were related to voter turnout in the Christchurch election 
will be investigated. The conditions leading to the surge and 
decline of voter turnout were identified by Campbell of the 
2 Michigan Survey Research Centre. The variables used in Campbell's 
model are mainly psychological (for example, political stimulation, 
political interest and party identification) • The model proposes 
that changes in turnout are mainly due to short-term political 
stimulation which - when added to the underlying level of 
political interest - moves the partisanship of the vote to either 
of the parties. That the decision to turnout to vote can have 
great influence on the party fortunes can be seen in Christchurch 
where changes in turnout have been accompanied by equally large 
changes in party strength (in percentage terms) • 
1. See Campbell et al. American Voter, chap. 4; Lester w. 
Milbrath, Political Participation : How and Why Do 
People Get Involved in Politics? (Chicago: Rand 
McNally, 1965). 
2. Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline: A Study of Electoral 
Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the 
Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 
3. 
The concept of party identification and the linkages 
between that identification and electoral behaviour were 
first systematically elaborated by Belknap and Campbell in 
1952.1 The utility and power of the concept of psychological 
attachment to political parties as a property separate from 
voting was developed in The Voter Decides and The American 
Voter. In Elections and the Political Order Campbell et al. 
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demonstrate how party identification, along with actual voting 
patterns, can be used to understand the nature of elections and 
the flow of voting. The concept of party identification will 
be explored in the Christchurch election; its influence on the 
voters will be measured and the relationship between party 
identification in a local election and in a national election 
will be examined. 
Candidate orientation - one of the key variables in the 
Michigan studies - is the principal factor leading to personal 
voting. 2 However, candidate orientation tends to be closely 
involved in the voter's mind with party and with issue factors. 
The problem then becomes one of identifying and isolating 
candidate orientation as a factor from the whole range of 
political, psychological and sociological variables acting on the 
voting choice. One of the first studies of ticket-splitting grew 
1. George Belknap and Angus Campbell, "Political Party 
Identification and Att:i.tudes toward Foreign Policy", 
Public Opinion Quarterly XV (1952), 601-623. 
2. Campbell et al., American Voter, chap. 2. 
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out of the Survey Research Centre studies. 1 Split-ticket 
voting is hypothesised to be the result of the intersection of 
three political motivations: party identification, candidate 
partisanship and issue partisanship. When these motivations 
are at their lowest or when they conflict, split ticket voting 
is the result. Coattail voting is an expression of candidate 
partisanship; it occurs when the personality of the party 
leader produces votes for the other members of the party ticket. 2 
The problem for this thesis is to isolate coattail influenced, 
straight ticket voting in the Christchurch election from 
straight ticket voting influenced by factors such as party 
identification and issue orientation. 
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICAL SCIENCE 
The revisionists who have questioned the mainstream social-
psychological model of voting behaviour have found allies in 
scholars who advocate 'economic' explanations. Recent theoretical 
developments by several economists have suggested that the 
'economic approach' to political science is capable of casting 
1. Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational 
Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American 
Political Science Review LI (1957), 293-312. 
2. See Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails : A Study 
in Political Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion 
Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368. 
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considerable light on a wide range of political activities. 1 
Rigorous logical and mathematical models drawn basically from 
economics have been developed and applied to various aspects 
of the political process. The approach has encouraged the 
building of simple formal models with explicit predictions 
which can be tested empirically. Operating with simple premises 
regarding rational behaviour, the economic approach enables 
interesting conclusions regarding political behaviour to be 
deduced by logic. The results are not only clearer and more 
logical than traditional approaches to political problems, they 
are more realistic. Pioneers in the field of economic analysis 
were Downs, Buchanan and Tullock were were joined by Olsen and 
Hirschman. The works of these authors are distinctive landmarks 
in the development of the economic approach. They showed that 
testable hypotheses regarding political behaviour could be 
formulated from the assumption of rational, wealth-maximising 
behaviour on the part of individual voters. Political participation 
is interpreted as a problem-solving device induced by costs and 
1. See especially Duncan Black, The Theory of Committees and 
Elections (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); 
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962}; Anthony 
Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1957}; Alberto. Hirschman, Exit Voice and Loyalty: 
Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970}; Mancur 
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the 
Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1965); Gordon Tullock, Toward a Mathematics of Politics 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1967} . For a 
commentary on the economic approach see: Brian Barry, 
Sociologists, Economists and Democracy (London: Collier-
Macmillan, 1970} . 
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benefits of political activity. Using theoretical notions of 
choice and rationality, the economic approach attempts to 
provide an 'economic' answer to the fundamental question: 'Why 
do people participate in politics?' 
Every individual is constantly faced with the problem of 
choice - a choice out of several alternative actions. Public 
choice theory and the economic approach attempt to derive 
conceptually refutable predictions regarding political outcomes 
from the rational behavioural calculus of individuals. The 
notion of choice recognises that people who desire scarce 
resources make choices between the available options. Political 
participation in the. form of voting involves the making of 
choices by each individual voter. At a minimum these choices 
involve decisions whether to register and vote and for whom to 
vote. For the voter who wishes to make the most of his vote 
these choices present dilemmas: How should political choices be 
made? The principles a voter should use in making his choices are 
elaborated in detail by the economic theorists. Such a framework 
for making voting choices includes estimates of costs and benefits 
stemming from the choices, the estimated probability of success, 
and the likely impact the individual's vote will have on the 
1 
electoral outcome. 
1. William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the 
Calculus of Voting", American Political Science Review 
LXII (1968), p. 28; Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, p. 109. 
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In making a choice, the notion of rational maximising 
behaviour assumes that, given full information, people will 
chose more of what they want instead of less. Electoral 
behaviour is conceived of as a rational decision-making process, 
and voters as rational decision-makers cast their votes, as a 
function of their self-interest, for the party or candidate from 
whom they expect the greatest amount of satisfaction. In this 
way rational choice models can be used to explain why an 
individual votes for one candidate or another, or why one 
candidate wins and another loses. 
A PUBLIC CHOICE MODEL OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
An Economic Theory of Democracy 
Anthony Downs offers a simple economic model to explain why 
people vote. He develops a model of party government and a 
calculus of rational choice based on three fundamental 
assumptions: that both voters and parties behave rationally 
at all times, that parties are guided only be the desire to win 
and hold office, and that every voter tries to promote his own 
self-interest with the ballot. 1 Each party's inunediate goal is 
to maximise its voting support by selling policies; the parties 
sell policies for votes in order to win elections. Under the 
realistic condition of imperfect information, party policies are 
conveyed more in the fashion of an ideology, that is, in "verbal 
images 11 , 2 of how to create the good society. Because parties must 
1. Downs, An Economic Theory, chaps. 2 and 3. 
2 • Ibid o I p • 96 • 
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maintain ideological continuity, they become 'locked in' along 
a left-right dimension. The parties move along this dimension 
seeking to maximise their voting support by adopting policies 
that are favoured by a majority of voters. The result is that 
the parties in a two-party system tend to converge ideologically 
upon the centre overlapping each other in terms of policies so 
that the parties closely resemble each other. This results in 
a certain amount of tension in the model for "party policies may 
become so vague, and parties so alike, that voters find it 
difficult to make rational decisions. Nevertheless, fostering 
ambiguity is the rational course for each party in a two-party 
system. 111 
According to Downs the voting act is a process by which the 
individual differentiates among alternatives on the basis of 
expected utility benefits. Rational behaviour is implied by the 
voter's ability to calculate logically the benefits that the 
various alternatives might be expected to yield, and rational 
choice is effected when ~he voter opts for the alternative he 
thinks will provide the greatest benefits. Down's definition of 
rationality assumes that voters as decision-makers have the 
ability to identify and order goals and preferences, that voters 
use the most efficient means available to them, and that their 
behaviour is oriented purposefully to maximise their self-
interest - whether economic or political. That is, rationality 
as an economic concept refers to the selection of means rather 
1. Ibid., p. 141. 
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than ends. Conversely, any behaviour which employs a non-
political means to achieve a political end is irrationa.l. 
The Role of Political Information 
To make a rational voting decision a person must know 
(1) what his goals are, (2) what alternative ways of reaching 
these goals are available, and (3) the probable consequences of 
choosing each alternative, that is, how different parties and 
candidates will affect his flow of benefits. To solve these 
dilemmas infonnation is required but such information is costly 
to the voter. The main steps of rationally deciding how to vote 
are as follows: 1 
1. Gathering relevant infonnation. 
2. Selecting from all this information that which 
will be used in the voting decision. 
3. Analysing the facts selected to arrive at 
conclusions about possible alternative 
policies and their consequences. 
4. Appraising the consequences in light of 
relevant goals. 
5. Co-ordinating the appraisals into a net 
evaluation of each party. 
6. Making the voting decision by comparing the 
net evaluations of each party. 
7. Actually votinq or abstaining. 
The main scarce resource consumed in the steps above is the time 
used for processing the information and weighing alternatives, but 
many other resources may be involved especially in the gathering 
of information. The resources any citizen can devot~ to paying 
for and assimilating data are limited and he must select only a 
few sources from which to tap. Thus only part of the total 
1. Ibid. , p. 209. 
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information available is used in making choices. Three factors 
determine how much information the rational decision-maker will 
invest in: the value to him of making a correct decision, the 
relevance of the information, and the cost of the data. If the 
costs of becoming informed are greater than the estimated value 
of the effect of the issue on the voter, then the rational 
decision-maker will not bother to invest in the information. 1 
Downs includes in his model an assumption that there is a 
basic amount of free political information available to all 
citizens. 2 This information can come from any of the following 
sources: political parties, mass media, pressure groups, friends 
and acquaintances. Free political information is of two types: 
"accidental" and "sought-for". Accidental data are the by-
products of the non-political activi~es of citizens, and may be 
acquired at home, work or while engaged in leisure pursuits. 
Sought for data are generally more costly in terms of time and 
effort than accidental data. Not all citizens receive the same 
amount of free data due to their different abilities to bear the 
non-transferable costs inherent in all information, the different 
nature of their informal social contacts and their social positions, 
and the extent to which government action directly affects them. 
Thus society's free information stream systematically provides 
some citizens with more politically useful information than it 
provides others; and in any society which contains uncertainty 
1. Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, pp. 102-103. 
2. Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 12. 
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and a division of labour, the cost of information is bound to 
be different for different people. Hence the amount of data it 
is rational for one person to acquire may be greater or smaller 
than the amount it is rational for another person to acquire. 
All information is costly: therefore those with high incomes 
can better afford it than those with low incomes. Hence people 
will not be equally well-informed politically, no matter how 
1 
equal they are in all other respects. 
The value of information in enabling the voter to cast an 
informed vote must be discounted by the value of the vote itself, 
which is the probability that his vote will be decisive. Since 
each person's vote is only one drop in a vast sea this means that 
the value of political information and the vote value become very, 
very small and that: 
"[There is] an enormously diminished incentive for voters 
to acquire political information before voting •••• It 
seems probable that for a great many citizens in a 
democracy, rational behaviour excludes any investment 
whatever in political information per se. No matter how 
significant a difference between parties is revealed to 
the rational citizen by his free information, or how 
uncertain he is about which party to support, he realises 
that his vote has almost no chance of influencing the 
outcome. Therefore, why should he buy political 
information?" 2 
Thus, it is rational for voters to be politically ignorant. It is 
not, however, rational to be ignorant about all aspects of 
government policy. In some instances it is quite rational to be 
well-informed. 
1. Ibid., pp. 221, 236. 
2. Ibid., p. 245. 
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Downs uses the variable of party differential which is 
the strength of the voter's desire to see one party win instead 
of the others. The rational voter estimates his party 
differential after which he is interested only in information 
which might change this decision. Downs further argues that the 
larger a voter's party differential, the less likely he is to 
invest in information. "In other words, the more a voter 
originally favours one party over another, the less likely he 
is to buy political information. 111 Thus the greater a voter's 
partisan attachment, the less informed he is likely to be. 
For the non-partisan voter whose party differential is zero, the 
incentive to acquire information is larger than that of a highly 
partisan voter, since any new information may cause him to switch 
his vote from one party to another. But since it does not make 
much difference to him who wins, it is irrational for him to 
acquire costly information. Therefore, Downs concludes that: 
"(l) Information is relatively useless to 
those citizens who care which party wins and 
(2) those citizens for whom information is most 
useful do not care who wins. In short, nobody 
has a very high incentive to acquire political 
information . " 2 
Instead people rely on the stream of free information they acquire 
accidentally in the course of their non-political pursuits. 
The Voting Decision 
Downs argues that in deciding who to vote for the voter 
supports his more preferred party-candidate alternative, where 
1. Ibid. I p. 243. 
2. Ibid., p. 244. 
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preference results from a comparison of the alternative social 
states (ie. platforms) . the two candidates promise to implement. 1 
And the rational citizen votes if 
pB - C >O 
where 
p.= the probability of affecting the outcome, 
B = the difference between the citizen's utility for the 
platform of his more preferred candidate and his 
utility for the platform of his less preferred 
candidate, 
C = the cost of voting. 
In mass elections one would expect p to be so small that the 
slight costs of voting (time, effort, travel costs, etc.) normally 
will outweigh the expected benefits of doing so. Thus as Tullock 
has shown, it is rational for citizens to abstain from voting 
2 
even if they have party preferences. If voting is typically 
irrational what, then, prevents democracy from collapsing through 
nassive abstention at elections? Downs answer to this is that 
rational citizens will be motivated by their "sense of social 
responsibility 113 into voting in order to ensure the larger goal 
of preserving the system. 
The conclusion that voting is an irrational act disturbed 
a nwnber of theorists so much that a reformulation was attempted 
4 by Riker and Ordeshook. These two attempt to improve the Downsian 
1. Ibid., chaps. 3,13,14. 
2. Tullock, Toward a Mathematics, chap. 7. 
3. Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 267. 
4. Riker and Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting". 
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model by blending some social-psychological ingredients into it. 
They propose that a citizen votes if 
pB - C + D > 0 
where D = the fixed benefits of voting. 
Riker and Ordeshook contend that fixed benefits as well as fixed 
costs· accompany the act of voting. D summarises these benefits. 
Among other things D incorporates a sense of citizen duty. By 
voting, the citizen fulfills the duty to which he has been 
socialised and thereby experiences a psychological satisfaction 
which may outweigh the costs of voting. These psychic benefits 
are independent of any benefits derived from helping to elect the 
voter's most preferred candidate. Thus the benefits of voting 
outweigh the costs and the act of voting is rendered rational. 
The Riker-Ordeshook reformulation is valuable in that it reminds 
us that the voting decision has both instrumental and expressive 
components. The Downsian formulation is purely instrumental: 
the citizen's vote has value only insofar as it helps his 
preferred candidate to win. More traditional political science 
has made us aware of the expressive component of the voting 
decision. One may vote to express solidarity with one's class or 
peer group, to affirm a psychic allegiance to a party, or simply 
to enjoy the satisfaction of having performed one's civic duty. 
The view of rationality put forward by Downs conflicts 
sharply with the traditional idea of citizenship in a dem:>cracy. 
This is because of the simultaneous truth of two seemingly 
contradictory propositions: (1) rational citizens want democracy 
to work well so as to gain its benefits, and it works best when 
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the citizens are well informed and when they turnout to vote, and 
(2) it is individually irrational to be well-informed and to 
1 
turnout to vote. That is, the goals men seek as individuals 
contradict those sought as members of the collective. This 
paradox exists because the benefits derived from efficient 
social organisation are indivisible: they are collective goods. 
A collective good is any good that cannot be withheld from any 
member of a specified group once it is supplied to one member 
2 
of that group. Examples of collective goods are the benefits 
that citizens receive from governments: law and order, social 
security, political order, defence and so on. Economists have 
stressed the difficulties of achieving an adequate supply of 
collective goods. Olsen has summarised the central dilemma: 
" ••• even if all of the individuals in a large group 
are rational and self-interested, and would gain if, 
as a group, they acted to achieve their common 
interest or objective, they will still not 
voluntarily act to achieve that common or group 
interest." 3 
This argument leads to the conclusion that groups will often fail 
to organise to achieve their conunon interests in the supply of 
collective goods. Where a group is already organised, this 
1. See Downs, An Economic Theory, pp. 245-246. 
2. This definition follows closely the discussion in Olsen, 
Logic of Collective Action. 
3. Ibid., p. 2. For discussion of the collective dilemma 
surrounding the supply of public goods see also: James M. 
Buchanan, The Demand and Supply of Collective Goods 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1968); Norman Frohlich, Joe A. 
Oppenheimer and Oran R. Young, Political Leadership and 
Collective Goods (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971); 
John M. Orbell, "On the Logic of Doing Unto Others", 
Department of Political Science, University of Canterbury, 1974. 
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pattern of individual motivation gives rise to what is known as 
the 'free-rider' problem. That is, since it is possible for 
individuals to receive collective goods without contributing 
to their supply, the rational citizen has an incentive to 
withhold contributions to the cost of the goods hoping that the 
efforts of others will be sufficient to provide the good to the 
1 
whole group. In our model this means that since many people 
do vote and since the individual's vote is not decisive, whether 
he is well informed or not, or whether he participates in voting 
has no impact on the benefits he gets. Therefore, the individual 
is motivated to shirk his share of the costs of providing a 
democratic government; he refuses to obtain enough information 
to become well-informed and it is rational for him to abstain 
f . 2 rom voting. 
The theory that voters act rationally at elections to 
maximise their benefits has received empirical support from a 
number of sources. Marion R. Just in her analysis of British 
voters concludes that: "Aspects of the models support the 
propositions of rational voting in the literature and comfort 
those who optimistically believe in man's free will and the 
ordinary citizen's rational judgement. 113 Brody and Page studied 
1. A more formal treatment of this problem is set forth in 
Norman Frohlich and Joe A. Oppenheimer, "I Get By With a 
Little Help from My Friends", World Politics XXIII 
(1970), 104-120. 
2. See Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 246. 
3. Marion R. Just, "Causal Models of Voter Rationality, Great 
Britain 1959 and 1963", Political Studies XXI (1973), 
p. 56. 
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the effects of voters' evaluations of candidates on turnout and 
"confirmed a central proposition from rational theory by showing 
that people act so as to maximise their expected utility. 111 
Stratmann tried to predict voters' choices as a function of 
their self-interest with respect to issues and candidates, and 
2 his findings support Downs' model. Key concluded that "in the 
large, the electorate behaves about as rationally and 
responsibly as we should expect, given the clarity of the 
alternatives presented to it and the character of the information 
available to it. 3 
Rational Choice Theory and the Problems to be Investigated 
The problems to be investigated in this thesis (which were 
raised in the social-psychological studies) lend themselves to 
analysis using rational choice theory. (A rational choice 
explanation for voter turnout has already been presented in this 
chapter.) A rational choice approach to the phenomenon of surge 
and decline emphasises the costs of political information at 
high and low-stimulus elections. In high-stimulus elections 
there is a large amount of information available at low cost and 
thus turnout increa~es. In low-stimulus elections the cost of 
1. Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, "Indifference, 
Alienation and Rational Decisions : The Effects of 
Candidate Evaluations on Turnout and the Vote", Public 
Choice XV (1973), p. 16. 
2. William c. Stratman, "The Calculus of Rational Choice", 
Public Choice XVIII (1974)' 93-105. 
3. Key, Responsible Electorate, p. 42. 
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information increases, and those who cannot afford the costs 
drop out. Consequently the turnout decreases. Using either 
party identification or candidate orientation as guides to 
voting behaviour can be efficient means for the voter to reduce 
his voting costs while still expressing a general opinion on 
the government or opposition. For the voter with a strong party 
loyalty a straight ticket, party oriented vote is his rational 
choice. For the voter without a strong party identification and 
who knows and likes a candidate of the opposing party,splitting 
his ticket to give a personal vote may well be a rational choice. 
Voters often know more about the party leaders than about the 
other candidates on the party ticket and they may make their 
voting decisions on this knowledge. Once the vote for the party 
leader has been decided, for those voters without much knowledge 
of the candidates for lower office and without a strong party 
identification, a cost-reducing choice is to vote a coattail vote~ 
that is, to vote for the remaining members of the leader's ticket. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Empirical voting behaviour theory is rooted in the 
sociological and social-psychological tradition. These models 
hold that citizens choose their preferred candidates on the 
basis of long-term factors such as party identification and 
enduring group loyalties and more short-term influences such as 
candidate qualities and the issues. Similarly the decision to 
participate by voting depends on psychological variables such as 
political interest, political efficacy, sense of citizen duty, 
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and psychological cross-pressures. In recent years 
revisionists have questioned the adequacy of the social-
psychological model and have argued that citizens vote in a 
rational manner consistent with their perceptions of the issues. 
On a formal theoretical level these views have found support 
from economic theorists who stress rational choice explanations 
of voting behaviour. Electoral behaviour is conceived of as a 
rational decision-making process, and voters as rational decision-
makers cast their votes as a function of their self-interest, 
for the party or candidate from whom they expect the greatest 
amount of satisfaction. To make rational political decisions 
electors require costly political information. Since it is 
unlikely that any one person's vote will be the decisive one 
in an election, the value of political information becomes very 
small and the rational citizen will not buy political information. 
Downs argues that voting is typically irrational, but Riker and 
Ordeshook show that voting has its expressive aspects and that 
people turn out to vote to express their citizen duty. 
This thesis uses both social-psychological and rational 
choice theories of voting behaviour for in many ways they 
complement each other. The social-psychological model of the 
Survey Research Centre emphasises the role of partisanship in 
the voting decisioI'll but says little about the implications for 
voter rationality. Anthony Downs and other economic theorists 
present models which examine the rationality of the voting 
79. 
decision, but say little about the role of partisanship as a 
rational means of reducing the costs of voting. The model used 
in this thesis represents a convergence of the two strands of 
theory by merging the deductive power of economic models and the 
1 
empirical richness of voting behaviour research. On the one 
hand Downs emphasises the instrumental benefits of voting and on 
the other the social-psychologists emphasise the expressive 
benefits. Both are components of the voting decision. 
1. Other writers who take note of this relationship include: 
Butler and stokes, Political Change, p. 37; Morris P. 
Fiorina, "The Voting Decision : Instrumental and 
Expressive Aspects", Journal of Politics XXXVIII (1976), 
390-415; Arthur s. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and 
Rationality as Bases of Party Identification", American 
Political Science Review LXIII (1969), 5-25; Pomper, 
Voters' Choice, pp. 9-10. 
CHAPTER IV 
VOTER TURNOUT 
People participate in politics in many different ways, 
with different degrees of emotional involvement and at different 
levels of the system, but voting is the one type of participation 
that is the most widely practised by all levels of society. For 
many people casting a ballot is the only time that they ever 
participate in national or local politicso Thus the act of voting 
is both an important variable to be explained and to be employed 
in the analysis of other political behaviour. Predicting the 
individual decision to vote and the level of voting turnout have 
become major themes in election studies, and measures of voter 
turnout have been used as important building blocks in many 
theories of electoral behaviour. The authors of The American 
Voter have pointed out that: "No aspect of voting is of more 
fundamental importance that the individual's decision whether to 
1 
vote at allo" voter turnout in an election can be viewed as a 
consequence of a number of social, psychological and political 
circumstanceso However, prior to examining these it is necessary 
to explain the problems of measuring the turnout in Christchurch 
using the North ward surveyo 
1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: 
John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964), p. 14. 
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MEASURING THE TURNOUT 
Table 4.1 shows the official turnout for Christchurch 
City and the turnout for each of the five wards using two 
different methods of estimation. 1 The first, using polling 
booth returns, is only an estimation because it is based on where 
TABLE 4.1 VOTER TURNOUT BY WARD 
WARD METHOD OF ESTIMATION 
Polling Booth Returns Sampling 
West 66% 64% 
North 52 81 
Pegasus 51 52 
East 55 
South 58 
CITY TOTAL 61 
people voted not where people lived; that is, electors did not 
always vote at polling places within their ward. Special (absentee) 
votes are excluded from these turnout figures and they are thus 
smaller than the unknown real turnout statistics. The second 
method of estimation is by sampling: survey research for North 
ward and analysis of the voting roll for West and Pegasus. The figures 
for West and Pegasus from the master roll analysis accord very well 
with the figures based on polling booth returns,and thus quite a 
lot of confidence can be placed in the master roll figures. 
1. Official turnout figures for the wards were not published. 
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The figure for North obtained from the survey is remarkably 
high (81 per cent) when compared to the city turnout of 61 per 
cent and the North turnout calculated from polling booth 
returns (52 per cent). However it is thought that some of this 
difference can be accounted for. 
For a start the figures of 52 and 61 per cent are 
proportions of the number of voters to the number of electors 
on the electoral roll, and if the roll is inaccurate, then 
these turnout figures are inaccurate. The roll is likely to 
include the names of people who are ineligible to vote (for 
example, deceased persons and others who have moved out of the 
district) and to exclude the names of many eligible but not 
1 
enrolled electors. The turnout figures of 52 and 61 per cent 
would be higher if the roll did not contain the names of 
ineligible electors, but they would be lower if the roll contained 
the names of all eligible electors. The accuracy of these turn-
out figures is therefore unknown. 
A second source of the difference in turnout figures is 
the disparity between the population sampled and the population 
of electors qualified to vote who are listed in the voting roll. 
The first of these populations is substantially smaller than the 
second because several groups that aremostunlikely to vote are 
not included in the sample population. The sample excluded the 
1. G.W.A. Bush has estimated that in Auckland City in 1971 
when the roll was 85 800, there were 15 000 who were 
eligible but not on the roll. See "The Non-vote in a 
Local Body Election", Political Science XXIV (September 
1972), p. 55. 
83. 
'floating' population - for example, people with no fixed 
addresses, travelling salesmen, and people in transit to new 
addresses. The authors of The American Voter in trying to account 
for the difference between the official presidential election 
turnout and the reported turnout of their sample attribute as much 
as half the difference to this source. 1 However, for a New 
Zealand local election where different factors operate to different 
extents,it is not really possible to estimate with any amount of 
confidence the size of this second source of error. 
A third source of the difference stems from the fact that 
the figure of 81 per cent from the survey is based on voting 
intention in a pre-election survey. The American Voter in interviews 
both before and after presidential elections found a difference of 
about 12 percentage points between the actual turnout and the 
reported turnout, 2 and Richard Rose in a post-election survey in 
3 Britain found a difference of 11 per cent. These differences are 
considerably less than the difference for North ward, and this can 
be partly attributed to the different times of interviewing 
relative to the time of the election. In the American and British 
interviews which took place after the election, it is easy for 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: 
John Wiley, 1960), pp. 93-96. (However, Campbell 
et al.'s sample excluded the institutional population 
(people in hospitals for example) as well as the floating 
population. The North ward survey did not exclude 
institutionalised people). 
Ibid., p. 94. 
Richard Rose (ed.), The Polls and the 1970 Election 
(Glasgow: Survey Research Centre, Occasional Paper No. 
7, University of Strathclyde, 1970), p. 16. 
84. 
voters to report something they have actually done. In the North 
ward interviews it is very easy for voters to say they 'intend' 
to do something in the future without really meaning it. People 
may well 'intend' to vote at the time of the interview, but when 
election day comes around they forget, are too busy, or are out of 
town. There is not nearly the same publicity and interest in 
local elections in New Zealand as there is in a general election. 
Consequently many people may unintentionally fail to vote. 
Fourth, it is possible that those who refused to be 
interviewed are less likely to be interested in politics and to 
vote,and that those who were interviewed are more likely to be 
interested in politics and to vote. This would exclude a number 
of non-voters from the sample. 
Fifth, it is possible that people misled the interviewer 
by saying they intended to vote when they really had no such 
intention, probably because voting is conceived of as a democratic 
duty and some sense of guilt attaches to non-performance. Since 
the interviews were conducted without the respondents being asked 
their names,it is impossible to check voter intention with actual 
turnout using the master roll. However, overseas studies that 
have made such a comparison have discounted the importance of this 
1 
sort of error. 
1. Hugh J. Parry and Aden M. Crossley, "Validity of Responses 
to Survey Questions", Public Opinion Quarterly XIV (1950), 
61-80; Mungo Miller, "The Waukegan Study of Voter Turnout 
Prediction", Public Opinion Quarterly XVI (1952), 381-398. 
See also Aage Clausen, "Response Validity : Vote Report", 
Public Opinion Quarterly XXXII (1969), 588-606. 
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A final source of error is the fact that some voters 
are not counted as having turned out in the official count. 
Informal votes are included in the official turnout figure, but 
it appears that not all persons who were issued with special 
voting papers are included as well. The Returning Officer's Report 
on the election lists 5 880 people as being issued with special 
ballot papers, but only 4 443 are included in the figure that is 
1 
used to calculate the percentage turnout. This difference amounts 
to 1.47 per cent and would increase the city turnout from 60.51 per 
cent to 61.98 per cent. 
To conclude, a number of factors have been suggested to 
account for the difference between the North ward survey voting 
intention figure and the turnout calculated using polling booth 
returns, but it is impossible to measure the extent of all these 
sources of error. The large difference between the two figures 
must place some restraints on the use of the North ward survey 
findings regarding voter turnout. Conclusions therefore from the 
survey can only be tentative. This restriction on using the North 
ward data does not, however, limit its use when analysing other 
aspects of voting behaviour in North. The survey may not be very 
accurate with regard to turnout, but as Chapter II shows the survey 
was extremely accurate with regard to the partisan division of the 
vote. 
1. Christchurch City Council, "Returning Officer's Report 
1974 City Council Election", Christchurch, 1974 (mimeo), 
P• 7. 
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SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS AND VOTER TURNOUT 
Ever since Lazarsfeld et al. concluded that "social 
characteristics determine political preference 111,most voting 
studies have reported on the relationship between various 
demographic variables and voter turnout and voting choice. 
More recent research has emphasised a wider range of variables 
2 leading to the decision to vote, but it is still important 
to describe and explain the social correlates of voting 
participation. Higher levels of voting turnout have been 
reported for those with greater political resources: higher 
socio-economic status people generally, residents of higher 
status neighbourhoods, those with higher-status occupations, 
the middle classes, the better educated, certain age groups 
(forty-five to fifty-four years), men, married people and 
residents who have lived longer in a conununity. Lower levels 
of turnout have been reported for those with fewer political 
resources: lower socio-economic status people generally, 
residents of lower status neighbourhoods, those with lower-
status occupations, working class people, the less well-educated, 
the young (twenty-one to twenty-four years), the old (over seventy-
d . 3 five years), women, single people an newcomers to a conununity. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, 
The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1948), p. 27. 
For example, Campbell et al., American Voter. 
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: 
Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1963); Campbell et al., American 
Voter, abridged ed., chap. 15; Robert E. Dowse and John A. 
Hughes, Political Sociology (London: John Wiley, 1972), pp.297-
299; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday, 1960), p. 184; Lester W. Milbrath, Political 
Participation : How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics 
(Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), p. 116. 
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Such findings have proved of importance in providing a picture 
of the active electorate and, more specifically, a description 
of the proportional electoral influence of major social groupings. 
Why do some people vote more than others? There is no 
general theory explaining why people expend their resources in 
voting rather than in other ways. Lester Milbrath's concepts of 
the 'centre' and the 'periphery' of political life approach an 
explanation that can perhaps account for different levels of voter 
turnout. According to Milbrath, the factors associated with high 
political participation (such as education, high social involvement 
and high socio-economic status), represent advantaged locations 
within the social system for receiving political information, having 
a better leverage on politics, and a greater contact with political 
life. 1 Rational choice theory provides a different explanation. 
If we, like Downs, assume that acquiring information and voting 
are costly, then it can be shown that high-income citizens vote at 
a greater rate than low-income citizens. 2 The cost of voting is 
harder for low-income citizens to bear, therefore, even if the returns 
from voting among the two groups are the same, fewer members of low-
income groups vote. The cost of information is harder for low-income 
citizens to bear since they cannot afford as much as high-income 
citizens; hence more of them are likely to be uncertain because they 
lack information. Since political uncertainty reduces the returns 
1. Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 116. 
2. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 14. 
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from voting, a lower proportion of low-income groups would vote 
even if voting costs were equally difficult for everyone to bear. 
Since income is usually very closely related to occupational 
status, class and neighbourhood status,this argument is appropriate 
to explain the different turnout rates within these groups as 
well. 
Downs' model is also useful in accounting for the lower 
participation by women and the higher participation by older people, 
the better educated, and by those who have lived longer in a 
. . 1 
community. Women are often less exposed to political discussion 
than men, and their social role, especially in working-class life, 
is often defined as non-political. Hence, the chances of accidentally 
acquiring political information are greater in the case of men. An 
inference is that for women to acquire the same amount of political 
information as men they must make greater sacrifices. Hence, their 
lower participation is explained, as is the tendency to follow the 
husband's lead in voting. 
Similarly, the higher participation by older people - up 
to the age when the physical effort is too great - can be explained, 
in part, by referring to Downs' concept of accidentally acquired 
free information. The older one is, the more likely one is to have 
acquired more free information and, other things being equal, the 
lower is the cost of voting. The better educated person acquires a 
1. See also Dowse and Hughes, Political Sociology, pp. 303-
304. 
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stock of free political information as a by-product of his 
education. This gives him a free context within which to assess 
new information. Hence, the costs of participation for the better 
educated are lower and therefore the rates of participation are 
likely to be higher. Residents who have lived longer in a 
community are likely to have acquired more political information 
about local events, than newcomers, therefore their costs are 
less and their voting turnout rate is higher. This would be 
especially relevant for local elections. 
The question for this section to try and answer is: 'Can 
a rational choice model explain the different rates of voting 
participation among different social groups and categories in the 
1974 Christchurch City Council election?' If the model can help 
build a picture of the active electorate in Christchurch then this 
should help answer the fundamental question: 'Who participates in 
elections and why?' 
The Findings 
As predicted by rational choice theory and by Milbrath 
and others, the turnout was highest in the middle class neigh-
bourhoods of West ward (66 per cent) 1 and lowest in the working 
class neighbourhoods of Pegasus ward (51 per cent). The 
similarly low turnout in North (52 per cent) is surprising; the 
1. The turnout figures in this paragraph are based on 
polling booth returns. 
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ward contains some higher status neighbourhoods, some lower status 
neighbourhoods and some that are in between. Since the turnout 
in middle class West was high and the turnout in working class 
Pegasus was considerably lower, the mixed class area of North 
should have a turnout somewhere in between but at neither extreme. 
Looking at occupation, the trend in each of the three wards 
is generally the same (Table 4.2); turnout increases as 
occupational status increases - although the correlations are quite 
weak. In North there are exceptions to the trend in the farmer and 
wh~te collar categories. In West and Pegasus there is a cluster 
from farmer to unskilled and the lowest turnouts are recorded by 
students. The high turnout of the retired people is unexpected 
since previous studies already mentioned have found that turnout 
decreases past the age of sixty. It may be that party activists 
helped to lower the costs of voting for the elderly by providing 
them with transport to the polls and assisting them with special 
votes, for example. Included in the occupational categories in 
Table 4.2 are two general categories which present a simple 
picture of the influence of occupational status on turnout. The 
first three groups on the scale of occupational status have been 
combined under the heading 'higher' status and the last four 
(excluding student, retired and housewife) have been called 'lower' 
status. The greater association between occupation and turnout 
in West can thus be seen at a glance,although the corresponding 
figures for North show that oversimplification can be misleading. 
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TABLE 4.2 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS* BY WARD 
North West Pegasus 
Occupational Status % (N) % (N) % (N) 
1. Professional 100 (3) 77 (30) 69 (16) 
2. Business 80 (15) 83 (40) 62 (13) 
3. White Collar 72 (32) 73 (63) 55 (42) 
4. Farmer 91 (42) 62 (81) 47 (98) 
5. Skilled 79 (6 7) 62 (113) 50 (248) 
6. Semi-skilled 77 (39) 60 (89) 54 (287) 
7. Unskilled 60 (5) 56 (9) 50 (48) 
Student 78 (9) 53 (55) 39 (13) 
Retired 100 (11) 71 (38) 59 (46) 
Housewife 100 (8) 
x2 NV 2 x =15.54 x2=G.2s 
.Ol<p<.05 .50<p<.70 
r =.06 r =.14 r =-.01 
s s s 
Occupational Status North West Pegasus 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
Higher status (1-3) 
Lower status (4-7) 
76 (50) 
81 (153) 
77 (133) 
61 (292) 
59 
51 
(71) 
(681) 
* 
x2= o.32 
.50<p<.7c;> 
x2 = 9.37 
.OOl<p<.01 
x2= i.26 
.20<p<.30 
Occupational status for all three ward samples is coded 
according to the seven point Congalton-Havighurst scale of 
occupational status adapted for New Zealand by Peter Davis, "An 
Occupational Prestige Ranking Scale for New Zealand", Department 
of Psychology and Sociology, Research Project 24, University of 
Canterbury, 1974. See also A.A. Congalton, Status and Prestige 
in Australia (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1969). Students, retired 
people and housewives are not included on the scale and are 
therefore listed separately. 
X2 Chi Square 
p Probability that the relationship is random. 
r Spearman correlation coefficient. 
s 
NV x2 not valid because expected frequencies less than five. 
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Comparing the turnout for West and Pegasus for each 
occupational group it can be seen that turnout in West was higher 
for each occupational categoryo This underlines the importance 
of neighbourhood status; it seems to exert an influence independent 
of occupational status. Persons with low occupational status were 
more likely to vote if they lived in West (a higher status area) 
1 than if they lived in Pegasus (a lower status area). Possible 
explanations for this centre around two theories. The first relates 
to the role of spatial influences and social context. Lower 
occupational status persons living in an area of high neighbourhood 
status are under pressure to 'conform' to the majority viewpoint. 
Studies have shown the majority often 'convert' the minority to 
their views, especially when the latter have friends in the area 
2 
and belong to local voluntary organisations (such as churches). 
It is proposed that part of this'conversion' process includes 
group pressures to accept the ethic of voting by turning out on 
election day to do one's 'civic duty'o The second explanation 
relates to party organisation. The Citizens Association which 
relies on West ward for a large amount of its support was very active 
on election day getting out the vote' because they realised that 
this was where the votes were for their mayoral candidate and for 
their candidates for the ad hoc bodieso Labour's organisation in 
Pegasus was less efficient than Citizens organisation in West in 
lo This finding is confirmed by Bush, "The Non-vote", p .. SO. 
2. Kevin Ro Cox, "The Spatial Structuring of Information Flow 
and Partisan Attitudes", in Mattei Dogan and Stein Rokkan 
{edso), Quantitative Ecological Analysis in the Social 
Sciences (Cambridge, Mass .. : MIT Press, 1969),, PPo 157-186. 
This phenomenon is also noted by David Butler and Donald 
Stokes, Political Change in Britain: The Evolution of 
Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1974), pp.130-133. 
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1 getting people to the polls, and for the Citizens Association in 
Pegasus, "the aim is not to get everyone out to vote because in 
doing so you only help the Labour cause because of the general 
bias of the ward. 112 These two reasons help to account for the 
difference between the wardso 
Table 4o3 shows whether the relationship between occupational 
status and turnout in West and Pegasus remains when sex is controlled 
for. However, the relationship remains only for men in West and 
Pegasus. Sex disrupts the relationship for women; in West the 
turnout for women is similar regardless of occupational status 
{with one exception), and in Pegasus there seems to be no relation-
ship between occupational status and turnout for women. Looking 
across the rows of Table 4o3, in West men have higher turnouts in 
the higher status occupations (except 'business'), the turnouts 
are similar for the middle status people of both sexes, while the 
situation is reversed in the lower status occupations with women 
voting more heavily. In Pegasus there is no consistent relationship 
between sex and turnout. In conclusion, it appears that when sex 
is controlled for, occupational status loses some of its power as 
an explanatory variableo 
The relationship between class and turnout was investigated 
in North. Eighty-two per cent of the middle class respondents said 
they intended to vote and 81 per cent of the working class respondents 
lo N.G. Pickering (Mayor of Christchurch, 1971-74), Interview 
16 December 19770 
2. M0 0 0 Holdsworth {Chairman, Christchurch Citizens 
Association, 1974), Letter to the author, 20 January 1978. 
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TABLE 4.3 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY SEX BY WARD 
Occupational Status 
WEST 
1. Professional 
2. Business 
3. White Collar 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Farmer 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Student 
Retired 
Higher status (1-3) 
Lower status (4-7) 
Occupational Status 
PEGASUS 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Professional 
Business 
White Collar 
Farmer 
Skilled 
Semi-skilled 
Unskilled 
Student 
Retired 
Higher status (1-3) 
Lower status (4-7) 
Men Women 
% (N) % (N) 
82 (22) 63 (8) 
79 (29) 91 (11) 
79 (29) 68 (34) 
62 (52) 62 (29) 
62 (61) 62 (52) 
58 (57) 63 (32) 
50 (6) 67 (3) 
58 (36) 42 (19) 
67 (21) 77 (17) 
x2= 11.05 x2 NV 
.lO<p<.20 
80 (80) 72 (53) 
60 (176) 62 (116) 
x2= 8.77 x2= 1.09 
.OOl<p<.01 .20<p<.30 
Men Women 
% (N) % (N) 
80 (10) 50 (6) 
55 (11) 100 (2) 
52 (23) 58 (19) 
47 (60) 47 (38) 
48 (140) 53 (108) 
50 (173) 61 (114) 
51 (35) 46 (13) 
30 (10) 67 (3) 
50 (30) 75 (16) 
x2= 5.86 x2 NV 
.50<p<.70 
59 (44) 59 (27) 
49 (408) 55 (273) 
x2= 1.23 x2= 0.05 
.20<p<.30 .80<p<.90 
NV x2 not valid because expected frequencies less than five. 
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said they would vote. The Spearman correlation coefficient (r ) 
s 
is .01. This lack of relationship between class and turnout 
contrasts with overseas findings. It is difficult to suggest why 
this is so without investigating the relationship between class and 
variables such as party preference. The distribution of self-
assigned class was 48 per cent working class and 41 per cent middle 
class with the rest either refusing to accept a class identification 
or not knowing. 
The findings for education are almost exactly opposite to 
what other studies have shown. In the North ward survey turnout 
was greater for those without higher education than for those with 
higher education and greater for those who left school in their 
early teens (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). As this was not predicted in the 
TABLE 4.4 TURNOUT BY EDUCATION (NORTH WARD) 
Education 
Primary only 
Some secondary 
Completed secondary 
Technical or commercial 
Some university or teachers' college 
Completed university or teachers' 
college 
x2 = a.29 
r = -.11 
s 
.lO<p<.20 
% 
92 
93 
74 
79 
85 
76 
(N) 
(13) 
(44) 
(57) 
(62) 
(26) 
(29) 
theoretical discussion earlier, further investigation is warranted. 
Since educational background is usually fairly closely related to 
occupational status, and since occupation was related to turnout, 
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TABLE 4.5 TURNOUT BY AGE LEFT SCHOOL (NORTH WARD) 
Age Left School % (N) 
11-13 years 88 (17) 
14-16 years 86 (128) 
17-19 years 73 (86) 
x2 = 6.o3 .Ol<p<.05 
this suggests we should examine the three-way relationship 
between turnout, occupation and education. Table 4.6 reveals that, 
with two exceptions, education is indeed related to occupational 
status for the North ward sample. Education is controlled for in 
Table 4.7 which shows that for almost each occupational category 
TABLE 4.6 EDUCATION BY OCCUPATIONAL ~TATUS (NORTH WARD) 
Occupational Status Higher No Higher (N=) Education Education 
Professional 75 25 = 100% (4) 
Business 71 29 = 100% (7) 
White Collar 87 13 = 100% (24) 
Farmer 88 12 = 100% (34) 
Skilled 48 52 = 100% (50) 
Semi-skilled 24 76 = 100% (25) 
Unskilled 20 80 = 100% (5) 
x2 NV 
turnout is greater for those without higher education. The fact 
that a respondent had some higher education does not seem to have 
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TABLE 4.7 TURNOUT BY OCCUPATIONAL STATUS BY EDUCATION (NORTH 
·wARD) 
Occupational Status Turnout for those Turnout for those 
with higher without higher 
education education 
% (N) % (N) 
Professional 100 (3) 100 (1) 
Business 60 (5) 100 (2) 
White Collar 67 (21) 100 (3) 
Farmer 90 (30) 100 (4) 
Skilled 71 (24) 81 (26) 
Semi-skilled 67 (6) 79 (19) 
Unskilled 100 (1) 75 (4) 
x2 NV 
increased the propensity to vote. Controlling for education 
disrupts the relationship between occupation and turnout especially 
for the higher educated. It does seem that while occupation is 
directly related to turnout education is inversely related to turn-
out - although this conclusion can only be tentative because of the 
small numbers involved. 
There is a fairly strong relationship between age and 
turnout (Table 4.8); the older one is, the more likely it is that 
he or she voted. 
It is at first surprising that the turnout for men and women 
(Table 4.9) was similar for the differences between the sexes in 
political behaviour have been well-documented in many overseas studies. 
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TABLE 4.8 TURNOUT BY AGE BY WARD 
Age North West Pegasus 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
18-25 years 69 (58) 
26-40 73 (56) 
41-55 89 (63) 
56-70 94 (36) 
Over 70 94 (18) 
x2 = 18.10 
.OOl<p<.01 
r :;;:: .26 
s 
Student 
(young) 78 (9) 53 (55) 39 (13) 
Retired 
{old) 100 (11) 71 (38) 59 (46) 
TABLE 4.9 TURNOUT BY SEX BY WARD 
Sex North West Pegasus 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
Men 83 (115) 64 (350) 51 (535) 
Women 80 (115) 63 (400) 55 (483) 
x2 = 0.11 x2 = 0.003 x2 = 1.46 
.70<p<.80 .90<p<.95 .20<p<.30 
r = .03 r = .007 r = -.04 
s s s 
However, as Nigel s. Roberts has noted, "In New Zealand ••• the 
1 
situation ••• is certainly not as pronounced as overseas." The 
1. Nigel s. Roberts, "The Female Kiwi as a Political 
Animal", Politics IX (1974}, p. 200. 
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influence of neighbourhood status can be seen again in the difference 
between the turnout in West and Pegasus. Notably women in West 
have a turnout rate which is more than 10 per cent greater than 
that for men in Pegasus. Other research has shown that the turn-
out rates for men and women respectively at the 1960 General 
Election were 94 and 93 per cent, the 1962 Waitaki By-election -
79 and 76 per cent, and the 1971 Auckland city Council Election -
1 36 and 35 per cent. 
Looking closer at the participation of women, an interesting 
picture arises when their marital status is examined (Table 4.10). In 
TABLE 4.10 TURNOUT BY MARITAL STATUS BY WARD 
Marital Status West Pegasus 
% (N) % (N) 
Married women 71 (202) 55 (357) 
Single women 64 (39) 50 (12) 
Widows 58 (55) 65 (34) 
Unspecified (women) 51 (105) 47 (81) 
x2 = 11.89 x2 = 3.47 
.OOl<p<.01 .3o<p<.5o 
West married women voted more regularly than single women or widows 
followed by the unspecified. However, in Pegasus widows voted 10 
per cent more than married women. Further analysis of the sample 
shows that there are more widowed ratepayers living in Pegasus 
1. Bush, "The Non-vote", p. 54; A.V. Mitchell, Waitaki Votes 
(Dunedin: University of Otago, 1962), p. 47. 
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than West. Since, as we shall see later, ratepayers vote more 
regularly than residents this helps to explains why the \'"idows 
in Pegasus are more active. 
The North ward findings show that newcomers to 
Christchurch were less likely to vote than people who had lived 
longer in the city. Indeed turnout increased as length of 
residence increased (Table 4.11). 
TABLE 4.11 TURNOUT BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE (NORTH WARD) 
Length of Residence % (N) 
Moved into ChCh - during 1974 42 (19) 
during '72 & '73 69 (13) 
Lived in Ch Ch 3 to 15 years 80 (51) 
16 to 21 years 86 (29) 
- 22 years or more/ 
"All my life" 88 (119) 
x2 = 24.78 p<.001 
r = .24 
s 
To conclude this section on social characteristics, some 
social variables such as neighbourhood, occupation, age, marital 
status and length of residence were related to the propensity to 
vote as predicted by rational choice theory and consideration of the 
effects of information costs. Neighbourhood as defined by electoral 
ward is the strongest predictor of turnout. However, some 
variables which the theory strongly suggests should be related to 
turnout were not. These are class, education and sex. However, 
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before any thought is given to revising the theory, further 
testing in future elections would be very desirable. our rational 
choice model has not been entirely successful in explaining the 
different voting rates of different social groups, but a more 
satisfactory analysis can be found in a consideration of 
psychological variables. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES AND VOTER TURNOUT 
Working with the funnel of causality model employed in 
accounting for partisan choice, The American Voter has added to the 
demographic picture of voters and non-voters some important 
findings about psychological correlates of voting participation. 
The authors attempt to relate turnout behaviour to the individual's 
psychological involvement in politics: 
"We have felt that the individual develops a 
characteristic degree of interest and involvement 
in political affairs, which varies widely among 
individuals but which exhibits a good deal of 
stability for the same person through successive 
election campaigns. Postulating a dimension of 
this sort leads naturally to the hypothesis that 
the stronger the individual's psychological 
involvement the more likely he is to participate 
in politics by voting." 1 
Campbell et al. designed a number of measures that would catch the 
individual's psychological involvement in politics. The joint 
relationship between intensity of partisan preference and campaign 
interest, concern over the election outcome, political efficacy, 
and citizen duty is able to account for over 75 per cent of the 
1. Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 56. 
(emphasis added). See also Milbrath, Political 
Particioation, chap. 3. 
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turnout, thus demonstrating the significant role of involvement 
in motivating turnout behaviour. Butler and Stokes recognise that 
the problem of explaining why people take the trouble to vote 
when voting has its costs and when a single vote can make so little 
difference, is a real one. They suggest three motives behind 
individual voting which further our understanding of the voting 
decision: 
"Electors have the instrumental motive of voting: the 
casting of their ballots may contribute to the election ' 
of a government whose outputs they value. They may 
also have the expressive motive of voting: the casting 
of their ballots shows support for the party they 
identify themselves with, and has an intrinsic value 
of its own. Yet we must also allow for the normative 
motive of voting: the casting of the voter's ballot 
may reflect primarily a sense of civic obligation. 
Blurred ideas of popular sovereignty and universal 
suffrage are so interwoven in the prevailing conceptions 
of British government that the obligation to vote 
becomes almost an aspect of the citizen's national 
identity. As a result, a number of people are drawn 
to the polling place who would be unlikely to get there 
otherwise." 1 
While the North ward survey was not specifically designed 
to investigate the relationship between psychological involvement in 
politics and voter turnout, we are able to investigate the relation-
ships between voting and strength of party identification, cross-
pressures, interest in politics, and political awareness as measured 
by knowledge of the candidates and the issues. 
The intensity of the individual's partisan preference is 
related to turnout. The Survey Research Centre present data to show 
1. Butler and Stokes, Political Change, pp. 38-39. 
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"the greater the strength of the individual's preference, the 
1 greater the likelihood he would vote." Downs agrees on this: 
"Citizens who have definite party preferences are more likely to 
vote than those who cannot see much net difference between the 
parties." 2 This is because those who see a net difference are 
likely to feel more affected by the election result and hence 
are concerned that their preferences be taken into account. 
Individuals experiencing cross-pressures have been found 
to vote less than those free of 3 cross-pressures • Cross-pressures 
are treated primarily in terms of attitude conflict. Conflict 
within the individual's psychological field may result from 
different psychological forces acting on the individual. For 
example, an individual may have a standing party identification 
towards a particular party but he is attracted by the personal 
qualities of the candidate of the opposing party; such a person 
is said to be experiencing cross-pressures on his decision to vote. 
This may result in the individual being so unsure of himself that 
he refuses to vote at all. 
The Survey Research Centre authors also show that interest 
4 in politics is associated with voter turnout. Persons who are 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 53. 
Downs, An Economic Theory, p. 299. 
Campbell et al., Aillerican Voter. abridged ed., p. 46; 
Lipset, Political Man, pp. 185-216. 
Campbell et al., American Voter, abridged ed., p. 61. 
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interested in an election are more likely to feel affected by the 
outcome than those who are not interested. They are voting to 
maximise their income. 
Knowledge and awareness of politics has been found to 
1 be related to turnout. Since informed persons already possess 
information (either free or costly), they may well use this to 
try and maximise their incomes by voting. For the less well-
informed voting is irrational and abstention is rational behaviour 
since they have little or no information upon which to decide. They 
could end up voting in a manner that is not in their self-interest. 
Thus the hypothesis is that the more information a person has 
acquired about politics the more likely he will turnout to vote. 2 
The Findings 
Just under half of the North ward sample identified them-
selves with either of the two main parties contesting the election. 
Seventy-nine per cent of 'not very strong' party identifiers said 
they intended to vote in the election; while 89 per cent of 
'fairly strong' identifiers intended to vote, and 85 per cent of 
'very strong' identifiers said they would vote. The Spearman 
correlation coefficient is .06. Strength of party tie does not 
seem to be a very good predictor of turnout for the sample. 
1. Milbrath, Political Participation, p. 64. 
2. Derived from Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 14. 
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Cross-pressures could be experienced between parliamentary 
and local party identifications. There are two main parliamentary 
parties in national politics in New Zealand (Labour and National), 
but at the local body level only Labour nominates candidates for 
the city council elections. The Citizens Association candidates -
who may have individual ties with the National Party - claim to be 
'just a group of Independents'. Local politics are often seen as 
being divorced from parliamentary politics in New Zealand. For 
example, there is a strong feeling that political parties should not 
nominate candidates for local elections, and in local elections 
candidate personality can play a stronger role in influencing 
perceptions of politics. It is possible that persons identifying 
with one of the parties or saying they are Independent at the 
parliamentary level of politics will identify with another party 
or say they are Independent at the local level. The implication 
of Table 4.12 is clear, although due to small numbers it is not 
conclusive: controlling for parliamentary party identification reveals 
TABLE 4.12 TURNOUT BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY LOCAL 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION (NORTH WARD) 
LOCAL 
IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens 
Independent 
Labour 
X2 NV 
PARLIAMENTARY IDENTIFICATION 
National Independent Labour 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
92 (38) 100 (5) 33 (3) 
82 (34) 100 (1) 70 (43) 
50 (2) 100 (17) 83 (59) 
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that cross-pressures were an important influence on voting 
behaviour. The turnout for those identifying with Citizens and 
National was 92 per cent, but for those identifying with Citizens 
at the local level and Labour at the parliamentary level the 
turnout was only 33 per cent. The extent to which electors are 
cross-pressured seems to influence the propensity to vote. Those 
who accepted a parliamentary identification but did not identify 
with any party at the local level - the local Independents - voted 
at lower rates than those who did accept the equivalent party tie. 
However, the local Independents voted at higher rates than those 
completely cross-pressured, that is, those who had a parliamentary 
identification but reverse loyalties at the local level. All of 
the parliamentary Independents intended to vote regardless of their 
local party identification. Since these people were not cross-
pressure~ into abstaining,the survey suggests that being an 
Independent at the parliamentary level was more important in 
influencing turnout than local independence or party identification 
of any kind. 
Table 4.13 shows the relationship between interest in 
Christchurch City Council politics and voting intention. The 
voting rate was more than twice as high for persons with a great 
deal of interest than it wasfor persons with no interest. 
However, the problem is not merely to find relationships 
between psychological variables and turnout. Rather the problem 
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TABLE 4.13 TURNOUT BY INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL 
POLITICS . (NORTH WARD) 
INTEREST IN c.c.c. POLITICS 
None Some Quite Great 
a lot deal 
Intend voting 47% 82% 94% 96% 
(N=) (30) (129) (48) (24) 
x2 = 32.07 p<.001 
r = .33 
s 
is to investigate whether the relationships discovered between 
social characteristics and turnout are improved by adding the 
psychological characteristics while controlling for the social 
characteristics. A presumption is that the association will 
either increase or decrease and this will demonstrate the 
independent effect of the psychological characteristics. To 
illustrate the independent effect of interest in politics, education 
is held constant in Table 4.14, and this shows that interest in 
politics appears to exert an independent effect in increasing 
the tendency to vote. -
TABLE 4.14 TURNOUT BY INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL 
POLITICS BY EDUCATION (NORTH WARD) 
Turnout for those with 
higher education 
Turnout for those with-
out higher 
education 
(N = ) 
X2 NV 
INTREST IN CoC.C. POLITICS 
None Some 
29% 82% 
63 82 
(30) (129) 
Quite 
a lot 
92% 
96 
(48) 
Great 
deal 
92% 
100 
(24) 
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Similar to interest in politics, political awareness 
is a good indicator of turnout. Forty-six per cent of those who 
could not name any of the three mayoral candidates1 planned on 
voting while 71, 87 and 92 per cent of those who could name one, 
two and three candidates respectively intended voting. The 
Spearman correlation coefficient for the relationship is .31. 
As the number of issues respondents could mention increased so 
did the likelihood that they would vote. Sixty-eight per cent of 
those who could name no issues intended voting; while 87 and 
89 per cent of those who could name one and two issues respectively 
signified they would vote, and 94 per cent of those who could 
name three or more issues declared they would turn out. The 
Spearman coefficient is .24. To obtain a more comprehensive picture 
of the relationship between political knowledge and turnout, a scale 
of political awareness was constructed. The number of mayoral 
candidates and council candidates (there were ten in North) that 
were correctly mentioned were added to the number of issues 
mentioned. Turnout measured using this scale of political awareness 
is shown in Table 4.15. The intention to vote rose steadily with 
TABLE 4.15 TURNOUT BY POLITICAL AWARENESS (NORTH WARD) 
Intend 
(N = ) 
x2 
r = 
s 
1. 
Score on Scale of Political Awareness 
0 l 2 3 4 5 More than 6 
voting 47% 59% 67% 88% 89% 85% 100% 
(19) (17) (33) (59) (45) (20) (38) 
NV 
.36 
There were actually four candidates for the mayoralty but 
the fourth, an Independent gained only 325 votes, was 
unknown to our sample and is therefore ignored. 
increasing awareness reaching a maximum of 100 per cent for 
those who scored six or more on the scale. 
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Looking at the four measures of psychological involvement 
that were investigated, interest in politics and political awareness 
were good predictors of turnout, while strength of party identification 
was of much less importance in explaining voter turnout. The 
incidence of cross-pressures appeared to be a significant factor. 
Most of the people in the North ward survey who said they would 
vote were those who were the most interested and the most informed 
about candidates and issues. These findings give support to the 
rational choice theory by showing that people act so as to maximise 
their expected utility, and to the social-psychological model by 
showing that psychological involvement is related to voting behaviour. 
POLITICAL FACTORS AND VOTER TURNOUT 
Political factors can be of the greatest importance in 
influencing the decision to vote. One of the most important of 
these is the type of election. National elections usually 
generate more interested and are regarded as more important than 
local elections,and consequently the costs of obtaining information 
are higher for voters at local elections. Also the party 
differential is apt to be small. This helps to explain why turnout 
is lower at local elections. This generalisation holds true for 
New Zealand where local elections consistently record lower turnouts 
and generate far less interest than national elections, and where 
partisan influences are often less important than in national elections. 
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Table 4.16 shows the consistent difference in turnout between local 
elections in New Zealand and Christchurch City, and parliamentary 
elections. 
TABLE 4.16 TURNOUT IN LOCAL AND GENERAL ELECTIONS IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
LOCAL ELECTIONS 
Year New Zealand 
1962 44%a 
1965 44b 
1968 46c 
1971 sod 
1974 soe 
a Excludes counties 
b Includes counties 
Christchurch 
City 
37% 
34 
43 
59 
61 
c Territorial local authorities only 
d Territorial local authorities only 
e All local authorities 
GENERAL ELECTIONS 
Year 
1963 90% 
1966 86 
1969 89 
1972 89 
1975 83 
Sources: N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local Authority 
Elections 1959, 1962 and 1965/1968/1971/1974", Wellington 
(1967/[no date)/[no date]/1976 (mimeo); "The General 
Election 1963/1966/1969/1972/1975", Appendices to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives (Wellington: 
Government Printer), 1964 H.33, 1967 H.33, 1970, H.33, 
1973, E.9, 1976, E.9. 
The type of voting system used can increase or decrease 
the costs to the elector of voting and hence influence the decision 
to vote. CUmbersome ballot papers with many names from which to 
choose in at-large,multi-candidate elections have greater costs 
associated with them than do say, ward systems or single member 
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1 
electoral systems. This problem is particularly applicable to 
this study for in an effort to decrease the costs of voting the 
electoral system in Christchurch was changed from an at-large 
multi-candidate election in 1971 to a ward system with four-member 
constituencies in 1974. The hope was that with fewer names to 
choose from on the ballot form, voting would be made easier, the 
t ld d d 1 . 2 cos s wou ecrease, an turnout wou d increase. Table 4.16 
shows, however, that the turnout between 1971 and 1974 increased 
by only 2 per cent and this seemed to be more attributable to the 
closely fought battle for the mayoralty than the introduction of 
the ward system. Further elections under the ward system are 
necessary to test whether the type of voting system in Christchurch 
influences voter turnout. 
Another deduction from Downs' theory relates the voting 
decision to the size of the constituency: in those seats with the 
most electors the cost of acquiring information about the likely 
impact of one's own vote would be higher than in seats with fewer 
voters, hence, other things being equal, the smaller the electorate 
the larger the turnout. This inference is quite strongly supported 
. 1 . 3 in Britain for turnout in local e ections. In Christchurch four 
of the five wards were of approximately equal size (20 000 electors) 
while the fifth had only 15 000 electors. This ward was West and as 
1. 
2. 
3. 
On the political consequences of electoral laws see Douglas 
Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 
N.G. Pickering (Mayor of Christchurch 1971-74), Letter to 
the author, 31 July 1974. 
Peter Fletcher, "An Explanation of Variations in 'Turnout' 
in Local Elections", Political Studies XVII (1969), 495-502. 
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Table 4.1 shows, the turnout in West was at least 8 percentage 
points greater than any other ward. However, this does not 
necessarily confirm the hypothesis. The high turnout in West is 
more likely to be due to the high proportion of high socio-economic 
status people living there than its smaller size. 
Turnout in New Zealand local elections could be related 
to the type of electoral qualification an elector possesses. It 
is hypothesised that ratepayers are more likely to vote than 
residents for two main reasons. First, the enrolment requirements 
and procedures are more complicated for residents than for ratepayers. 
Ratepayers are automatically enrolled by the local council when they 
buy property in the district. They do not have to live in the 
district and they do not have to be British subjects. On the other 
hand residents have to apply for enrolment themselves, they have to 
live in the district for three months prior to the election, and they 
have to be British subjects. 1 There is a lack of general knowledge 
in Christchurch City concerning enrolment qualifications and 
procedures; just how many eligible people are not on the Christchurch 
roll is an unknown factor. The North ward survey revealed two 
elderly ladies who had not voted in any city council elections 
because they thought that only ratepayers could vote. The ease or 
difficulty of the voter registration procedure is important because 
it can raise or lower the costs of voting. One study using aggregate 
analysis shows that the proportion of voters registered resulting from 
1. These requirements applied to the 1974 local elections but 
have since been slightly amended. 
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the ease or difficulty of the registration procedure accounts 
1 for more variance in voter turnout than any other measure. 
Another factor that suggests ratepayers would be more likely to 
vote than residents is that since ratepayers pay rates directly 
to the city council,they perceive that they have more to gain or 
lose through the election of certain candidates with certain 
policies. (Other residents also contribute to the city's rates 
but indirectly, via their landlord for example). An hypothesis 
derived from Downs' rational economic theory is that those 
citizens whose incomes are more directly affected by government 
policies are more likely to vote than those who incomes are less 
2 directly affected. It is suggested that since ratepayers feel 
they are the ones who provide the money for the city to operate, 
3 
they may as well have some say in how it is spent. This can be 
seen as rational citizens attempting to maximise their utility 
from the city administration. Overall, it can be seen that rate-
payers have lower costs to incur in voting and greater possible 
benefits to be gained from voting than residents, other things 
being equal. Confirmation of the initial hypothesis is presented 
in Tables 4.17 and 4.18. In all types of local authority except 
suburban cities and boroughs, and counties, the difference in turnout 
1. Stanley Kelly, Richard E. Ayres and William G.Bowen, 
2. 
3. 
"Registration and voting : Putting First Things First", 
American Political Science Review LXI (1967), 359-379. 
Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 14. 
It is not widely known, however, that the income from rates 
is a relatively small proportion of the total income of 
the average city. In Christchurch the proportion is about 
15 per cent. See J.H. Gray, An Outline of Local Government 
in New Zealand (Christchurch: Hillside Publications, 1976), 
p. 60. 
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between ratepayers and residents was 7 or 8 per cent. In West and 
Pegasus wards the difference was slightly less. 
TABLE 4.17 TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION - 1974 NEW 
ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS 
Type of Local Authority Ratepayer Resident 
Christchurch City 61% 54% 
Four main cities 56 48 
Provincial cities 53 45 
Suburban cities & boroughs 42 41 
Other boroughs 61 54 
Counties 65 66 
Source: N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, "Local 
Authority Elections 1974", Tables 1-5. 
TABLE 4.18 TURNOUT BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION - WEST AND 
PEGASUS WARDS 
Ward 
West 
Pegasus 
Ratepayer 
67% 
54 
Resident 
61% 
51 
To summarise the importance of political factors, the fact 
that the Christchurch election was a local government election did 
influence the turnout; the type of voting system did not seem to 
be important, while electoral qualification is a factor that needs 
to be considered when accounting for local election turnouts. 
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CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The large discrepancy between the North ward survey 
turnout figure and the estimate based on polling booth returns 
suggest that conclusions from the survey should be regarded as 
tentative only. However, firmer conclusions can be drawn from the 
West and Pegasus turnout figures based on the master roll analysis. 
A number of social characteristics (neighbourhood, occupation, age, 
marital status and length of residence) are related to turnout in 
the three samples, although none of the relationships are very 
strong. Measures of psychological involvement (interest in 
politics, political awareness, cross-pressures) have stronger 
relationships with turnout. The political considerations of type 
of election and electoral qualification are related to turnout. 
According to the analyses in this chapter, a person is more likely 
to vote if he or she has lived in a higher status neighbourhood 
for some length of time, has a high occupational status, is over 
forty years old, married (women only), interested in and aware of 
politics, not cross-pressured by different party allegiances and a 
ratepayer. 
It is possible to apply a number of theoretical notions 
regarding the voting decision to the study of a New Zealand local 
election. An attempt is made to show how a theory of rational 
wealth-maximising behaviour can explain why people bother to vote. 
The rational choice model is not entirely successful in explaining 
the different rates of voting participation among different social 
groups and categories in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. 
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Some variables which the theory strongly suggests should be 
related to turnout are not; these are class, education and sex. 
With regard to social groups the model does not provide a very 
clear picture of the active electorate in Christchurch, nor does 
it provide a very adequate answer to the question: 'Who 
participates in elections and why?' The results of the investigation 
into psychological involvement and voting participation support 
both rational choice theory - by showing that people act so as to 
maximise their expected utility - and the social-psychological 
model - by showing that psychological involvement in politics is 
related to voting behaviour. Most of the voters in the sample were 
the most interested and the most informed about candidates and 
issues. Psychological variables were more closely related to turnout 
than sociological variables. Psychological variables provided a 
relativeiy clearer picture of the active electorate and some of 
the answers to the question: 'Who participates in elections and 
why?' Political factors and rational choice theory were partially 
successful in accounting for different rates of turnout. The type 
of election and electoral qualification were related to turnout, . 
yet the type of voting system and size of constituency were not. 
The political variables tested in this study give some answers to 
the question 'who participates and why?' This chapter as a whole 
does not provide a clear answer to the central question: 'Who 
participates in elections and why?' for such an answer must be 
almost impossible. However some possible answers have been suggested. 
We now examine more closely voter turnout at successive elections, its 
relationship to the partisan division of the vote and the 
consequences for election outcomes. 
CHAPTER V 
SURGE AND COUNTER-SURGE 
Angus Campbell has put forward a theory of political 
motivation and electoral change that tries to account for 
variations in voter turnout and the partisan division of the vote 
. 1 . 1 at successive e ections. He seeks to explain two interesting 
phenomena in United States electoral politics. These are: (1) 
the tendency for a sharp increase in voter turnout to be 
associated with a strong increase in the vote for one party,while 
there is little change in the vote for the other, and (2) the 
tendency for the party which has won the Presidency to lose seats 
in the House of Representatives in the off-year election which 
2 follows. The aim of this chapter is to use Campbell's model to 
help explain the variations in voter turnout and the partisan 
division of the vote which were first observed through aggregate 
data at the 1968, 1971 and 1974 Christchurch City Council elections. 
Between the 1968 and 1971 elections there was a sharp increase in 
voter turnout accompanied by an equally large increase in the vote 
1. 
2. 
Angus Campbell, "Surge and Decline : A Study of Electoral 
Change", in Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the 
Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 3. 
These regularities were pointed out by v.o. Key, Jr., 
Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups (New York: 
Crowell, 4th ed., 1958), p. 638. 
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for the Labour Party. Between the 1971 and 1974 elections there 
was another increase in turnout accompanied this time by a large 
increase in the vote for the Citizens Association. Data from the 
North ward survey will be used to shed light on these trends. 
First, the elements of the model are explained and a rational 
choice explanation of surge and decline is offered; then the 
relevant empirical evidence from the North ward survey· is 
analysed. 
THE MODEL OF SURGE AND DECLINE 
Campbell begins with a general proposition about the 
nature of electoral change: 
"Fluctuations in the turnout and partisanship of the 
vote in the national elections are primarily determined 
by short-term political forces which become important 
for the voter at election time. These forces move the 
turnout by adding stimulation to the underlying level 
of political interest of the electorate, and they move 
the partisanship of the vote from a baseline of 
'standing commitments' to one or the other of the two 
parties." 1 
Campbell goes on to present a number of specific propositions which 
elaborate this general statement and these are summarised below. 
He then applies the model to a series of United States presidential 
and congressional elections. 
Short-term political stimulation in an election derives 
from several sources: candidates, especially party leaders; issues; 
and other events and circumstances of the moment. The intensity and 
character of this stimulation varies from one election to the next 
1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 41. 
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resulting in the classification of low-stimulus elections and 
high-stimulus elections. The essential difference between a high-
stimulus and a low-stimulus election lies in what Downs calls the 
voter's party differential, 1 that is, the importance the electorate 
attaches to the choice between the various party-candidate 
alternatives offered. 
The notion of underlying political interest is used to 
describe the individual's level of concern with political matters. 
It is regarded as an enduring personal characteristic - the result 
of political socialisation. 
Party identification derives primarily from a basic 
psychological attachment to a political party. It is generally 
stable o~er time and tends to influence political perceptions, 
attitudes and acts in a partisan direction. 
Differences in turnout between elections are brought about 
by changes in non-political circumstances (such as bad weather on 
election day) and/or changes in the level of political stimulation. 
Campbell describes three types of electors: (1) 'core voters' who 
comprise a large proportion of the turnout and whose level of 
political interest is sufficiently high to take them to the polls 
in all elections, including low-stimulus elections; (2) 'peripheral 
voters' whose level of political interest is lower, but whose 
1. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy {New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 3. 
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motivation to vote has been sufficiently increased by the 
stimulation of the election situation; and (3) non-voter3 who do 
not vote even in high-stimulus elections because of non-political 
factors or because their political interest is too low to motivate 
them. The turnout in any one election is largely dependent on the 
nwnber of peripheral voters who are sufficiently stimulated to 
vote. A high-interest election will bring them to the polls, while 
a low-interest election will be decided largely by core voters. 
The partisan division of the vote in any one election is 
a consequence of the partisan forces on the voters. Superimposed 
on the underlying party identifications are the contemporary elements 
of politics which tend to swing votes either way. In a low-stimulus 
election these elements are weak resulting in a low turnout and a 
division of the vote which follows party lines. In the absence of 
strong pressures from candidates or issues, party loyalty holds the 
voters to their respective tickets. In a high-stimulus election 
candidates and issues exert strong influences on the vote and 
motivate a surge of peripheral voters to the polls. This increase 
in the motivation to vote "will also swing the partisan division 
of the vote toward the party which happens to be advantaged by the 
circumstances of the moment. 111 It is very unlikely that a high-
stimulus election will favour the different party-candidate 
alternatives equally. "Increases in turnout will consequently be 
accompanied by shifts in the partisanship of the vote. 112 
1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 44. 
2. Ibid., p. 44. 
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The partisan surge which characterises a high-stimulus 
election consists of two components: 
"(l) those peripheral voters for whom the stimulus 
of highly differentiated party-candidate alternatives 
provides the needed impetus to move them to the polls 
and who, depending on the strength of their party 
identification, are swung towards the ticket of the 
advantaged party, and (2) those core voters who are 
drawn from their normal position as Independents or 
identifiers with the disadvantaged party to the 
candidate of the party which is advantaged by the 
political circumstances of the moment." 1 
If a high-stimulus election is followed by a low-stimulus 
election, there will be a decline in the total vote, and a 
decline also in the proportion of the vote received by the party 
advantaged by the political circumstances of the preceding election. 
The two components of this decline are: (1) the dropout of those 
peripheral voters who had voted previously, and who had given the 
advantaged party a majority of their votes; and (2) the return to 
their usual voting positions of those core voters who had moved 
to support the advantaged party in the surge election, the 
identifiers with the disadvantaged party moving back to the support 
of that party, and the Independents back to a position between the 
parties. Of those whose normal identification was with the advantaged 
party, the peripheral voters would drop out in the low-stimulus 
election and the core voters would continue their support. Campbell 
calls this whole electoral process the 'cycle of surge and decline'. 
1. Ibid., p. 44. 
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A RATIONAL CHOICE EXPLANATION 
Rational choice theory can help explain the phenomenon 
of surge and decline. In high-stimulus elections there is a 
greater amount of political information flowing around about 
parties, personalities and issues, and because of this there is 
a greater likelihood of low-interest peripheral voters picking 
up accidentally a reasonable amount of 'free' information. As 
well the overall costs of obtaining information are reduced for 
everyone, but especially for the peripheral voters. Hence with 
their costs reduced, the turnout of peripheral voters increases. 1 
As Campbell points out, it is unlikely that all this extra cheap 
information will favour the party-candidate alternatives equally. 
Hence the large decrease in the costs of obtaining information that 
comes from a high-stimulus election is associated with a strong 
increase in the vote for one party. Thus the hypothesis follows 
that if there is a large decrease in the costs of obtaining 
information, then there will be a strong increase in the vote for 
one party. The other component of the partisan surge at high-
stimulus elections is due to those core voters who are drawn froM 
their normal positions as Independents or identifiers with the 
disadvantaged party to the advantaged party. Since the distance 
between the parties increases at high-stimulus elections, one party 
will be seen by these core voters to offer more benefits than the other. 
Thus their party differential increases, that is, they see a bigger 
1. This conclusion follows from Downs, An Economic Theory, 
chap. 14. 
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choice between the alternatives offered, and they vote for the 
party offering them the greatest benefits - the advantaged party. 
If a low-stimulus election follows a high-stimulus 
election, then the costs of obtaining information will increase 
and the peripheral voters who supported the advantaged party of the 
previous election will drop out because they cannot bear the costs 
involved. Also those core voters who moved from their normal voting 
positions to vote for the advantaged party will move back as the 
perceived difference between the parties decreases. In a low-
stimulus election, the vote with the least cost and greatest 
benefits is the vote consistent with one's standing party loyalty. 
Hence there will be a decline in the total vote and a decline in 
the share of the vote received by the advantaged party at the 
preceding election. 
1968-1971 : A CASE OF ELECTORAL SURGE 
Campbell notes that: 
"We think it likely that the basic concepts which 
we have relied on in this analysis .•• are equally 
applicable to the understanding of political 
behaviour in other democratic systems." 1 
Indeed, the basic concepts are particularly applicable to the under-
standing of recent Christchurch City Council elections. As in the 
United States the phenomenon of surge and decline in Christchurch was 
first suggested by aggregate data. Table 5.1 shows the results of 
the 1968 and 1971 Christchurch mayoral elections. 
1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 62. 
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TABLE 5.1 1968 AND 1971 MAYORAL ELECTIONS (TWO-PARTY VOTE) 
Citizens Labour Differ- Turn- Differ-
ence out ence 
1968: 23 273 64% 12 910 36% 43% 
+16% +16% 
1971: 23 212 48% 25 121 52% 59% 
Judging by the level of turnout 1968 was a low-stimulus 
election in which only 43 per cent of the voters were attracted to 
the polls. The retiring Mayor had ~one little to create any 
controversy and both mayoral candidates failed to produce any great 
enthusiasm for a large turnout. The winner in 1968, A.R. Guthrey 
(Citizens) was an activist mayor who antagonised many people 
with his controversial statements and actions. In the 1971 
election he supported the Citizens proposals for the controversial 
Hagley Park road and the use of Porritt Park as the venue for 
the 1974 Commonwealth Games. (These two items were very big 
issues in that election. Even three years later when the North 
ward survey was conducted,42 per cent of the sample could 
recall the Commonwealth Games site as an issue in 197Lwhile 
35 per cent could recall the Hagley Park road as an issue). 
At the 1971 election there was a sharp increase in turnout of 16 per 
cent accompanied by a 16 per cent increase in the vote for the 
Labour candidate, Mr Neville Pickering. While Labour's vote almost 
doubled, Guthrey's vote did not reduce; it remained steady at 23 200. 
The sharp increase in turnout characteristic of a high-stimulus 
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election was thus "associated with an increase in the vote for 
one party [Labour], with little change in the vote for the other. 111 
The Increase in Turnout 
Respondents in the North ward survey were questioned about 
their turnout at the 1968 and 1971 elections. Analysis of the 
responses of those eligible to vote in both elections (N= 109) 
reveals that there were four components to the 1968-71 increase 
in turnout: 
(i) 71 per cent voted in both 1968 and 1971; 
(ii) 1 per cent voted in 1968 and not 1971; 
(iii) 13 per cent voted in 1971 and not 1968; 
(iv) 15 per cent voted in neither election. 2 
The social characteristics of these four segments were 
examined to see if there were any significant differences between 
core voters, peripheral voters and persistent non-voters. With 
regarq to occupational status,the core voters who voted in both 
elections and the peripheral voters who voted in one election but 
not the other did not differ in any significant way. However, the 
persistent non-voters were more likely to be of lower occupational 
1. 
2. 
This is the description of surge given in Ibid., p. 40. 
There is a discrepancy between these reports and the actual 
turnout figures for 1968 and 1971. The suggested reasons 
why the North ward survey reports of turnout are higher 
than the actual turnout are discussed in Chapter IV. In 
the present case the recall of both the 1968 and 1971 
turnoutsappear to be overstated. This introduces some 
distortion into the relative size of the different components 
of the vote and some restraints on the conclusions that can 
be drawn from the data. 
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status. There were no significant differences with respect to 
social class. The core voters tended to have had some higher 
education whereas both the peripheral and non-voters tended 
not to have had higher education. Core voters came equally from 
young and old age groups, peripheral voters were mainly younger, 
and non-voters were almost all younger persons. Core voters 
tended to have lived longer in the community whereas both peripheral 
and non-voters tended to have lived in the community for shorter 
lengths of time. There were slight differences between the sexes. 
Core and peripheral voters were more often women and the non-voters 
contained more men. The biggest difference between the core and 
peripheral voters, however, was in their respective levels of 
political interest. 
Table 5.2 shows that the core voters were by far the most 
interested in Christchurch City Council politics in general. Nineteen 
per cent of the core voters had a 'great deal' of interest in 
Christchurch City Council politics, whereas none of the peripheral 
voters had this high level of interest. Core voters were also more 
interested in the 1971 election itself. Twenty-four per cent of 
those who voted in both 1968 and 1971 said they had a 'great deal' of 
interest in the election,but only 13 per cent of those who voted in 
one election but not the other reported a similarly high level of 
interest. None of the non-voters said they had a 'great deal' of 
intrest in the 1971 election. Those responsible for the major 
difference in turnout between 1968 and 1971, while not always distinct 
TABLE 5.2 INTEREST IN CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL POLITICS 
BY 1968-1971 TURNOUT 
127. 
INTEREST IN POLITICS* TURNOUT 
Great Deal 
Quite a lot 
Some 
None 
x2 
* 
Voted in Voted in one 
both 1968 election but 
and 1971 not the other 
19% 0% 
27 13 
50 67 
4 20 
100% 100% 
(N=78) (N=lS) 
(Chi-square) not valid (NV) because expected 
frequencies less than five. 
Voted in 
neither 
election 
6% 
13 
50 
31 
100% 
(N=l6) 
Based on responses to the question, "How much 
interest do you generally have in what goes 
on in Christchurch City Council politics - a 
great deal, quite a lot, some or none at all?" 
with respect to their social group characteristics, were distinctly 
less interested in city council politics and the 1971 election. 
The 1968-1971 surge in turnout was thus mainly du e to low-interest 
peripheral voters who were motivated to go to the polls by the 
high-stimulus election. 
The Swing in Partisanship 
Without the candidates and issues of 1971, the 1963 
election was a low-stimulus election that g ene rated a low turnout. 
In 1971 the turnout increased dramatically and there was a large 
shift in the partisanship of a large proportion of the 1968 voters 
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1 Table 5.3). Those 1971 voters who did not vote in 1968 
divided equally between th0 two parties in 1971, but Pickering's 
decisive margin came from the 1968 voters. 
TABLE 5.3 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1968 TURNOUT 
1971 MAYORAL VOTE 1968 TURNOUT 
Voted Did not vote 
Guthrey 
Pickering 
Did not vote 
44% 
55 
1 
23% 
23 
54 
100% 100% 
(N=75) (N=30) 
x2 = 42.29 p<.001 
where p is the probability the relationship is random. 
The model predicts, however, that in a high-stimulus 
election (such as 1971) the increase in the motivation to vote -
which generates a surge of peripheral voters into voting - will 
also swing the partisan division of the vote toward the party which 
happens to be advantaged by the circumstances of the moment. It 
appears that the increase in the motivation to vote in 197~ which 
brought the surge of peripheral voters to the polls,did not swing 
the partisan division of the vote to Labour. Rather the swing to 
1. Since the respondents in the North ward survey were not 
asked who they voted for in the 1968 mayoral election, 
it is not possible to pinpoint the swing in partisanship 
between 1968 and 1971. However, we do know that 64 per 
cent of the whole electorate voted for Guthrey in 1968. 
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Labour crune from the core voters who voted in 1968. This suggests 
that while the surge in tu~nout did not contribute to Pickering's 
victory, the political circumstances that created the surge (the 
sharply defined issues and Guthrey's personality) acted decisively 
in Pickering's favour since they swung the votes of many of those 
who had (presumably) voted for Guthrey in 1968. The conclusion to 
be drawn from this is that a surge in turnout does not always on its 
own contribute to a swing in partisanship. It is easy to conclude 
from aggregate statistics that a surge in turnout (such as that 
between 1968 and 1971) is responsible for a swing in partisanship, 
but it is not until survey data are exrunined that more positive 
conclusions can be drawn. 
More can be learnt about the nature of the changes between 
1968 and 1971 by exrunining the party identifications of the 1971 
voters (Table 5.4). Those who voted in 1968 and who voted Guthrey 
in 1971 contained a high proportion of Citizens identifiers. This 
confirms one of the hypotheses about a high-stimulus surge. When 
the tide is running against a party as it was for Citizens in 1971, 
it reduces that party mainly to its loyal partisans; the party 
loses support from the Independents. The advantaged party, in this 
case Labour, benefits especially from the Independents. Forty-four 
per cent of those who voted in 1968 and voted Pickering in 1971 were 
Independents,as opposed to only 31 per cent of those who voted in 
1968 and voted Guthrey in 1971. However, 9 per cent of those who 
voted in 1968 and voted Guthrey in 1971 were Labour identifiers, 
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TABLE 5.4 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1968 TURNOUT BY LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Party 
Identification 
Very strongly 
Citizens 
Fairly strongly 
Citizens 
Not very strongly 
Citizens 
Independent 
Not very strongly 
Labour 
Fairly strongly 
Labour 
Very strongly 
Labour 
X2 NV 
1968: 
1971: 
Voted Voted Did not 
vote 
Guthrey Pickering Guthrey 
24% 0% (1) 
24 2 (1) 
12 0 (0) 
31 44 (3) 
3 10 (0) 
6 24 (1) 
0 20 _ill_ 
100% 100% (N=7) 
(N=33) (N=41) 
Did not 
vote 
Pickering 
(O) 
(0) 
(0) 
(3) 
(O) 
(1) 
(2) 
(N=6) 
while only 2 per cent of the 1968 voters who voted Pickering in 1971 
were Citizens supporters. While Pickering won more of the Independents' 
votes, Guthrey won more votes from supporters of the opposite party 
than Pickering did. (Due to small numbers it is not possible to 
make any generalisations about the party identifications of the 
1971 voters who did not vote in 1968.) 
Thus it appears that the 1968-1971 increase in turnout was 
mainly due to the high-stimulus election in 1971 which motivated 
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a surge of voters to the polls and that the shift in partisanship 
between 1968 and 1971 was mainly due to those Independent core 
voters who swung to Labour. 
1971-1974 : A CASE OF COUNTER-SURGE 
While he was mayor between 1971 and 1974 Pickering - like 
Guthrey - was an activist, but he was an even more controversial 
figure who antagonised people very easily. He was the focus of 
attention on the local political scene and his comments on many 
local issues frequently made the headlines. The Citizens candidate 
in 1974 was the well-known, long-serving councillor Hamish Hay 
whose mild-mannered personality was overshadowed by his opponent's. 
There were no obvious issues in 1974 that were ?imilar to the big 
issues of 1971. Hence it was expected that there would be a 
corresponding decline in turnout. 
According to the model of surge and decline a high-stimulus, 
high-turnout election tends to be followed by a low-stimulus, low-
turnout election, for as Campbell argues: "Swings away from the 
basic division of party loyalties in high-turnout elections tend 
to swing back in the low-turnout election which follows. 1 Thus, 
according to the model, it was expected that the 1974 election would 
constitute the 'decline' component of the model. However the 
aggregate statistics tell a very different story as Table 5.5 shows. 
1. Campbell, "Surge and Decline", p. 62. 
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TABLE 5.5 1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS (TWO-PARTY VOTE) 
Citizens Labour Differ- Turn- Differ-
ence out ence 
1968: 23 273 64% 12 910 36% 43% 
+16% +16% 
1971: 23 212 48% 25 121 52% 59% 
-4% +2% 
1974: 29 482 52% 27 237 48% 61% 
Instead of a pattern of surge and decline we have what looks like a 
pattern of 'surge and counter-surge'. The turnout, instead of 
decreasing, apparently increased slightly1 and it was "associated 
with a strong increase in the vote for one party [Citizens], with 
2 little change in the vote for the other." The·1974 election was 
another high-stimulus election which had the effect of increasing 
the turnout and maintaining the 1971 level of support for Labour. 
The crucial impact of the high-stimulus election, however, was to 
1. 
2. 
This 'slight' increase in turnout is more apparent than real. 
In fact there were 10 000 more voters in 1974 than in 1971, 
but the number on the roll increased by 13 800. In 1971 there 
were 12 800 more voters than in 1968, but the number on the roll 
remained steady due to the first purging of the roll in eight 
years. The fact that the number on the roll remained steady 
between 1968 and 1971 means that the 12 800 increase in turn-
out shows up as a 16 per cent surge in turnout. If the number 
on the roll had remained steady between 1971 and 1974, then 
the 10 000 increase in turnout would also show up as a surge 
in turnout {of 11 per cent) rather than a small increase (of 
2 per cent). The percentage turnout would then by 70 per cent 
instead of 61 per cent. It seems, then, that it would be fair 
to describe the increase in turnout between 1971 and 1974 as a 
'surge' rather than as a 'slight increase'· 
This is again Campbell's description of surge. See Campbell, 
"Surge and Decline", p. 40. 
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motivate another surge of voters into voting for the newly 
advantaged party of this election which was Citizens. 
What stimulated the surge in turnout in 1974? The survey 
in North ward suggests that the influence of the candidates' 
personalities was a key factor. Twenty per cent of the sample in 
North spontaneously mentioned the personalities of the mayoral 
candidates as an issue in the election, and when asked why they 
were voting for their candidate, fully 59 per cent of the intending 
voters gave as their reason the personality of one or both of the 
mayoral candidates. It was Pickering the Labour candidate who 
polarised most of the voters into being either for or against him. 
Forty-one per cent of the intending voters gave Pickering's 
personality as a reason for voting either for or against him; in 
contrast only 18 per cent mentioned Hay's personality. 
The Increase in Turnout 
Respondents in North ward were asked about their voting 
behaviour at the 1971 and 1974 elections. Analysis of the responses 
of those eligible to vote in both elections (N= 161) shows that 
there were three components to the 1971-74 increase in turnout: 
(i) 79 per cent voted in 1971 and intended to vote in 
1974; 
(ii) O per cent voted in 1971 and did not intend to vote 
in 1974; 
(iii) 16 per cent intended to vote in 1974 and did not vote 
in 1971; 
(iv) 5 per cent did not vote in 1971 and did not 
intend to vote in 1974. 1 
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The most interesting group is the 1971 non-voters who intended 
to vote in 1974. These are the peripheral voters who - although 
eligible - were not drawn to the polls in the high-stimulus 
election of 1971. The issues of 1971 failed to motivate them but 
the issues and events leading up to the 1974 election apparently 
provided the motivation. 
The social characteristics of the three segments of the 
electorate were examined to see if there were any significant 
differences between them. Those who voted in 1971 and 1974 were 
more often of higher occupational status than those who intended 
to vote only in 1974, who were higher in status.than the persistent 
non-voters. There were marked differences in social class - a 
variable that has not been associated with turnout until now. 
Fifty-two per cent of those who intended to vote only in 1974 said 
they were middle class, while 42 per cent of the voters in both 
elections and only 29 per cent of the non-voters were middle class. 
With regard to education there were no significant differences 
between the voters in both elections and those who voted in 1974 
but not 1971, but the non-voters were less well-educated. Voters 
in both elections tended to be older than the 1974 voters who abstained 
1. Again there is a discrepancy between these reports and the 
actual turnout figures for 1971 and 1974. The intention 
to vote in 1974 appears to be quite overstated. This has 
the effect of inflating the size of the 1971 non-voters 
who intended to vote in 1974 and the group of voters who 
voted in both elections. It also has the effect of 
understating the size of the 1971 voters who dropped out in 
1974 - no one was in this category. 
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in 1971, who were older than non-voters. There were slight 
differences with respect to sex. Voters in 1971 and 1974 were 
more often women, while those who intended to vote only in 1974 
were more often men, and non-voters were equally divided between 
the sexes. 
The differences in the various levels of political interest 
tell us more about the three types of electors. Those who voted 
in 1971 and 1974 had more interest in city council politics. 
Fourteen per cent of these voters had a 'great deal' of interest 
while 8 per cent of those who intended to vote only in 1974 and none 
of the non-voters had similarly high levels of interest. Similarly 
when asked about their interest in the 1971 election 19 per cent of 
those who voted in both elections had a 'great deal' of interest 
while 8 per cent of those who voted in 1974 but not 1971 and none 
of the non-voters had that amount of interest. Thpse people who 
increased the turnout in 1974, while not always distinct with respect 
to their social characteristics, clearly lacked an intrinsic interest 
in politics. However, this group had significantly more interest 
in the 1974 election compared to the 1971 election than did those 
who voted in both years (Table 5.6). For most of the consistent 
voters the 1974 election held about the same amount of interest. 
Those who intended to vote only in 1974 had much less 
interest in city council politics generally and in the 1971 election 
in which they abstained, but they had a great deal more interest in 
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TABLE 5.6 INTEREST IN 1974 COMPARED TO 1971 BY 1971-1974 
TURNOUT 
INTEREST IN 1974 TURNOUT 
COMPARED TO Voted in Did not vote in Voted in 
More 
Same 
Less 
1971* 1971 and 1971 but intend- neither 
intended ed to vote in election 
to vote 1974 
in 1974 
interest 30% 64% 38% 
interest 55 28 25 
interest 15 8 37 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=l25) (N=25) (N=8) 
X2 NV 
* Based on responses to the question, "Would you 
say that you have more interest or less interest 
in this (1974] election, or about the same 
amount of interest?" 
the 1974 election than in 1971. It is suggested that it was this 
increase in political interest in the one election that motivated 
the 1971 non-voters to the polls and produced the surge in turnout. 
Most noteworthy is the fact that this increase in interest did not 
correspond to a high level of interest in city council politics 
generally. It related to the one high-stimulus election. It is this 
kind of voter who is motivated only by the high-stimulus election; 
in a low-stimulus election he would probably abstain since he lacks 
an underlying interest in politics. It appears that the people who 
increased the turnout in 1974 were similar to the people who increased 
the turnout in 1971 in that they were both less interested in politics 
generally. Both groups were motivated by the circumstances of each 
137. 
election rather than an intrinsic interest in politics itself. 
Almost all of those 1968 non-voters who surged to the 
polls in 1971 voted again in 1974 (Table 5.7). As well most of 
TABLE 5.7 TURNOUT IN 1974 BY TURNOUT IN 1968 AND 1971* 
1974 TURNOUT 1968-1971 TURNOUT 
Voted in Voted in Voted in Voted in 
both 1971 & 1968 & neither 
1968 & not not election 
1971 1968 1971 
Intend to vote 80% 93% {l) 69% 
Do not intend 
to vote 6 0 (0) 25 
Don't know 14 7 _lQl_ 6 
100% 100% (N=l) 100% 
(N=78} (N=l4) (N=l6) 
X2 NV 
* Only those eligible to vote in all three election 
are included. 
the 1968-71 core voters intended to vote again. The 1974 election 
also stimulated a very large proportion of the 1968-71 non-voters, 
although a small core still remained unmoved. 
The Swing in Partisanship 
Between 1971 and 1974 the number of votes won by the Citizens 
mayoral candidates increased from 23 000 to 29 000, while the number 
of votes won by Pickering, the Labour candidate, increased only 
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slightly from 25 000 to 27 000. The high-stimulus election of 
1974 brought at least 10 000 voters to the polls who had not voted 
in 1971 and shifted the partisanship of the vote to Citizens. 
Tables 5.8 and 5.9 contain the same basic data regarding 
mayoral voting in 1971 and 1974,but the percentages are calculated 
from different bases. In Table 5.8 Pickering has a slight edge 
over Hay among those voters who voted for the same party in both 
years. That is, even though the tide was running against him 
Pickering held on to a large proportion of his 1971 voters as Table 
5.9 shows. In both tables Hay has a slim margin among those who 
switched their votes from 1971 to 1974. Both tables show the 
important impact of the 'new voters' of 1974 who were ineligible 
to vote in 1971. Those eligible to vote in both elections and 
who did not vote in 1971 divided equally between Hay and Pickering 
in 1974. However when the new voters are included, Hay's small 
but decisive margin can be seen. It appears from the survey that 
it was a small number of Pickering-Hay switchers plus a slightly 
larger number of 1974 new voters who gave Hay his slight but 
sufficient margin over Pickering. (The margin may appear to be 
quite small but it should be remembered that the election was as 
close in North as it was over the city as a whole. In North 
Hay won only 52.4 per cent of the two-party vote to Pickering's 
47.6 per cent, and in the city Hay won 52.0 per cent to Pickering's 
48.0 per cent). Hay in fact won a large majority among the new 
voters. Sixty-three per cent of them said they would vote for Hay 
while 37 per cent intended to vote for Pickering. Just over half 
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TABLE 5.8 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE 
1971 1974 Includes only those Includes those 
vote voting eligible to vote in ineligible to vote 
intention both elections in 1971 (ie. the 
'new voters' in 1974) 
Guthrey Hay 33% 22% 
Pickering Pickering 35 24 
Guthrey Pickering 6 4 
Pickering Hay 7 5 
Guthrey Did not vote 0 0 
Pickering Did not vote 0 0 
Did not 
vote Hay 9 16 
Did not 
vote Pickering 9 14 
Did not 
vote Did not vote 1 15 
100% 100% 
(N=l29) (N=l91) 
TABLE 5 .9 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE 
1971 VOTE 1974 
VOTING 
INTENTION Guthrey Pickering Did not vote 
(A) (B) 
Hay 84% 17% 46% 35% 
Pickering 16 83 46 31 
Will not vote 0 0 8 34 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
{N=Sl) (N=54) (N=24) (N=86) 
x2 NV 
(A) Includes only those eligible to vote in both elections. 
(B) Includes those ineligible to vote in 1971 (ie. the 
'new voters' of 1974). 
140. 
these new voters were young people voting for the first time. 
More light can be shed on the nature of the changes 
between 1971 and 1974 by looking at the party identifications of 
the 1974 voters (Table 5.10). Similar to the 1968-71 pattern, 
those who voted Pickering in both 1971 and 1974 contained a high 
proportion of Labour identifiers. When one party is advantaged 
by the circumstances of the moment, as Citizens was in 1974 (and 
Labour was in 1971),it reduces the losing party mainly to its 
loyal followers. As in 1971 the Independents moved to support 
the advantaged party; 38 per cent of the Guthrey-Hay voters were 
Independents as opposed to only 28 per cent of the constant 
Pickering voters. Those who switched their votes from 1971 to 1974 
came from most party groups but were mainly Independents and weak 
·a ·f · 1 1 enti iers. Of the Guthrey-Pickering switchers, 33 per cent 
appear to be Labour identifiers returning back to the party they 
normally support while 22 per cent are Citizens identifiers voting 
for the Labour candidate. Similarly 37 per cent of the Pickering-
Hay switchers appear to be Citizens identifiers returning to their 
usual party position while ·13 per cent are Labour identifiers 
switching to Citizens. The party affiliations of the two groups 
of 1974 voters who failed to vote in 1971 suggest further insights 
into the interaction of party identification and the partisan 
pressures of a high-stimulus election. Those 1971 non-voters who 
voted for Pickering in 1974 were exclusively Labour identifiers and 
1. Due to small numbers in the remaining columns of Table 
5.10 the following conclusions can only be tentative. 
TABLE 5.10 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Party Identification 1971: Guthrey Pickering Guthrey Pickering 
1974: Hay Pickering Pickering Hay 
Very strongly Citizens 18% 0% 11% 0% 
Fairly strongly Citizens 28 0 0 25 
Not very strongly Citizens 13 0 11 12 
Independent 38 28 45 50 
Not very strongly Labour 0 11 0 13 
Fairly strongly Labour 0 35 22 0 
Very strongly Labour 3 26 11 0 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
(N=39) (N=43) (N=9) (N=8) 
x2 NV 
Did not vote 
Hay 
0% 
45 
0 
46 
0 
0 
9 
100% 
(N=ll) 
Did not vote 
Pickering 
0% 
0 
0 
60 
10 
10 
20 
100% 
(N=lO) 
I-' 
.:::. 
I-' 
• 
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Independents. They were motivated into voting but their party 
loyalty was strong enough ~o enable them to resist the swing to 
Citizens. In contrast 9 per cent of the non-voters who were 
motivated into voting for Hay were very strong Labour identifiers. 
They had been brought out of abstention and contributed to the 
surge to Citizens. 
As well as examining the party identifications of the 1974 
voters we can examine the consistency with which the 1971-74 
voting groups supported the city council ticket of the mayoral 
candidate they preferred in 1974. This provides further information 
about the voting behaviour of the components of the 1971-74 swing. 
In Table 5.11 it can be seen that those consistent Pickering voters 
who withstood the surge to Citizens in 1974 were strongly corrunitted 
to the support of the Labour Party as indicated by their high level 
of straight ticket voting. As well most of those who came out of 
abstention to vote for Pickering in 1974 voted a straight Labour 
. k 1 tic et. This supports the earlier observation that when the tide 
is running against a party it reduces that party to its partisans 
or straight ticket voters. The consistent Citizens voters also had 
a fairly high record of straight ticket voting. The Hay voters who 
abstained in 1971 contained a larger proportion of split ticket 
voters. Some of these 1971 non-voters who surged to vote for Hay 
were strong Labour identifiers as Table 5.10 revealed; these people 
did not go all the way to voting a straight Citizens ticket. Those 
1. Due to the small numbers in Table 5.11 these conclusions 
can only be tentative. 
TABLE 5.11 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTING PATTERN 
1974 Mayoral and Council 1971: Guthrey Pickering Guthrey Pickering Did not vote 
Voting Pattern 1974: Hay Pickering Pickering Hay Hay 
Voted straight ticket 45% 65% 29% 33% 66% 
Voted straight ticket 
except for one council 
candidate* 36 16 14 33 17 
Voted split ticket 19 19 57 34 17 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
{N=31) {N=37) .. (N=7) (N=6) (N=6) 
x2 NV 
* Voters could vote for four council candidates in North ward. 
Did not vote 
Pickering 
63% 
37 
0 
100% 
(N=B) 
..... 
~ 
w 
. 
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who switched votes from 1971 to 1974 were far more likely to 
have voted split tickets. Only 29 per cent of the Guthrey-
Pickering switchers went all the way to vote a straight Labour 
ticket. Similarly only one-third of the Pickering-Hay switchers 
voted a straight Citizens ticket. Table 5.10 revealed that these 
switchers were mainly Independents and weak identifiers and this 
lack of strong loyalty is consistent with their voting patterns. 
Further analysis of the North ward data enables us to trace 
the voting behaviour over time of those 1968 non-voters who surged 
to vote in 1971. We know that they surged about equally to 
Guthrey and Pickering in 1971 but how did they behave in 1974? 
Since there was a swing to Citizens in 1974 it is perhaps surprising 
that Pickering held on to as many as 83 per cent of those who surged 
1 
to vote for him in 1971 (Table 5.12). Hay, however, managed to 
hold on to only 71 per cent of those who voted for Guthrey in 1968. 
A large proportion (29 per cent) of those 1968 non-voters who voted 
Guthrey in 1971 voted Pickering in 1974. These people could have 
been uninterested in the 1968 election, brought to the polls in 1971 
because they liked Guthrey's activist style, and switched to Pickering 
in 1974 because they preferred his similar style of politics. The 
first two columns of Table 5.12 show how the true 'core voters' who 
voted in 1968 and 1971 voted in 1974. Most of them voted for the 
same party in 1971 and 1974. Those who did not vote in both 1968 
and 1971 (although they were eligible to do so) voted heavily for 
Pickering in 1974. 
1. Due to the small numbers in Table 5.12 these conclusions 
can only be tentative. 
TABLE 5.12 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY 1971 MAYORAL VOTE BY TURNOUT IN 1968 AND 1971 
1974 
VOTING VOTED IN 1968 & 1971 VOTED IN 1971 & NOT 1968 DID NOT VOTE IN 1968 & 1971 
INTENTION 1971 VOTE: Guthrey Pickering Guthrey Pickering 
Hay 71% 13% 71% 0% 17% 
Pickering 13 74 29 83 75 
Don't know 16 13 0 17 8 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(N=31) (N=38) (N=7) (N=6) (N=l2) 
X2 NV 
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As in 1971 the high-stimulus election of 1974 brought 
a surge of voters to the polls who were motivated by the 
circumstances of the election rather than an underlying interest 
in politics. The swing in partisanship to Citizens between 1971 
and 1974 was brought about by the new voters of 1974 together with 
the 1971-74 vote switchers. These people were mostly Independents 
and weak party identifiers who were likely to have cast split 
ballots in the city council election. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Angus Campbell has presented a theory of the nature of 
electoral change that seeks to explain regularities in American 
electoral behaviour. These are the highly partisan character of 
surges in turnout in presidential elections and the characteristic 
loss which the party winning the Presidency suffers in the follow-
ing off-year elections. It is proposed that fluctuations in turnout 
and partisanship result from a combination of short-term political 
forces superimposed on the underlying level of political interest 
and on the long-term party identifications of the electorate. 
Rational choice theory centering on the effects of information costs 
at high and low-stimulus elections assists in the explanation of 
surge and decline. Data from three elections show that the basic 
concepts of the model are applicable to recent Christchurch City 
Council elections and that they assist in understanding the outcomes 
of those elections. 
The 1968 election was a low-stimulus election in which 
less than half the eligible voters were attracted to the polls. The 
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1971 election was a high-stimulus election brought about by two 
significant issues and resulted in a sharp increase in turnout. 
Those responsible for this increase in turnout - the 1971 voters 
who did not vote in 1968 - were less interested in city council 
politics and the 1971 election than those who voted in both 
elections. The 1968 non-voters were motivated to the polls by 
the high-stimulus election which reduced the costs of voting 
by lowering the costs of obtaining information about the parties, 
personalities and issues. There was a greater chance that these 
low-interest peripheral voters would pick up a reasonable amount 
of 'free' information about the election. The swing in partisanship 
between 1968 and 1971 which gave Pickering his victory was brought 
about not by those 1968 non-voters who surged to the polls in 1971, 
but by the 1968 voters who presumably voted Guthrey in 1968. The 
increase in the motivation to vote in 1971 did not swing the partisa~ 
division of the vote to Labour; rather the political circumstances 
that created the surge swung the votes of the 1968 voters. Analysis 
of the party identifications of this group reveals that it was 
the Independents who contributed most to the partisan surge. The 
decrease in the costs of voting in the 1971 election certainly 
favoured one party at the expense of the other and resulted in a strong 
increase in the vote for the favoured party. The distance between 
the p~rties increased in the high-stimulus election and one party 
was presumably seen to offer more benefits than the other. It was 
the Independent core voters who were drawn to Labour because they 
presumably saw it as the party offering the greatest benefits. 
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The 1974 election was another high-stimulus election 
brought about by Pickering's personality which polarised voters 
into being either for or against him. The increase in turnout 
between 1971 and 1974 was due mainly to citizens who were without 
an underlying interest in city council politics but who had a 
great deal more interest in the high-stimulus election itself. 
A high-stimulus election once again lowered the costs of obtaining 
information about the election and thus increased the likelihood 
that citizens would become more interested in the election itself o 
The counter-surge in partisanship between 1971 and 1974 which 
favoured Hay came mainly from the new voters of 1974 and those 
who voted Pickering in 1971. An increase in the motivation to 
vote was once again associated with a swing in partisanship. 
Analysis of the party identifications and voting patterns of the 
groups of voters reveals that it was the Independents, weak 
identifiers and split ticket voters who contributed most to the 
swing. As in 1971 the low costs of voting in 1974 favoured one 
party at the expense of the other and resulted in a strong increase 
in the vote for the advantaged party. The distance between the 
parties increased and this time it was the Citizens who appeared to 
offer the greatest benefits and who therefore attracted the votes 
of the Independents and weak identifiers. 
Despite the small numbers in the North ward survey, we know 
from a comparison of the survey findings and election results (Tables 
2.1 and 2.2) that the survey was very accurate. A reasonable amount of 
confidence can thus be placed in the tentative conclusions in this 
chapter based on small numbers. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ROLE OF PARTY 
Two questions that are often raised regarding the role of 
party in local government elections are:to what extent is local 
party loyalty an influence on voting behaviour, and what is the 
relationship between voting behaviour in local elections and 
voting behaviour in parliamentary elections? Using the data 
gathered in the North ward survey and both social-psychological 
and rational choice theories, this chapter seeks to throw some 
light on these questions by examining the role of party in the 1974 
Christch~rch City Council election. In the following pages the 
importance of party identification is pointed out and the rationality 
of party voting is discussed. Before the empirical evidence is 
presented, some background about the role of parties in New Zealand 
local elections is given in order that the Christchurch data may 
be seen in perspective. 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
The Importance of Party Identification 
A central thread running through many studies of electoral 
behaviour is the concept of party identification which derives 
from a basic psychological attachment to a political party. 
Research mainly in the United States and Britain has found that most 
people have a party loyalty which remains stable for most of their 
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lives and grows in strength over time. Party identification has 
been found to be a powerful influence on electoral behaviour; 
citizens tend to vote for their party's candidates. Equally 
important are the findings relating party affiliation to other 
phenomena. Party loyalty is a guide to understanding the 
political system; candidates, issues and other elements of 
politics are often evaluated in party terms. Parties are objects 
of mass loyalty and affection; citizens express positive feelings 
towards their party. Partisanship is like a force mobilising 
citizens into political life; those citizens with a party 
"d ·f· · f h · d · 1 d ·t· 1 i enti ication are o ten t e most active an invo ve ci izens. 
Recent research from the United States shows that partisanship is 
declining and that the trends outlined above are occurring less 
2 frequently than before. However, these findings do not mean that 
party idcntif ication is no longer regarded as an important 
analytical variable. 
1. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, 
Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential 
Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); David 
Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain : The 
Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd ed., 
1974); Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: 
John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964); Angus Campbell et al., 
Elections and the Political Order (New York: John Wiley, 
1966); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, 
The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954); 
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson and Hazel Gaudet, 
The People's Choice (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1948). 
2. Walter Dean Burnham, "The United States : The Politics of 
Hetereogeneity", in Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Behaviour 
A Comparative Handbook (New York: The Free Press, 1974), 
chap. 13; Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and John R. Petrocik, 
The Changing American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1976); Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice 
Varieties of Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975). 
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Party identification is one of the most powerful deter-
minants of voting behaviour. The behaviour of the electorate 
is shaped far more by generalised attitudes, beliefs, and images 
about parties than by any specific policy issues. 1 Voters have 
long been able to perceive a link between candidate and party even 
though they may know nothing else about him; a party provides 
a powerful set of cues about a candidate just by selecting him. 
The American Voter points out that "merely associating the party 
symbol with [a candidate's] name encourages those identifying with 
the party to develop a more favourable image of his record and 
experience, his abilities and other personal attributes. 112 The 
main rule of party voting is quite simple. When there is a choice 
between the candidate of the party a citizen identifies with and a 
candidate of an opposing party - he votes for his party. Party 
voting therefore requires the following conditions: The voter has 
a party identification that is long-term and extends across 
elections. There must be candidates from different parties 
contesting the election. Party affiliation must be at least the 
major criterion for voting choice. Without a party identification 
citizens cannot vote on the basis of party. A candidate not 
identifying with a party cannot receive a party vote. 3 
The Party Identifier as a Rational Voter 
The notion of the rational voter, who selects the most 
1. Butler and Stokes, Political Change, chap. 16. 
2. Campbell et al., American Voter, p. 73. 
3. Nie et al., Changing American Voter, pp. 156-157. 
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attractive alternative only after evaluating the available 
options, appears to conflict with the evidence that party 
identification is a major determinant of voting behaviour and 
is established in childhood.before the individual has any 
k 1 d f 1 . 1 now e ge o party po icy. However, there is not necessarily 
any incompatibility between the two. As Goldberg points out, 
party identification learned in childhood might prove to be a 
rationally sound guide to action in adulthood. 2 
The presence of a party affiliation simplifies the election 
for the elector. It assists him in working his way through a maze 
of events, issues and personalities presented to him that he knows 
very little about. In a world where information is difficult to 
obtain and imperfect when obtained, party identification becomes 
an organising precept enabling the individual to behave consist-
ently with his basic political predispositions, without spending 
great efforts in either seeking information or reaching a voting 
decision. Instead of deciding each election which party to support, 
party identifiers can just continue to implement their "standing 
1. See, for example, Fred I. Greenstein, Children in Politics 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, rev. ed., 1969); 
Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, The Development of 
Political Attitudes in Children (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); 
Herbert H. Hyman, Political Socialization : The Development 
of Political Attitudes in Children (Glencoe, Ill.: Free 
Press, 1959). 
2. Arthur S. Goldberg, "Social Determinism and Rationality 
as Bases of Party Identification", American Political 
Science Review LXIII (1969), 5-25. 
-
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decision" 1 to support one party or the other. Such action can 
be an efficient means for the voter to reduce his voting costs 
by saving time and effort, while still expressing his general 
judgement on the government and opposition. Inherited partisan 
affiliations kept generally throughout life are, for many voters, 
a rational means of minimising the costs of voting, especially 
the costs of obtaining information and making decisions about the 
various issues, policies and personalities. 2 
The electoral context within which the voter makes his 
choice has its consequences for the rational voter. In an 
electoral situation partly characterised by vagueness, over-
lapping issue positions and ambiguous campaign statements, the 
rational citizen, after considering the parties' past performance, 
will often find that the groups to which he belongs have fared 
best under governments of the party which happens also to be the 
party of his parents. In most cases this party's candidate is an 
acceptable choice, the voter's party identification and group-
1. v.o. Key, Jr. and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and 
Electoral Decision : The Case of Indiana", in Eugene 
Burdick and Arthur Brodbeck {eds.), American Voting 
Behaviour {Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), p. 286. 
2. This rational choice explanation of party identification 
follows from Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 
(New York: Harper and Row, 1957). See also Butler and 
Stokes, Political Change, p. 37; Goldberg, "Social Deter-
minism"; Pamper, Voters' Choice, pp. 9-10; Kenneth 
Prewitt and Norman Nie, "Review Article: Election Surveys 
of the Survey Research Centre", British Journal of Political 
Science I {1971), pp. 486, 492. Campbell et al. {American 
Voter, pp. 72, 83), while not explicitly developing the 
idea of party identification as a rational guide to voting 
behaviour, do nevertheless imply that party loyalties act 
in this way. 
based evaluations intersect, and he votes in a manner similar 
to that of his neighbours, fellow-workers, and parents. As 
Goldberg suggests: 
"Certain sociological determinants, specifically 
group norms regarding party identification, may, 
upon examination, prove to be rational guides to 
action. For the voter who is a reasonably 
rational fellow, it will be argued, these group 
norms may seem rather sensible." 1 
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Adhering to a party can be an effective expression of the voter's 
particular interests. Party identification can be seen as a 
problem-solving device learned from one's parents that is 
instrumental for the advance of the voter's own particular set 
of values. 
In discussing the influence of party on voting in his 
economic model, Downs uses the variable "party differential". 
As rational citizens each voter votes for the party he believes 
will provide him with a higher utility income than any other 
party. To discover which party this is, he compares the utility 
incomes he believes he would receive were each party in office. 
The difference between these two expected utility incomes is the 
citizen's "expected party differential". However, the most 
important part of a voter's decision is the size of his "current 
party differential" which is the difference between the utility 
income he has actually received and the one he would have received 
had the opposition been in power. The greater the size of the 
citizen's party differential, the greater his desire to see one 
1. Goldberg, "Social Determinism", p. 5. 
party win instead of the others because of the difference it 
will make to his utility income. 1 
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The complexity of a multi-candidate election, such as the 
1974 Christchurch City Council election with a very large number 
of available choices, 2 could be expected to force voters to rely 
heavily on cost-reducing decision rules in choosing candidates. 
Party identification is one such rule. To have a psychological 
identification with a political party and to follow it in voting 
is rational political behaviour. 
THE ROLE OF PARTY IN NEW ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS 
Many studies have recorded the importance of party in New 
Zealand general elections, 3 yet few attempts have been made to 
1. Downs , An Economic Theory, pp. 39-40. 
2. As well as the four mayoral candidates (Citizens, Labour, 
Values, Independent) there were ten city council candidates 
in North Ward (four Citizens, four Labour and two Values). 
Since voters did not have to vote for the maximum number 
of candidates (four) to cast a valid vote, the number of 
different ways of casting a valid vote for the city council 
election was 31, and for the mayoral and council elections 
taken together the number of choices was 124. 
3. See, for example, R.M. Chapman, W.K. Jackson and A.V. Mitchell, 
New Zealand Politics in Action : The 1960 General Election 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1962); Keith Jackson, New 
Zealand : Politics of Change (Wellington: Reed, 1973); 
Stephen Levine (ed.), New Zealand Politics : A Reader 
(Melbourne: Cheshire, 1975); Stephen Levine and Alan 
Robinson, The New Zealand Voter : A Survey of Public Opinion 
and Electoral Behaviour (Wellington: Price Milburn for NZUP, 
1976); Austin Mitchell, Politics and People in New Zealand 
(Christchurch: Whitcombe and Tombs, 1969). 
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examine the role of party in local elections. 1 New Zealand 
parliamentary party politics are of a highly developed kind, 
articulated through two tightly disciplined and well-organised 
mass parties. For many people in New Zealand stability in party 
choice at general elections is a life-long feature. Although 
recent findings reveal an increased instability in voting 
2 patterns, it is still apparent that party loyalties are wide-
spread, persistent, fairly strongly held and fairly evenly 
balanced between the two major parties. Survey researchers have 
found between two-thirds and three-quarters of their samples 
identifying with one or other of the two major parties. 3 
In contrast local politics present a completely different 
picture. One of the most distinctive features of local government 
in New Zealand as a whole is the complete absence of highly 
developed, tightly disciplined, well-organised mass parties. "The 
1. See G.W.A. Bush, "The 1968 Auckland City Mayoralty Contest", 
Political Science XXII (December 1970), 23-42; G.W.A. Bush, 
Labour's Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local Body Elections 
(Auckland: Department of Political Studies, University of 
Auckland, 1974); R.J. Johnston, "Spatial Elements in 
Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christchurch City Council 
Election", Political Science XXIV (April 1972), 49-61; 
Mitchell, Politics and People, chap. 11, "Who Runs Local 
Government : Christchurch ". 
2. R.M. Chapman, "The Politics of Change", National Business 
Review, 4 August - 13 October 1976; Levine and Robinson, 
New Zealand Voter, pp. 146-149. 
3. Jackson, Politics of Change, p. 108; Levine and Robinson, 
New Zealand Voter, p. 18; Mitchell, Politics and People, 
p. 182. 
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whole ethos of local government in New Zealand ••• militates 
against cohesive parties. 111 Most members of local authorities 
in New Zealand are elected not as nominees of political parties 
but as Independents. Following the 1974 local elections four 
out of every five councillors elected in all territorial local 
authorities were Independents; councillors with party 
affiliations accounted for only 15 per cent. However, when these 
figures are broken down according to the type of local authority, 
(Table 6.1), it can be seen that in the four main cities (Auckland, 
Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin) all the councillors except 
one were elected as political party candidates. Party politics 
dominate local elections in the four main cities although to a 
lesser extent than in general elections. 
There is, however, uncertainty about whether political parties 
should become involved in local elections. There is the feeling 
that parties do not belong in local government and that they have 
nothing positive to contribute. 2 Austin Mitchell has observed that: 
"[In the counties and smaller boroughs] party plays no part. Both 
councillors and electors tend to recoil from the suggestion that 
it should. 113 This feeling is also quite conunon in the cities, even 
though parties have contested city elections for many years. In 
Auckland in 1971 G.W.A. Bush found that even amongst Labour Party 
1. David A. Hyslop, "The Christchurch Citizens' Association : 
History, Organisation, and Decision-making", M.A. thesis, 
University of Canterbury, 1973, p. 49. 
2. See, for example, John Fitchett, "Say No to Parties", Why 
Bother About Local Government, (Wellington: National Youth 
Council, 1977). [No page numbers]. 
3. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 297. 
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TABLE 6.1 AFFILIATION OF COUNCILLORS ELECTED AT 1974 NEW 
ZEALAND LOCAL ELECTIONS 
LOCAL AUTHORITY 
Four Other Other Other Counties 
Main Major Cities Cities (105)a 
PARTY Cities Cities With & 
AFFILIATION (13)a Over Borou~hs 
13 000 (110) 
Electors 
(9)a 
Citizens 70% 4% 42% 7% 2% 
Labour 28 1 9 3 1 
Values 1 1 1 0 0 
Independent 1 94 45 87 97 
Other 0 0 3 3 0 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total 
11% 
3.8 
0.2 
83 
2 
100% 
(N=69) (N=l66) (N=l23) (N=874) (N=415) (N=l647) 
a Figure in parentheses shows number of local authorities. 
b "Citizens" includes local ratepayers' groups fulfilling 
a similar role. 
Source: Calculated from N.Z. Department of Internal Affairs, 
"Local Authority Elections 1974", Wellington, 1976 
(mimeo), Table 23. 
identifiers, as many as one in three either disagreed or were 
uncertain whether Labour should nominate party tickets in local 
elections (Table 6.2). As well almost one in two of the supporters 
of 'no particular party' either disagreed or were uncertain about 
Labour's presence. The feeling against parties is sometimes seen 
in newspaper editorials at election time. In Christchurch in 1974 
the Christchurch Star commented: 
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TABLE 6.2 RESPONSES TO THE STATEMENT 'LABOUR SHOULD PUT UP 
TICKETS IN LOCAL ELECTIONS' BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
'Labour should 
put up tickets 
in local 
elections' 
Agree 
Disagree 
Uncertain 
Labour 
67% 
10 
23 
100% 
National 
44% 
38 
18 
100% 
No particular 
party 
52% 
27 
21 
100% 
(Number of cases not stated) 
Source: Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, p. 18. 
"Many people would prefer not to have party politics 
in local body elections at all and there is 
certainly nothing they contribute which would be 
described as useful." 1 
In Auckland during the 1971 Auckland City Council election campaign 
the New Zealand Herald conunented: 
"Whether politics in their national colours or 
affiliations should rule, or seek to rule, local 
government has long been a matter of controversy 
and a source of some suspicion." 2 
Coupled with these attitudes against party involvement is the 
'popular image' of local politics as politics where voters should 
(and do) vote for the person rather than the party. Mitchell has 
noted that: 
1. Christchurch Star, 7 October 1974. 
2. New Zealand Herald, 30 September 1971, p. 6. 
"There are indications that while [the voter] takes 
the party ticket as a basic guide, he picks and 
chooses on the basis of the reputations, or at 
least the names, of the candidates." 1 
Bush argues that: 
"It is commonly premised that, other things being 
constant, candidates with the best-known names poll 
the heaviest •••• The notion that a team of Tom, Dick 
and Harrys would entice out the faithful as much 
as would a team of Sir Edmund Hillarys is palpable 
nonsense." 2 
In Auckland in 1971 the New Zealand Herald put forward that: 
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"Candidates could well be assessed on personal attributes rather 
than party or ticket labels. 113 With regard to the 1974 Christchurch 
election, The Press editorialised: 
"Party affiliations will not always disclose the nature 
of the men and women seeking office. Electors can, and 
should, without a qualm, vote for board and council 
candidates in whom they have the greatest trust." 4 
Whether the North ward survey data supported this popular image of 
local politics will be revealed in this chapter. 
On the role of party in the larger cities,Mitchell has 
commented: 
"Party becomes necessary to give some coherence to policies 
and to group-label members whose individual characteristics 
and attributes, even names, can be known only to a small 
proportion of the electorate." 5 
1. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 298. 
2. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, pp. 5, 7-8. 
3. New Zealand Herald, 30 September 1971, P• 6. 
4. The Press, 11 October 1974. 
5. Mitchell, Politics and People, p. 297. 
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Parties play an important role in the larger cities because they 
provide a framework within which electors, local personalities 
and policies can operate. They give shape and direction to the 
political behaviour of councillors and individual citizens, yet 
it is an incomplete party system for their role hardly ever 
approaches the importance that it does in national politics. 
Political parties are important in local government for the 
development, presentation and implementation of policies, and in 
the elections they contest, their role is to structure the vote by 
providing party labels and simplfying the voter's choice. 
Only a few studies have actually attempted to measure the 
extent of party identification and its influence on voting in New 
Zealand local elections. In the 1971 Auckland City Council 
election, G.W.A. Bush found that the distribution of parliamentary 
party identification was Labour 37 per cent, National 39 per cent 
and uncommitted 24 per cent. 1 Of the Labour Party identifiers, 
39 per cent intended to vote a straight Labour ticket, and apart 
from 7 per cent who intended to vote a straight Citizens ticket, 
the rest intended to split their ballots. Of the National Party 
identifiers, half were going to vote a straight Citizens ticket 
. . k 2 
and half were going to vote split tic ets. In an analysis of 
spatial patterns of voting in the 1968 Christchurch City Council 
election, R.J. Johnston found that "the party effect accounted 
1. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves, p. 13. Bush does not record 
whether his sample was asked if they had a party 
identification with respect to local politics. 
2. Bush does not record voting intention by local party 
identification. 
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for 80 per cent of the variation in voting"; and he concluded: 
" ••• the positions of the various candidates would probably be 
determined, first by their party affiliation, secondly, by 
their degree of general exposure to the electorate, and thirdly, 
by their local support."1 These meagre findings, however, can 
hardly provide the basis for any generalisations about the 
extent and influence of local party identifications. 
INFLUENCE OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN CHRISTCHURCH 
The public uncertainty about political party involvement 
and the lesser role that parties play in local government are 
reflected by the relatively small proportion of the North ward 
sample who accepted a local party affiliation (Table 6.3). Less 
than half of the sample identified themselves at the local level 
with either the Citizens Association or the Labour Party. Most 
of the remainder did not think of themselves in these terms or 
said they were Independents. On the other hand five out of every 
six people in the sample were willing to identify themselves with 
a parliamentary party at the national level. The number of 
respondents who claimed to have no loyalty to any of the parties 
contesting the Christchurch City Council election is enormous when 
compared to the proportion of the same sample who said they were 
Independents with regard to national politics (10 per cent). 
Previous surveys have shown very similar findings regarding the 
1. Johnston, "Spatial Elements", pp. 56, 60. 
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TABLE 6.3 PARTY IDENTIFICATION (NORTH WARD SAMPLE) 
1£>cal Party Identificationa Parliamentary Party Identificationb 
Citizens 22% 32% National 
Independent (Don't 
think of self in 
party terms) 47 10 Independent 
Labour 27 46 Labour 
Values 2 4 Values 
Social Credit 0 1 Social Credit 
Other 0 1 Other 
Don't know 1 3 Don't know 
No answer 1 3 No answer 
100% 100% 
(N=231) N=231) 
a Based on answers to the question, "Getting back to local 
body politics, do you usually think of yourself as Labour 
or Citizens Association, or don't you think of yourself 
in these terms?" 
b Based on answers to the question, "With regard to politics 
throughout the country as a whole, do you usually think 
of yourself as National, Labour, Social Credit, Values 
or what?" 
proportion of parliamentary Independents. A survey in the 
Lyttelton electorate in 1972 found 8 per cent saying they were 
Independents,and Mitchell in two other Christchurch electorates 
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1 
in 1966 found 11 per cent. However in a nation-wide postal 
survey in 1975, 26 per cent of the respondents were not supporters 
2 
of any party. Some of the local Independents in Christchurch 
may not prove to be quite so 'Independent' when their voting 
behaviour is examined. A number of these self-described 
Independents may actually be straight ticket voters or 'partisans 
in disguise' as we shall see later on. 
The Downsian model offers a possible explanation for the 
difference in party affiliations between the national level and 
the local level. New Zealand's system of policy-making and 
administration is highly centralised, and the tasks assigned to 
local government are more limited. Therefore, the impact of 
decision-making about these issues on the well-being of the 
individual is often quite low. For many citizens these issues 
fail to generate any party differential. That is, many citizens 
believe that their utility income will not differ no matter which 
party holds office. 
Although local party loyalties were less widespread than 
parliamentary party loyalties, local identifications were as 
1. Nigel s. Roberts, unpublished research (1972); Mitchell, 
Politics and People, p. 182. 
2. Levine and Robinson, New Zealand Voter, p. 18. 
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equally strongly held as parliamentary identifications (Table 
6.4). Almost three-quarters of those who had a parliamentary 
party identification said they felt either very strongly or 
TABLE 6.4 STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION {NORTH WARD SAMPLE) 
STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Very strong 
CITIZENS Fairly strong 
Not very strong 
Not very strong 
LABOUR Fairly strong 
Very strong 
11% 
24 
11 
12 
23 
19 
6% 
20 
14 
12 
31 
17 
STRENGTH OF PARLIAMENTARY 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Very strong 
Fairly strong NATIONAL 
Not very strong 
Not very strong 
Fairly strong LABOUR 
Very strong 
100% 100% 
{N=ll2) {N=l 76) 
fairly strongly towards the parliamentary parties, and three-
quarters of those who had a local identification said they felt 
equally strongly towards the local parties. {The proportion who 
felt very strongly towards the Citizens Association was almost 
twice the proportion who felt very strongly towards the National 
Party). Not so many people felt attached to a local party compared 
to a parliamentary party, but for those that did, their loyalties 
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were no less weaker than those of the parliamentary identifiers. 
The influence of local party identification on voting 
behaviour in a New Zealand municipal election can be examined by 
looking at voting in the mayoral election, whether a straight or 
split ticket was voted in the council election, and whether a 
straight or split ticket was voted in the mayoral and council 
elections combined. For those who had a party affiliation at the 
1974 election, it seemed to exert a very strong influence on voting 
for the mayoral candidates (Table 6.5). Most party identifiers 
TABLE 6.5 
MAYORAL 
VOTE 
Citizens 
Labour 
x2 
r 
s 
= 
= 
1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDEN'rIFICATION 
Citizens 
98% 
2 
100% 
(N=41) 
71. 93 p<. 001 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Independent 
56% 
44 
100% 
(N=64) 
Labour 
10% 
90 
100% 
(N=52) 
.68 (with Independents included as a category of 
party identification). 
x2 Chi-square 
p Probability that the relationship is random 
r Spearman correlation coefficient 
s 
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intended to remain loyal to their party's candidate; the 
correlation coefficient of .68 indicates the relationship is quite 
strong. However, only just over half the voters in Table 6.5 
appear to be voting on the basis of party; those who admitted no 
party attachment - the Independents - were divided about equally 
between the candidates with slightly more voting for Citizens. 
Strength of party identification appears to be a factor in party 
voting. With one exception the stronger the feeling of attachment 
to a party, the more likely it is the elector intended to vote 
in accordance with his party tie (Table 6.6). Considering the 
TABLE 6.6 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
STRENGTH OF PARTY MAYORAL VOTE 
IDENTIFICATION Citizens Labour 
Very Strongly Citizens 100 0 = 100% 
Fairly Strongly Citizens 100 0 = 100% 
Not Very Strongly Citizens 88 12 = 100% 
Independent 56 44 = 100% 
Not Very Strongly Labour 9 91 = 100% 
Fairly Strongly Labour 5 95 = 100% 
Very Strongly Labour 16 84 = 100% 
(N=} 
(10) 
(23) 
(8) 
(64) 
(11) 
(22) 
(19) 
x2 not valid (NV) because expected frequencies less 
than five 
r = .66 
s 
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popular image of local politics as politics where voters choose 
the person rather than the party, these results are surprising. 
Voting for the city council candidates seemed to be less 
influenced by party than the mayoral voting (Table 6.7). Quite 
a number of party identifiers had loyalties that were not strong 
TABLE 6.7 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
CITY COUNCIL VOTE 
Straight Citizens Ticket 
Split Ticket 
Straight Labour Ticket 
x2 = 82.89 
r = .63 
s 
p<.001 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens Independent Labour 
53% 10% 2% 
44 79 27 
3 11 71 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=32) (N=58) (N=41) 
enough to influence straight ticket voting. Yet one out of five 
of those who said they were 'Independent' intended to cast straight 
ticket votes. Some of these Independents may have no party 
identification and are not concerned with the election outcome, 
but are voting a straight party ticket because that alternative 
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appears the least costly. Some of the Independents may be voting 
a straight ticket to support an issue position or a candidate 
preference they may have. Yet many of the Independents were 
probably 'partisans in disguise'. That is, they say they have no 
party affiliation, but when it comes to voting behaviour they 
vote the party ticket all the way. Notably these partisans in 
disguise were just as likely to vote straight Labour as straight 
Citizens. Labour identifiers' support for the Labour ticket was 
stronger than Citizens identifiers' support for the Citizens 
ticket. That is, Citizens supporters were more likely to say that 
they intended to vote for some Labour candidates, than Labour 
supporters were to vote for some Citiz~ns candidates. The stronger 
the feeling of attachment to a party, the stronger the influence 
1 
of party loyalty in voting for the council (Table 6.8). With a 
few exceptions those who had stronger loyalties to their party were 
more likely to vote a straight party ticket for the city council. 
Split ticket voting is notably highest amongst the weak party 
identifiers as well as the Independents. 
When voting patterns at the mayoral and council elections 
combined are examined (Table 6.9), the pattern is similar to Table 
1. Due to the small numbers in some of the rows in 
Table 6.8 this conclusion is provisional. 
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TABLE 6.8 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
STRENGTH OF PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Very Strongly 
Citizens 
Fairly Strongly 
Citizens 
Not Very Strongly 
Citizens 
Independent 
Not Very Strongly 
Labour 
Fairly Strongly 
Labour 
Very Strongly 
Labour 
X2 NV 
CITY COUNCIL VOTE 
Straight Split Straight (N=) 
Citizens Ticket Labour 
Ticket Ticket 
50 38 12 = 100% (8) 
67 33 0 = 100% (18) 
17 83 0 = 100% (6) 
10 79 11 = 100% (58) 
0 71 29 = 100% (7) 
0 26 74 = 100% (19) 
6 7 87 = 100% (15) 
6.6, but the split ticket voters are now classified according to 
their mayoral votes. While a total of 43 per cent of the Citizens 
identifiers intended to vote split tickets, 40 per cent of them 
intended to remain loyal to their party's mayoral candidate. All 
the Labour supporters who were going to split their tickets 
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TABLE 6.9 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION* 
MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTE PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens Independent Labour 
Straight Citizens 
Ticket 57% 13% 0% 
Citizens Mayor & Split 
Council Ticket 40 48 0 
Labour Mayor & Split 
Council Ticket 3 28 26 
Straight Labour 
Council 0 11 74 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=30) {N=46) {N=39) 
X2 NV 
* Only those who indicated their votes for both mayoral 
and council elections are included. 
indicated they would remain loyal to Labour's mayoral candidate. 
Almost half of the Independents said they would split their ballots 
while voting for the Citizens mayoral candidate, but only 28 per 
cent intended to split their ballots and vote for the Labour mayoral 
candidate. Loyalty to Labour seems to be a stronger force than 
loyalty to Citizens because a greater proportion of Labour supporters 
intended to vote a straight Labour ticket, than Citizens supporters 
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intended to vote a straight Citizens ticket. When voting for the 
mayoral and council election by strength of party tie is examined 
{Table 6.10), the extent to which party loyalty exerts an influence 
TABLE 6.10 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY STRENGTH OF 
LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
MAYORAL AND COUNCIL VOTE 
STRENGTH OF Straight Citizens Labour Straight 
PARTY Citizens Mayor & Mayor Labour 
IDENTIFICATION Ticket Split & Split Ticket 
Council Council 
Ticket Ticket 
Very Strongly 
Citizens 63 37 0 0 = 100% 
Fairly Strongly 
Citizens 65 35 0 0 = 100% 
Not Very Strongly 
Citizens 20 60 20 0 = 100% 
Independent 13 48 28 11 = 100% 
Not Very Strongly 
Labour 0 0 67 33 = 100% 
Fairly Strongly 
Labour 0 0 22 78 = 100% 
Very Strongly 
Labour 0 0 14 86 = 100% 
X2. NV 
{N=) 
(8) 
(17) 
(5) 
(46) 
(6) 
(18) 
(15) 
can again be seen. Those with weaker party ties were more likely 
to split their ballots. 
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That two-thirds of those who had a party identification 
and that one-quarter of those who did not, intended to vote 
straight party tickets in the 1974 election (Table 6.11) indicates 
that party identification was a fairly strong influence on voting 
behaviour for the sample. 
TABLE 6.11 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICK.ET IN 1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL 
ELECTION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Mayoral and Council 
Vote 
Straight ticket 
Split ticket 
x2 = 18.s1 
Party Identifiers 
p<.001 
67% 
33 
100% 
(N=69) 
Independents 
24% 
76 
100% 
(N=46) 
VOTING IN LOCAL ELECTIONS AND VOTING IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
The extent of parliamentary party identification in the 
North ward sample has already been noted (Table 6.3). Almost 80 
per cent of the sample identified with either the Labour or the 
National Parties, and nearly two-thirds felt either very strongly 
or fairly strongly towards those parties. But what kind of 
174. 
relationship exists between party identification at the local 
level and party identification with respect to politics through-
out the country as a whole? How many people have two different 
party identifications? How many of the local Independents are 
parliamentary identifiers and what parties do they identify with? 
It would certainly reduce the costs of becoming informed and the 
costs of voting if voters had one party identification that they 
could use in both local and parliamentary elections. 
Given that the Labour Party that contestscity council elections 
is the same Labour Party that contests general elections, and that 
the Citizens Association roughly corre~ponds to the National Party 
. 1 {in an ideological way if not in an organisational way) , then it 
would be reasonable to expect that most identifiers at the one level 
would identify with the corresponding party at the other level. 
1. The relationship between the Citizens Association and the 
National Party has always been a sensitive issue. The 
Citizens Association insists that it "is definitely in no 
way connected with the National Party" (M.O. Holdsworth, 
Chairman, Christchurch Star, 28 September, 1974), yet there 
were strong individual links between some of the 1974 
Citizens candidates and the National Party (documented in 
Chapter I), and the President of the Association once 
remarked that: "While it is not tied up with the National 
Party its views were generally along the same lines." (E.B.E. 
Taylor, Address to Annual Meeting of the Christchurch Citizens 
Association, 27 April 1970, quoted in Christchurch Star, 11 
July 1974, p. 1). See p.177-178 in this chapter for further 
evidence of the electorate's view of the relationship between 
the Citizens Association and the National Party. 
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Looking at the identifiers at the local level, most of them 
identified with the corresponding party at the parliamentary 
level (Table 6.12). However, 6 per cent of the Citizens identifiers 
and 3 per cent of the Labour identifiers had twc different party 
TABLE 6.12 PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
National 
Independent 
Labour 
Values/Social Credit/ 
Other 
X2 NV 
LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens Independent Labour 
79% 32% 3% 
11 17 2 
6 42 95 
4 9 0 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=48) (N=99) (N=62) 
identifications - one for parliamentary politics and one for local 
politics. It would be interesting to investigate the origins and 
development of these two apparently conflicting identifications. 
Are they a passing reaction to the contemporary events of politics 
or are they rooted in the longer term? The North ward survey, 
however, was not designed to investigate the origins and development 
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of party identification. The relationship in Table 6.12 is 
stronger for Labour identifiers than for Citizens identifiers; 
and the Citizens supporters were more likely to be Independents 
in parliamentary politics. That significantly more local 
Independents identified with Labour at the parliamentary level 
than identified with National is surprising, for it is often 
thought that local Independents are merely National party supporters 
in disguise. However this is evidently not so. It is also 
interesting that about one in four of the local Independents still 
showed their independence from Labour or National at the 
parliamentary level; they were either Independents once again or 
supporters of minor parties. 
Having seen the parliamentary loyalties of the local identifiers, 
the local loyalties of the parliamentary identifiers are shown in 
Table 6.13. (That is, instead of being the dependent variable as 
in Table 6.12, parliamentary identification is now the independent 
variable). Only just over half of the National and Labour supporters 
identified with the corresponding party at the local level. This is 
more significant in the case of Labour because the parliamentary 
party is the same party that contests local elections; yet 40 per 
cent of the parliamentary Labour identifiers did not feel the same 
TABLE 6.13 LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
LOCAL PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens 
Independent 
Labour 
X2. NV 
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
National Independent Labour Values/Social 
Credit/Other 
53% 22% 3% 18% 
44 74 40 82 
3 4 57 0 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
(N=72) (N=23) (N=l03) (N=ll) 
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attachment to Labour at the local level. More of the parliamentary 
Independents felt loyal towards Citizens than Labour at the local 
level. Perhaps this is because they think Citizens is less of a 
political party than Labour. 
Further light was shed on the relationship between local and 
parliamentary party loyalties by Warren Head in ananalysis of survey 
data from the 1966 general election in the Fendalton electorate. 
Forty per cent of the sample thought that a vote for the Citizens 
Association "was like a vote for the National Party" while 18 per 
cent thought it was not. Of those who had voted in the 1965 
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Christchurch City Council election 61 per cent thought that a 
vote for Citizens was like a vote for National, and 25 per cent 
of those who had not voted in 1965 thought the same. 1 
The respondents in the North ward sample were asked which 
party they would vote for if a general election was to be held in 
the near future. The influence of parliamentary party loyalty on 
voting in this hypothetical election is shown in Table 6.14. Given 
TABLE 6.14 FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE BY PARLIAMENTARY PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION 
FUTURE GENERAL 
ELECTION VOTE 
National 
Labour 
x2 = 128.47 
r = .75 
s 
PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
National Independent Labour 
90% 36% 1% 
10 64 99 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=62) (N=l4) (N=94) 
p<.001 
the nature of parliamentary party politics compared to local party 
politics, it could be expected that parliamentary loyalty would be 
1. warren P. Head, "A City Decides : The General Election of 
1966 in Christchurch", M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, 
1967, p. 272. 
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a stronger influence on voting in general elections than local 
loyalty would on voting in local elections. This does not appear 
to be so when comparing the distribution in Table 6.14 with the 
distribution of local party loyalty and mayoral voting in Table 
6.5; however a comparison of the correlation coefficients shows 
th.at parliamentary loyalties do appear to be more influential. 
The relationship between parliamentary party loyalties and 
voting in local elections is an interesting one. Party ties at 
the level of national politics appeared to be very important - in 
structuring the mayoral vote in the 1974 election (Table 6.15). 
Only small proportions of National and Labour supporters did not 
TABLE 6.15 1974 MAYORAL AND CITY COUNCIL VOTES BY PARLIAMENTARY 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
1974 c.c.c. PARLIAMENTARY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
VOTE National Independent Labour x2 
MAYORAL 
Citizens 90% 53% 17% 
Labour 10 47 83 68.5 
100% 100% 100% p<.001 
(N=58) (N=l7) (N=75) 
COUNCIL 
Straight Citizens 46% 13% 2% 
Split Ticket 49 87 42 NV 
Stra_ight Labour 5 0 56 
100% 100% 100% 
(N=47) (N=l5) (N=62) 
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vote for the corresponding party candidate in the 1974 mayoral 
election. Looking at the council voting, parliamentary loyalties 
were not strong enough to prevent widespread split-ticket voting, 
but very few parliamentary identifiers voted a straight ticket for 
the opposing local party. Parliamentary loyalties were not always 
directly transferable to the local scene especially when the city 
council election offered the voter more than one vote. While 
some of the parliamentary Independents were prepared to vote a 
straight Citizens ticket, none of them were prepared to vote a 
straight Labour ticket. 
Examination of how voters in a Jocal election would behave 
if a general election was held in the near future should provide 
further evidence of the relationship between voting behaviour in 
local and general elections. The best comparison between the two 
types of elections is between the mayoral election and a general 
election because in each the voter has only one vote; he cannot 
give a few votes to each party to satisfy any cross-pressures, he 
must decide which one party or person he will vote for. Such a 
comparison is containe d in Table 6.16. The significant feature of 
this table is that almost one-third of those who voted Citizens for 
mayor said they would vote Labour if a general election was held 
in the near future. Following Labour's defeat in 1974 (in the 
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Wellington mayoralty as well as in Christchurch), it was claimed 
by various people that these losses demonstrated a nationwide swing 
1 
against the then Labour Government. However this does not seem to 
TABLE 6.16 FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE BY 1974 MAYORAL VOTE 
FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION MAYORAL VOTE 
VOTE Citizens Labour 
(51%) (49%) {= 100%) 
National (37%) 70% 3% 
Labour (63%) 30 97 
100% 100% 
Total (100%) 
{N=70) {N=68) 
x2 = 63.73 p<.001 
have been the case in Christchurch when so many of the Citizens 
mayoral voters intended to vote for a Labour member of parliament. 
It is also important to note that while the survey accurately 
showed Hay's lead over Pickering (51 per cent to 49 per cent), it 
also revealed that 63 per cent of the voters in the mayoral election 
would vote Labour in a general election (Table 6.16). Labour was 
1. see "The Vote in Christchurch", The Press, 14 October 1974, 
p. l; R.D. Muldoon quoted in Ibid., p. l; J.G. Power [N.G. 
Pickering's former secretary and defeated Labour council 
candidate], quoted in Christchurch Star, 15 October 1974, p.1. 
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defeated both in Christchurch in 1974 and in the next general 
election a year later, but the North ward survey shows that 
Labour's defeat in Christchurch was not evidence of a swing 
against the Labour Government. (It should be remembered, however, 
that the North ward survey was conducted in September 1974, which 
was almost certainly the high-point of the 'honeymoon period' of 
the new Prime Minister, W.E. Rowling. From then on the Labour 
1 Government's fortunes steadily waned). 
The relationship between voting in the 1974 Christchurch City 
Council election and voting in a general election can be seen 
clearly in Table 6.17. Only about half of the National and Labour 
TABLE 6.17 1974 CITY COUNCIL VOTE BY FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION 
VOTE 
1974 CITY COUNCIL 
VOTE 
Straight Citizens 
Split Ticket 
Straight Labour 
x2 = 52.99 p<.001 
FUTURE GENERAL ELECTION VOTE 
National Labour 
52% 0% 
43 54 
5 46 
100% 100% 
(N=42) (N=72) 
1. See the results of the Herald-NRB (National Research 
Bureau) political surveys sununarised in New Zealand 
Herald, 12 December 1977. 
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voters in a general election intended to vote straight party 
tickets in the 1974 election. In a local election where there are 
more choices than in a general election party loyalty is not 
always strong enough to influence s~raight ticket voting. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The key concept of psychological identification with a 
political party has been found to be of vital importance in 
overseas studies in influencing both electoral behaviour and 
people's perceptions of politics. Party affiliation assists the 
elector in simplifying the election, for it enables him to behave 
consistently with his basic political predispositions without 
spending great effort in seeking information or reaching a voting 
decision. In New Zealand political parties play a lesser role in 
local government compared to central government. Only in the four 
main cities do parties have a significant role where they provide 
a framework in which electors, personalities and policies can 
operate. They provide group-labels for the candidates and thus 
simplify the election for the voter who can then use his standing 
party loyalty as a guide to voting. A party affiliation with regard 
to local politics in Christchurch City was accepted by a substantially 
smaller proportion of the North ward sample compared to the 
proportion that felt an attachment to a parliamentary party. The 
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Downsian economic model suggests that this is because of the 
lesser importance of the issues decided on at the local level in 
New Zealand. However local party loyalties were as equally 
strongly held as parliamentary party loyalties. 
Given the undeveloped nature of party politics in New 
Zealand local government and the public uncertainty about political 
party involvement in local elections, it is surprising that party 
identification was of such major influence in the 1974 election. 
In the mayoral election only a few voters deviated from their local 
party ties. However split ticket voting was quite common amongst 
party identifiers in the council election. When voting for the 
mayoral and council elections is examined together, the influence of 
party is more apparent. In the mayoral election almost all the 
voters who had a party tie voted in a consistent manner with it. 
These voters were minimising their costs by behaving in line with 
their standing party loyalties. Fewer voters in the city council 
election followed the party line exactly. That so many party 
identifiers split their tickets suggests that the expected difference 
in utility income is not so great. That is, the flow of benefits 
from the city council as a whole seems to depend more on which 
party's mayoral candidate was elected rather than on which party's 
COW1cil candidates were elected. 
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It was mentioned earlier on in this chapter that the 
complexity of a multi-candidate election with its large number of 
available choices could be expected to lead voters to rely heavily 
on party identification in voting as a means of reducing the costs 
of making decisions about the various candidates. However, it 
seems that the greater the number of choices, the less voters used 
party affiliation as a guide to voting. In the mayoral election 
where there were two main choices,party identification was very 
closely related to voting behaviour. In the city council election 
where there were, in effect, 31 available choices, party identification 
was of much less importance in structuring the vote; and in the 
mayoral and council elections together where there were 124 choices~ 
party loyalty was only slightly more important in structuring the 
vote. Voters did not rely heavily on party attachments when there 
were a large number of choices; rather, many apparently based their 
decisions on non-party factors and took the opportunity to spread their 
votes around. In the mayoral election voters have, of course, only 
one vote and they may feel unwilling to be disloyal to their party. 
In the council election voters could give their main support to 
their usual party, vote for one or two candidates of either of the other 
parties, and still call themselves Citizens or Labour supporters. 
Party loyalty is apparently not as strong when there are a larger 
number of choices. Whether this split ticket voting is related to 
factors such as the personality of the candidates will be 
investigated in the next chapter. 
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Overall the relationship between voting in local elections 
and voti_ng in parliamentary elections is quite close. With regard 
to local and parliamentary party identifications, the relationship 
between them appears to be quite peculiar. While most of the 
local identifiers felt tli.e corresponding attachment to the 
parliamentary party, only half of the parliamentary identifiers 
felt loyal to the corresponding local party (Tables6.12 and 
6.13). This is an indication that parties are less important 
to the voter with regard to local politics. For the North ward 
sample the role of local party identification in structuring the 1974 
mayoral vote was almost as important as the role of parliamentary 
party identification in structuripg voting in a future general 
election (Tables 6.5 and 6.14). Parliamentary loyalties were quite 
closely related to voting in the 1974 mayoral election, but distinctly 
less so in the council election. When there was more than one vote, 
electors were prepared to be more flexibile in casting their ballots 
(Table 6.15). voting in the mayoral election and in a future 
general election were not closely associated because quite a few 
voters intended to switch party votes between the two elections 
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(Table 6.16). Voting in the city council election was also 
less related to voting in a general election because of the 
large number of split ticket voters (Table 6.17). In general, 
voting in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election was quite 
closely related to voting in parliamentary elections, but there 
were significant exceptions. 
The findings in this chapter support both social-psychological 
and rational choice theories of voting. Half the sample felt a 
psychological attachment to a political party with respect to 
local politics and this attachment appeared to be a strong 
influence on voting. Rational choice theory leads us to expect 
that voters, as rational actors, will use this party affiliation 
as a guide to voting in order to minimise their costs. These 
party voters are able to use their party identification as an 
organising precept enabling them to behave consistently with their 
basic political attitudes without spending great efforts in seeking 
information or reaching a voting decision. Rational choice theory 
also leads us to expect that there would be a fairly strong 
relationship between voting in local elections and voting in 
parliamentary elections, because the parties contesting both elections 
roughly correspond and the rational voter would vote the same way in 
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both elections to minimise his costs. This chapter has shown that 
social-psychological theory is useful because of its emphasis on 
partisanship,while rational choice theory is useful because of its 
assumption 0£ voter rationality. Both perspectives assist in the 
explanation of voting behaviour. While party has been shown to be 
of some significance, the fairly large amount of split ticket 
voting suggests that an examination of the impact of candidate 
personality would shed further light on the voting decision. 
CHAPTER VII 
PERSONAL VOTING, TICKET-SPLITTING 
AND COATTAIL VOTING 
Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are 
names given to types of voting where the personality of one or more 
candidates is presumed to be the dominant influence in the voting 
decision. Personal voting stems from voters' perceptions of the 
personalities of the candidates rather than their party 
affiliations or their policy stands. Ticket-splitting and coattail 
voting are specific kinds of personal voting. Straight and split 
ticket voting are possible when there is a choice between competing 
teams of candidates. A split ticket vote can occur when an 
attractive personality manages to win the support of an otherwise 
straight party ticket voter. Coattail voting occurs when the 
personal image of the party leader generates votes for himself and 
one or more other members of the party ticket who are then said to 
be 'riding into office on the leader's coattails'. Coattail voting 
emphasises the importance of party leadership and the role of the 
leader's personality in winning votes for the other candidates on 
his ticket. On the other hand split ticket voting emphasises the 
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role that individual candidates can play through their own 
personalities by standing out and winning votes against the 
electoral tide. 
Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting were 
1 first investigated using the social-psychological approach. This 
chapter uses this perspective as well as rational choice theory, for 
the problems raised by the social-psychological studies appear 
particularly appropriate to investigation using rational choice 
theory. The aim of this chapter is to investigate the three types 
of voting at the 1974 Christchurch City Council election using social-
psychological and rational choice theories. As well as reviews of 
the relevant literature and the building of theoretical models, 
attempts will be made to measure the degree of personal voting, 
ticket-splitting and coattail voting in the election. 
PERSONAL VOTING 
The question of the extent to which candidates are able to 
1. See, for example, Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter 
(New York: John Wiley, abridged ed., 1964), chap. 2; Angus 
Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of 
Straight and Split Ticket Voting", American Political 
Science Review LI (1957), 293-312; Warren E. Miller, 
"Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and 
Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1955), 353-368. 
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win votes because of their own personal qualities, rather than 
their party labels or policy proposals, has often been posed but 
never answered satisfactorily. While few studies have made a 
detailed analysis of the problem, general commentaries abound 
with references to the 'personal vote' that individual candidates 
are supposed to have attracted because of their sincerity, likeability, 
trustworthiness, strength, past experience, expected performance in 
office, and the like. The authors of The American Voter have 
observed: 
"Although a candidate is likely to be seen partly 
in te:nns of his connection with party and with 
issues of public policy and matters of group 
interest, he will be evaluated as well in te:nns 
of personal attributes." 1 
While David Butler and Donald Stokes have noted: 
"It would certainly seem that any special appeal 
exercised by MPs was through their general 
personal qualities rather than their stand on 
the issues." 2 
v.o. Key, Jr., describes the "responsible voter" as one who casts his 
ballot in light of "relevant questions of public policy, of 
3 
governmental performance and executive personality." 
1. Crunpbell et al., American Voter, p. 24 (Emphasis added). 
2. David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: 
The Evolution of Electoral Choice (London: Macmillan, 2nd 
ed. I 1974) t P• 356. 
3. v.o. Key, Jr., The Responsible Electorate : Rationality in 
Presidential Voting 1936-1960 (cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), p. 7. (Emphasis Added). 
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Three studies have attempted a more detailed loo]~ at the 
extent of personal voting. In England Philip M. Williams concludes 
an analysis of aggregate statistics with the generalisation: "A 
familiar member may in time be worth an extra 2 per cent swing, or 
2000 more on his majority. 111 A New Zealand study undertaken by 
Nigel S. Roberts using survey research concluded: "It appears that 
McGuigan attracted about 3 per cent of the Lyttelton electorate to 
2 
give him a personal vote. 11 In a study of the 1968 Christchurch City 
Council election using polling booth data R.J. Johnston was able to 
conclude: "Just under 3 per cent of the average [council] candidate's 
support could be ascribed to a 'friends-and-neighbours' type 
individual effort. 113 Much remains to be learnt, however, about the 
1. Philip M. Williams, "Two Notes on the British Electoral 
System", Parliamentary Affairs XX (1966), p. 25. 
2. Nigel s. Roberts, "Getting It Rzjht", in Brian Edwards (ed.), 
Right OUt : Labour Victory '72 - The Inside Story (Wellington: 
Reed, 1973), p. 201. 
3. R.J. Johnston, "Spatial Patterns and Influences on Voting 
in Multi-Candidate Elections : The Christchurch City Council 
Elections, 1968", Urban Studies X (1973), p. 77. "The 
'friends-and-neighbours' effect assumes that information 
about a candidate emanates from his home, so that ... the 
nearer one lives to a candidate's home, the more likely one 
is to know him, to have met him, or to know somebody who knows 
him. such interpersonal knowledge is expected to attract 
support for ... the person rather than for the cause he 
represents. This hypothesis proposes that people abandon 
traditional party affiliations to support a known candidate." 
R.J. Johnston, "Local Effects in Voting at a Local Election", 
Annals, Association of American Geographers LXIV (1974), p. 419. 
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personal vote: about voters' perceptions of candidates, how they 
evaluate them, how they react to them, and why. 
Personal voting is thought to be usually small and difficult 
to discern in many elections. Why, then, is the problem of personal 
voting worthy of study in this analysis of a New Zealand local 
election? First, it is important to take a macro-view of the 
electoral process and consider the interaction of candidates - as 
the key political actors in the electoral process - with the 
electorate. Second, in a close election any small gains made by a 
candidate from personal voting could be decisive in determining 
the final result. Third, the circumstances surrounding local 
elections in New Zealand suggest that a higher level of personal 
voting than occurs in general elections might be expected. This is 
because party politics are not as important as in general elections, 
party identification can become less significant, far less is at 
stake in local elections, and electors have more than one vote and 
thus the opportunity to split their tickets to vote for an attractive 
personality of the opposite party. Finally, while there has been 
much comment that people are more important than parties in local 
elections, no one has yet employed survey research methods to 
investigate personal voting in a New Zealand local election. 
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A Model of Personal Voting 
Rational voting theory as applied to the problem of 
personal voting recognises the effects of information costs on the 
1 ' . . . 1 e ector s voting decision. The scarcity and high cost of 
information about party policies and campaign issues may mean that 
the personal characteristics of the candidates are almost the only 
information that reach the voter besides the candidates' party 
affiliations. Party affiliation is a major factor in influencing 
2 
voting behaviour because of its low cost. However in local 
elections, information about candidates' personalities may also be 
available without great expense. 
In a mayoral election party labels are often irrelevant for 
many voters. In Downsian terms their party differentials 3 are 
relatively low and it does not make much difference to their 
expected utility stream which party holds the mayoral office. 
However, it does make a difference to their expected benefits 
which particular candidate is elected. If information is 
1. 
2. 
3. 
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957), chap. 12. 
See, for example, Gerald Pomper, Voters' Choice: Varieties 
of Electoral Behaviour (New York: Dodd Mead, 1975), 
pp. 9-10. 
Downs, An Economic Theory, chap. 3. 
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readily available about the personal qualities of the mayoral 
candidates, then voters may well base their choice on this 
information. A voting decision on this basis is the only way a 
voter can maximise his expected utility when it makes a 
difference to him which candidate is elected. 
In city council elections, where there are many more 
candidates, far less information is available at low cost. Since 
costs are higher, personality characteristics may be the only,or 
at least the dominant, images that are passed on to some voters 
during the campaign. For these voters personal voting is a 
rational choice because they can act on the available information 
and do not have to spend more resources gathering further knowledge 
about the parties, policies and issues. Personal voting can be 
a cost-reducing choice. 
The question for this section of this chapter to answer is: 
to what extent and in what circumstances did the qualities of individual 
candidates affect voting patterns in the 1974 Christchurch City Council 
election? Past research in electoral behaviour has suggested three 
main influences affecting voting behaviour: party identification, 
issue orientation, and candidate orientation. Party identification 
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is regarded as a long-term influence,while issues and candidates 
have been shown to constitute major short-term influences on the 
1 
vote. It is this 'candidate orientation' factor of The American 
Voter's 'funnel of causality' model that is hypothesised to be the 
key factor leading to personal voting. However, candidate 
orientation tends to be closely involved in the voter's mind with 
2 
party and with issue factors. Both parties and issues can play a 
very important role in moulding popular perceptions of candidates. 
Once a voter identifies with a party, this often includes his 
acceptance of that party's candidates and its policies. The Survey 
Research Centre authors found that supporters of a party evaluated 
their party's candidates more favourably than did supporters of the 
3 
opposing party. The crucial task, then, is to identify and 
isolate those voters for whom candidate orientation is an independent 
vote-determining factor. This can be achieved by examining voters' 
perceptions of and attitudes towards the candidates, parties and 
issues, and also the motivations underlying their voting behaviour. 
1. See, for example, Campbell et al., American Voter; Angus 
campbell, Gerald Gurin and Warren E. Miller, The Voter 
Decides (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954). 
2. Herbert F. Weisberg and Jerrold G. Rusk, "Dimensions of 
Candidate Evaluation", American Political Science Review LXIV 
(1976), 1167-1185. 
3. campbell et al., American Voter, pp. 33-35. 
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Evidence is needed that the effect of attitudes towards the 
candidates is independent of the influence of attitudes towards 
the parties and the issues. 
Two groups of personal voters are likely to be difficult 
to identify and isolate - those whose 'personal vote' for a 
candidate happens to reinforce their usual party affiliation, and 
those whose 'personal vote' happens to reinforce an issue-oriented 
decision. Amongst these two groups it is hard for the observer to 
distinguish the candidate-oriented voter from the party voter and 
the issue voter. It is for this reason that these types of 
personal voting will not be considered and attention will be focussed 
on partisan identifiers who abandon traditional affiliations and 
voting patterns to cast a personal vote for a candidate of the 
opposing party. These personal voters are: identifiers of Party A 
or voters who cast an otherwise straight ticket for Part A and who 
cross party lines to vote for a candidate of Party B because of the 
personal characteristics of one or more candidates. These voters are 
influenced by their short-term evaluations of the candidates into 
1 
deviating from their normal long-term party ties. For these 
1. See Philip E. Converse, "The Concept of A Normal Vote", in 
Angus Campbell et al., Elections and the Political Order (New 
York: John Wiley, 1966), chap. 2. 
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voters the influence of party has declined and been overtaken by the 
influence of personalities. It is likely that this kind of voting 
behaviour will be exhibited by voters with weak party allegiances. 
It is this kind of voting that R.J. Johnston is hypothesising in 
his definition of the 'friends-and-neighbours' effect. 1 
Another group of personal voters possibly worth investigation 
are those Independents who do not accept a party affiliation. As they 
profess to have no party ties perhaps some of their votes could be 
personal votes. However Chapter VI showed that almost one in four 
of the Independents in the North ward sample voted straight party 
tickets in the 1974 election, thus casting great doubts on their 
professed 'independence'. As it would be impossible to distinguish 
the personal voter from the party voter amongst the Independents, 
they will not be further examined. If self-description is not a good 
indicator of independence then perhaps voting behaviour is. Those 
who cast a straight council vote for one party and voted for the 
mayoral candidate of the opposite party could be personal voters 
and this will be investigated. 
The extent of personal voting in an election and its effects 
(if any) on the election outcome may be assessed in terms of 
1. See fn. 3, p. 193 above. 
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candidates' salience to the electorate, the content of the images 
conveyed, voter reactions to these images, and how unevenly 
balanced are the favourable and unfavourable elements in the images. 1 
Personal Voting for the Mayoral.Candidates 
The mayoral candidates can be expected to be more salient to 
the electorate than the council candidates because they benefit from 
a number of advantages. The importance of the office they seek plus 
the fact that there is only one mayor but nineteen councillors 
usually results in the mayoral race becoming the centre of public 
attention. The leaders are usually highly visible public figures 
who can, ~hrough their own personalities,excite a great deal of 
feeling - both positive and negative. In contrast with general 
elections all electors have the opportunity to cast personal votes 
for the party leaders. The North ward survey revealed that the 
mayoral candidates were very well-known to the electorate. Eighty-
six per cent of those interviewed knew that Mr Neville Pickering (the 
incumbent) was the Labour candidate for mayor, and 81 per cent 
correctly named Mr Hamish Hay as the Citizens candidate. However only 
13 per cent knew the name of the Values Party candidate, Mr Gary 
Williams. 
1. see Butler and Stokes, Political Change, pp. 352, 360. 
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The respondents' answers to the question "Why do you think 
you'll vote that way [for mayor]?" revealed the content of the 
images that the two main candidates had conveyed to the electorate. 
The number of favourable and unfavourable responses made by each 
respondent regarding the candidates was recorded. (Although the 
respondents were giving a reason for voting for a particular 
candidate, the fact that they made a favourable remark about the 
other candidate was still noted) . In all 192 comments about the 
personalities of Hay and Pickering were mentioned. Of these 26 per 
cent were favourable comments about Hay, while only 8 per cent were 
unfavourable to Hay. In contrast, opinions of Pickering were more 
polarisee; 38 per cent of all the comments were favourable towards 
him but 28 per cent were unfavourable. The sum of the pro-Hay and 
anti-Pickering comments is 54 per cent, while the sum of the pro-
Pickering and anti-Hay comments is 46 per cent giving by coincidence 
almost the same margin for Hay that won him the election. 
Typical responses favourable to Hay were: "I like him", 
"I like him better than Pickering", "He is less politically minded 
than Pickering", "He would be a good mayor" and "He is honest and 
has the community at heart". The most frequent response disapproving 
of Hay was that people simply did not like him but without giving 
specific reasons. Over half the responses favourable to Pickering 
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mentioned "His good record in office" and that he had "done a good 
job as mayor". A typical respondent said: "He has a good record, 
he speaks his mind, ..• a bustler, he gets things done, he doesn't 
mind being unpopular •••• " Almost two-thirds of the comments 
against Pickering concerned the fact that people did not like him 
personally. Typical responses referred to Pickering's "arrogance" 
and a dislike of his "methods" and his "style". "Pickering's OK", 
said one person in the sample, "but he's not my idea of a mayor. A 
mayor needs to be dignified". One elector summed up the attitudes 
to Pickering when he remarked: "He gets things done, though I don't 
like him personally." The focus in the mayoral election was 
certainly on Pickering. Two-thirds of all the responses concerning 
the two candidates were either pro- or anti-Pickering. The people 
in the North ward sample certainly liked Pickering better than Hay, 
but they also disliked Pickering much more than they disliked Hay. 
Favourable and unfavourable comments about candidates can 
indicate potential personal voting if the comments are made by 
supporters of the opposite party to which the candidate represents. 
Thus if all the favourable comments about Hay came from Citizens 
identifiers then it would be difficult to distinguish personal 
voting from party voting. However Table 7.1 shows that 8 per cent 
TABLE 7.1 LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION BY ATTITUDE TO MAYORAL 
CANDIDATES 
PARTY IDENTIFICATION ATTITUDE 
Citizens 
Independent 
Labour 
Pro-
Hay 
58% 
34 
8 
100% 
(N=26) 
Anti-
Pickering 
47% 
50 
3 
100% 
(N=30) 
Anti-
Hay 
0% 
71 
29 
100% 
(N=7) 
Pro-
Pickering 
0% 
37 
63 
100% 
(N=43) 
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.x2 (Chi-square) not valid (NV) because expected frequencies 
less than five 
of those who were pro-Hay identified with the Labour Party, and 3 
per cent of those who were anti-Pickering were also Labour 
·d ·t· 1 l.. enti iers. In contrast no Citizens identifiers felt unfavourable 
to Hay or favourable to Pickering. The survey indicates that Hay 
was more likely than Pickering to receive a personal vote, even though 
some of these votes seemed to be a reaction against Pickering, rather 
than a positive vote for Hay's personality. 
The reasons given by the sample for their voting choices were 
1. These percentages are based on small nmnbers; they are 
therefore tentative only. 
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analysed to assess voters' reactions to the images that the 
candidates conveyed and how unevenly balanced these images were. 
However as Roberts has pointed out (regarding the 1972 Lyttelton 
survey): 
"Most people vote on the basis of several complicated, 
interconnected reasons. Often no single reason will 
stand out clearly and separately, and to ask voters to 
unravel the intertwined strands and to nominate the 
most important cause can, at best, give us only a rough 
indication of what lay behind their choice on polling 
day." 1 
Nevertheless, Table 7.2 is able to throw some light on the reasons 
for voting for Hay and Pickering. As many as 37 per cent of those 
who intended to vote for Hay were doing so because they disliked 
Pickering. In contrast only 9 per cent of Pickering's voters did 
not like Hay. Pickering's personality was invaluable to Hay; Hay 
received more votes from people who disliked Pickering than for any 
other reason. Pickering's voters were three times as likely as Hay's 
voters to say that they liked the candidate's party or that they 
usually voted for that party. In the case of Pickering and Labour 
(and to a lesser extent for Hay and Citizens), the dislike of the 
candidate's party was not as strong as the dislike of the personality 
that carried the party's banner. Very few persons in the sample 
mentioned the candidate's stand on the issues as a reason for voting 
for him. 
1. Roberts, "Getting It Right", p. 200. 
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TABLE 7.2 MAIN REASON FOR 1974 MAYORAL VOTE BY MAYORAL VOTE 
REASON MAYORAL VOTE 
Hay Pickering 
I like the candidate 32% 54% 
I dislike the other candidate 37 9 
I like the candidate's party/ 
I usually vote for this party 6 19 
I dislike the other candidate's 
party 5 2 
I like the candidate's stand on 
the issues 5 2 
I dislike the other candidate's 
stand on the issues 5 0 
Other reason/No reason given 10 14 
100% 100% 
{N=83) {N=81) 
The problems of isolating personal voters from party voters 
were discussed earlier in this chapter. It was indicated that 
attention would be directed to party identifiers who voted for a 
candidate of the opposing party because of the personality of one 
or more candidates, and to straight council ticket voters who vote 
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for the mayoral candidate of the opposite party because of 
personality factors. We can be confident that these voters would 
not be influenced by party affiliations in their voting for the 
mayoralty. Analysis of the Citizens identifiers who crossed party 
lines to vote for Pickering, and of the Labour identifiers who 
crossed party lines to vote for Hay because of the personal 
characteristics of the two candidates, reveals that Hay received 
a personal vote from this source of four per cent, and that Pickering 
received no personal vote from this source. (That is, four per cent 
of Hay's voters were Labour identifiers who crossed party lines 
because of the personalities of the candidates). Of this four per 
cent of Hay's voters, three per cent wer.e voters attracted to Hay 
because of his personal qualities and one per cent were voting for 
Hay because they did not like Pickering's personality. Analysis of 
the straight council ticket voters who crossed party lines to vote 
for the mayoral candidate of the other party reveals that only one 
per cent of Pickering's votes came from those who voted a straight 
Citizens ticket for the city council, but this was not because of 
the candidates' personalities. There were no voters who intended 
to vote for Hay and a straight Labour ticket for the council. 
Given the popular image of local elections where voters are 
supposed to vote for the person rather than the party, these findings 
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are surprising. Yet Chapter VI showed that only 2 per cent of 
the Citizens identifiers intended to vote for Pickering and 10 per 
cent of the Labour identifiers intended to vote for Hay {Table 6.4). 
It appears that in this particular mayoral election party 
identification was clearly the dominant influence on voting, but 
personal voting for the successful mayoral candidate was evident. 
With regard to rational choice theory, it appears that party 
identification is more of a cost-reducing device than candidate 
orientation. Voters relied far more heavily on party identification 
as a guide to voting than they relied on their attitudes towards the 
personalities of the mayoral candidates. 
Personal Voting for the City Council Candidates 
Public knowledge about the city council candidates is 
generally lower compared to the mayoral candidates. Little information 
about their personalities or their policies is available through 
the mass media during the campaign, and therefore many of them remain 
unknown. These candidates are, therefore, forced to rely mainly on 
their party labels for the great bulk of their votes. How, then, can 
council candidates become well-known in order to benefit from 
personal voting? There are two answers to this question. 
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First, they may become well-known in the local area around 
their homes where information about them can be spread on a face-to-
face level. Such knowledge is predicted to attract support £or the 
'local boy' regardless of the party he represents. The resulting 
pattern is called the 'friends-and-neighbours' e£fect and is produced 
by local flows of information about a candidate. 1 
Some council candidates are able to rely on a second 
additional source of potential personal votes - the amount of knowledge 
electors already possess about them. Candidates may be well-known 
through the mass media because they are long-serving sitting 
councillors, members of parliament, prominent local businessmen, 
sports administrators, or they may be well-known for their 'community 
services'. Such candidates have a distinct advantage over their lesser 
known counterparts with regard to their personal vote-pulling power and 
1. See fn. 3, p. 193 above. The term 111 £riends-and-neighbours' 
e£fect" was first used by V.O. Key, Jr., in his Southern 
Politics (New York: A1£red A. Knop£, 1949). The concept was 
developed by David R. Reynolds ("'A Friends-and-Neighbours' 
Voting Model as a Spatial Interactional Model for Electoral 
Geography", in Kevin R. Cox and Reginald G.Golledge (eds.), 
Behavioural Problems in Geography: A Symposium (Evanston, Ill.: 
Department of Geography, Northwestern University, Studies in, 
Geography No.17, 1969), pp.81-100; and further tested and extended 
by R.J. Johnston in his studies 0£ New Zealand local elections. 
see his "Spatial Elements in Voting Patterns at the 1968 Christ-
church City Council Election", Political Science XXIV (April 1972}, 
49-61; "Spatial Patterns";"Local Effects". 
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consequently the election outcome, for it often happens that the 
best-known names poll the heaviest in New Zealand local elections. 
To enjoy the advantage of notability, a candidate need not be well-
known only for political reasons. Almost anything will do: what 
. 1 
matters is the extent to which he or she is well-known. Thus a 
first-time candidate whose name is frequently used in media advert-
isements for a household product can be more well-known than a 
candidate who has been a sitting councillor fortheprevious three 
years. 
In sharp contrast to the mayoral candidates, the council 
candidates were relatively unknown (Table 7.3). Seventy per cent of 
TABLE 7.3 NUMBER OF CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES FOR NORTH WARD 
CORRECTLY NAMED 
Percentage 
of Sample 
(N=231) 
Number of Candidates Correctly Named 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
70% 17 7 2 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 = 100% 
those interviewed could not name any of the 10 candidates for North, 
and only 13 per cent could name 2 or more. These low figures may have 
1. G.W.A. Bush, Labour's Lost Loves and the 1971 Auckland Local 
Body Elections (Auckland: Department of Political Studies, 
University of Auckland, 1974), PP· 7-8. 
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been partly due to the fact that only one sitting councillor was 
standing in North for re-election. However, due to the ~;carcity 
of information regarding individual candidates and the newness of 
the ward system,this picture probably applied to the other wards 
as well. 
It is not possible to test whether the well-known candidates 
received personal votes through the 'friends-and-neighbours' effect 
or through being 'city notables'. However, the election results 
and the survey findings do suggest that being a 'city notable' can 
be important in an election. Dodge was a well-known manufacturer 
of venetian blinds who used his own name in advertisements for his 
product. He was the most well-known candidate in North (Table 7.4) 
TABLE 7.4 KNOWLEDGE OF NORTH WARD CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES 
Candidate 
Dodge (C) 
Caygill (L) 
Blaxall (C) 
Drayton (L) 
Burn (C) 
Hawkey (C) 
Marshall (L) 
Jackson (L) 
Wright (V) 
Wilkes (V) 
c citizens L Labour 
Percentage of Sample Who 
Knew Candidate 
(N=231) 
16% 
12 
7 
6 
4 
4 
4 
3 
0.4 
0 
V Values 
, 
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and he received more votes than any other candidate in North. 
Caygill was a sitting COWlcillor, vocal on many issues, the second 
best-known candidate and the only Labour candidate elected in 
North. Blaxall was a former coWlcillor, prominent in welfare 
services, the third best-known candidate and also elected. The 
fourth candidate elected was Burn who was fifth equal best-known. 
When the party identifications of those who knew any of 
the candidates are examined, identifiers of one party were more 
likely to know the names of their party's candidates than the names 
of candidates of the opposing party (Table 7.5). Citizens identifiers 
TABLE 7.5 RESPONDENTS WHO COULD NA.ME CITY COUNCIL CANDIDATES 
BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
CANDIDATE NAMED BY PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
RESPONDENTS Citizens "Independent Labour 
Dodge (C} 28%* 17% 7% 
Blaxall (C) 16 5 0 
Hawkey (C) 14 2 2 
Burn (C) 10 3 2 
Jackson (L) 2 5 2 
Marshall (L) 2 3 7 
Drayton (L) 4 4 13 
Caygill (L) 8 13 13 
(N=5l) (N=l09) (N=62) 
* i.e. 28 per cent of the Citizens identifiers (N=51) 
knew Dodge was a candidate. 
C Citizens 
L Labour 
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were more likely than anyone else to know the names of the 
Citizens candidates, and Labour identifiers were more likely to 
know the Labour candidates. Dodge and Caygill were particularly 
well-known, not only by their own party supporters, but also by 
Independents and supporters of the opposite party. In only two 
cases is knowledge of a candidate by non-supporters of his party 
greater than or equal to knowledge by his own party supporters. 
Caygill was equally well-known to Labour supporters and Independents, 
and Jackson was better-known by Independents than supporters of 
his own party. These two candidates had somehow managed to make 
non-Labour identifiers aware of their candidacy, although Caygill 
was much more effective. These findings support rational choice 
theory which contends that party identification is a device which 
electors use to lower the costs of being informed about the 
candidates, parties and issues. More Citizens identifiers, for 
example, knew that the names of the Citizens candidates than any 
other electors because the costs of finding out for the Citizens 
identifiers were less than for other electors. Just by having a 
party affiliation the Citizens identifiers already had a stock of 
political information about the election, and it appears that they 
minimised their costs by only investing in further information about 
the Citizens Association (i.e. the names of the Citizens candidates). 
Dodge and caygill were well-known by non-Citizens and non-Labour 
supporters because the costs of finding out that they were candidates 
had been reduced. As already mentioned Dodge's name was often 
heard over the radio in advertising household products and Caygill 
was a sitting councillor. 
~ersonal voters for the council candidates are those who 
intend voting mainly for one party ticket, but who will spilit their 
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ballots and vote for one candidate of the opposing party because 
they like his personal qualities. Those city council voters who 
said they intended to vote for a main party group for the council 
were asked if they intended to vote for any other candidates who 
were not members of the party ticket. Those who answered "Yes" 
were asked who and why? Of those who said they would vote for a 
main party group (N=l26) 40 per cent said they would split their 
tickets and vote for another candidate, 51 per cent said they 
would not, and 9 per cent did not know. When those who said yes 
they would split their tickets were asked who they would vote for, 
only 16 per cent of this group could name a candidate (Table 7.6). 
TABLE 7.6 RESPONSES TO THE QUESTION 'IF YOU INTEND VOTING FOR 
ANY NON- ... [CHOSEN GROUP] CANDIDATES FOR THE CITY 
COUNCIL: WHO?' 
Response Perce~tage of Those Who 
Caygill 
Dodge 
Jackson 
Person rather than party 
Labour 
Values 
other (Did not name a candidate) 
Don't know who yet 
Intended to Vote for 
Other Candidates 
12% 
2 
2 
16 
8 
8 
2 
50 
100% 
(N=50) 
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Half the group did not know yet who they would vote for,and one in 
six just said they would vote for the person rather than the party. 
Caygill (Labour) was the candidate whom most voters were 
prepared to cross party lines and split their tickets for. 1 Two-
thirds of these voters were voting straight Citizens tickets except 
for Caygill,and the rest were voting straight Values tickets except 
for Caygill. Although D::>dge was the most well-known candidate, only 
one person in the sample said they would cross party lines to vote 
for him. Dodge's appeal appears to have been restricted to 
Citizens supporters,whereas Caygill's appeal transcended party lines. 
When asked why they would vote for Caygill the three main reasons 
mentioned were that the respondents "liked him", he had "done a good 
job" and because he was "a young person". This evidence suggests 
that Caygill received a definite personal vote in North ward, but 
without knowing the exact number in the sample who may have voted 
Caygill it is not possible to measure what proportion of Caygill's 
votes were personal votes. Further evidence that these votes for 
Caygill were personal votes comes from an examination of the party 
identifications of the Caygill voters. One-third of them were 
Citizens identifiers and the rest were Independents; none of them 
were Labour identifiers. Caygill's voters were also more likely to 
have voted Citizens in the mayoralty. Five out of six voted for 
Citizens and the remainder voted for the Values mayoral candidate. 
The North ward city council candidates in the 1974 election 
were relatively unknown compared to the mayoral candidates. However 
1. Since the number of respondents who said they would vote for 
caygill was small the following conclusions can only be 
tentative. 
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a few candidates were well-known to the sample and were elected 
to the council. Party identifiers were more likely to know 
their party's candidates than any other candidates. This finding 
supports rational choice theory which contends that party 
identification is a problem-solving device which electors use to 
lower the costs of being informed about the candidates, parties 
and issues. Two out of five of the straight ticket voters for the 
council said they would split their tickets and vote for another 
candidate. Of these voters 12 per cent said they would vote for 
Caygill and this is evidence of a definite personal vote for him. 
For those voters who have knowledge of a candidate such as Caygill 
and who like his personal qualities, a personal vote for him is a 
vote aimed at maximising thevoter'sutility stream from the city 
council. 
TICKET-SPLITTING 
It was pointed out in Chapter I that Christchurch City had 
a Labour mayor for 21 of the 27 years between 1947 and 1974, but 
that the Citizens Association had a majority on the council for 18 
of those 27 years (see Table 1.1). Christchurch voters have 
apparently been quite prepared tosplit their ballots between the two 
parties in a number of elections. Even though the 1974 election did 
not produce a split result (for example, a Labour mayor and Citizens 
council), the North ward survey revealed that' there were more voters 
who intended to split their votes between the parties than there 
were who intended to vote straight party tickets. Fifty-three per 
cent of those who knew their voting intention said they would vote a 
split ticket for the mayoral and city council elections and 47 per 
cent said they would vote straight party tickets. This evidence of 
ticket-splitting suggests that Christchurch City Council elections 
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offer a fruitful area for research into the phenomenon. A local 
election in New Zealand is an ideal place to study ticket-splitting, 
for local elections are the only opportunity the New Zealand voter 
has to split his ballot and vote for two or more parties in the 
one election. In parliamentary elections there is of course 
only one vote, but in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election, 
the voter could cast four votes for the city council and one for the 
mayoralty. Voting for the mayor and council in a New Zealand local 
election is thus analogous to voting for the president and congress 
in the United States. 
The Campbell-Miller Model 
From their surveys of the 1952 and 1956 United States 
. 1 presidential elections Campbell and Miller distinguish four basic 
types of straight and split ticket voters: (1) The'indifferent 
straight ticket voter' has little concern with the election outcome, 
he has no strong feelings towards parties, candidates or issues and 
casts a vote requiring least effort - a straight ticket. (2) The 
'indifferent split ticket voter' picks out particular candidates as 
a favour to a friend or because he likes the candidate's name, for 
example. His vote is not party oriented. (3) The 'motivated 
straight ticket voter' holds partisan views towards parties, 
candidates or issues or all three and uses his vote to implement 
his political orientations. (4) The 'motivated split ticket voter' 
is politically involved but his political motives conflict. He 
tries to satisfy both components of the conflict by supporting 
candidates from both parties. 
1. Angus campbell and warren E. Miller, "The Motivational 
Basis of straight and Split Ticket Voting", American 
Political Science Review LI (1957), 293-312. 
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According to Campbell and Miller the motivational basis of 
straight and split ticket voting can be understood in terms of 
three underlying generalisations: 
"(l) In the presence of specific goal-directed 
motivation, behaviour tends to be organised toward 
the achievement of the goal, and the stronger the 
motivation the less the deviation from the goal. 
(2) Conflict between motives reduces the strength 
of goal-directed motivation and produces ambiguities 
in behaviour. (3) In the absence of specific goal-
directed motivation, behaviour tends to be governed 
by a principle of least effort." 1 
As measures of political motivations the authors use the 
variables party identification, candidate partisanship, and issue 
partisanship. When a voter's political motivations combine in a 
mutually supportive manner in one partisan direction, the pressure 
towards full support for one party is increased. Straight ticket 
voting is highest amongst voters whose party,candidate and issue 
motivations all impel them to support the same party. Straight 
ticket voting is lowest amongst voters for whom none of these 
motives are present. The most significant variable associated 
with straight and split ticket voting is party identification. It 
2 
exercises a "controlling influence" on the way the voter marks his 
ballot. Candidate and issue factors both appear to have an 
independent influence on the tendency to vote a straight ticket, but 
they are less important than the party factor. However, when 
candidate and issue partisanship conflict with party identification, 
the resulting cross-pressures influence the voter to try to satisfy 
1. I.bid. I P• 310 • 
2. Ibid. I p. 311. 
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both components of the conflict by supporting candidates from both 
parties. Conflicting motivations reduce the pressure toward a 
party oriented vote and open the way to split ticket voting. 
Campbell and Miller investigate the effects of the physical 
layout of the ballot paper on straight and split ticket voting. 
Research into the effects of ballot form on voting behaviour is not 
uncommon and has indicated that certain ballot forms can influence 
voting behaviour. 1 The voter's ability to make a rational choice 
in the voting booth is dependent, not only on his own personal 
characteristics, but also on the electoral context, and the form of 
the ballot can be an important part of that context. In the United 
States there are two basic types of voting paper in use in the 
various states. (1) The 'party column' or 'single-choice ballot' 
groups the names of all candidates in columns according to party 
affiliation. On this type of ballot it is usually possible and 
simple to vote a straight ticket for every office by making a single 
mark. (2) The 'office-block' or 'multiple-choice ballot' groups 
all candidates according to the off ice they seek rather than by their 
party. To vote a straight ticket on this ballot requires every 
office to be voted on separately and therefore requires more effort. 
{This second ballot form is used in New Zealand local elections). 
campbell and Miller found that the proportions of straight 
and split ticket voting depended on the form of the ballot. Straight 
ticket voting was significantly higher in states with single choice 
ballots than in states with multiple choice ballots, and this 
1. see, for example, Jerrold G. Rusk, "The Effect of the 
Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting : 1876 
1908", American Political Science Review LXIV (1970), 
1220-1238. For a New Zealand study see John c. 
Blydenburgh, "The Effect of Ballot Form on City Council 
Elections", Political Science XXVI (July 1974), 47-55. 
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difference depended on the voters' strength of party identification. 
Those with weak levels of party identification and Independents were 
most influenced into voting a straight ticket where it was easier 
for them to do so by making a single mark. In multiple choice 
ballots where the weak identifiers and Independents were denied 
the easy method of voting, the likelihood of split ticket voting 
. 1 increased. In the absence of partisan influences the form of the 
ballot, essentially a non-political variable, acted as an influence 
on the vote in facilitating or inhibiting straight or split ticket 
voting. 
A Rational Choice Explanation 
Rational choice theory can help explain why people behave 
in certain ways when confronted with the opportunity to split their 
ballots. Campbell and Miller's four basic types of straight and 
split ticket voters are re-examined applying the assumptions of 
rational wealth-maximising behaviour and consideration of the effect 
of ballot form. 
First, consider the indifferent voter in general. The 
indifferent voter has a low interest in politics, little political 
information, a lack of concern regarding the election outcome and 
the parties, personalities and issues involved, no goal-directed 
2 
motivations, and a nil party differential. He has little information 
with which to discriminate between candidates and he is unwilling 
to make such an effort. Because he is so uninformed the costs of 
1. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 307; see also 
Campbell et al., American Voter, pp. 148-149, 154. 
2. However, it is assumed the indifferent voter has sufficient 
interest and motivation to actually turnout on election day. 
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obtaining information in order to organise his ballot toward 
any political objective are so high that he does not bother. Since 
his party differential is nil, whichever party wins the election 
will not interrupt his expected utility flow from the government. 
He expects no extra benefits from either party. Therefore he would 
be irrational to invest in costly information and he remains 
. 1 
uninformed. 
Once the indifferent rational voter has got to the polls he 
will be searching for a method of voting involving the least effort 
and lowest cost in time and energy. He finds such a cost-reducing 
method in the form of the ballot. If the indifferent voter is 
confronted with a single-choice ballot he will find that the method 
of voting involving the least effort and lowest cost is to cast a 
straight ticket vote by making a single mark. Thus we have the 
'indifferent straight ticket voter'. 
If the indifferent rational voter is confronted with a 
multiple choice ballot, as he is in local elections in New Zealand, 
then he will find that voting a straight ticket involves more effort 
and more investment in time and energy. He would have to go through 
all the ballots for each off ice voting for each one in terms of some 
consistent principle such as party identification. Since this is 
too costly, and therefore irrational, he splits his ballot and makes 
2 
his selections on a "capricious quasi random basis", perhaps 
selecting one candidate because he has heard of him, and another 
because of his position on the ballot. Thus we have the 'indifferent 
split ticket voter'. 
1. This conclusion follows from Downs, An Economic Theory, 
chap. 13. 
2. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 300. 
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Now consider the motivated voter. The motivated voter 
has a high interest in politics, a high degree of political 
information, a concern for the election outcome derived from his 
interest in parties, personalities and issues, motivations 
directed toward specific goals, and a reasonably high party 
differential. He is the voter most willing to make an effort to 
discriminate between candidates either on the basis of party 
loyalties, personality factors or issue factors. 
Whether the motivated voter votes a straight or split ticket 
depends on the size of his party differential. If his party 
differential is large, then it means that it makes a big difference 
to his expected utility stream which party's candidates are elected. 
Therefore, if he expects his utility to decrease if a candidate 
from the less-favoured party is elected, he will vote a straight 
party ticket. He cannot afford the risk of a candidate from the 
opposing party being elected. The costs of this happening would 
be too high - higher in fact than the costs of going through the 
ballot and organising it in the form of a straight party ticket. 
Not even the form of the ballot will prevent the motivated voter 
from voting a straight ticket even if he has to go through and vote 
for each candidate for each office. 
The motivated voter's party differential is often not large 
enough to influence him into voting a straight party ticket. The 
motivated voter may have conflicting motivations stemming from his 
high interest in politics which act to reduce his party differential. 
That is, it does not make quite so much difference to his expected 
utility stream which party is elected; it is more a question of 
wh.l.ch candidates will give him the greatest benefits if elected. 
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Thus to satisfy his conflicting motivations and to increase his 
utility stream,the motivated voter splits his ballot between the 
two parties. The less the motivated voter's party differential 
and the more conflicting his motivations, the more he will cross 
party lines to split his ballot. 
It is suggested that there would be greater reliance on cost-
reducing methods of voting in multi-candidate elections than in 
single member elections. E.E. Schattschneider and others have 
argued that the proverb 'there's two sides to every story' is seen 
1 
as an inherent fact of life by many people. The human actor, as a 
voter or in whatever role he plays, tends to seek and expect two-
sided stories: for-against, postive-negative, good-bad, more-less, 
have-have not. When there are more than two opinions or points of 
view as there are in multi-candidate elections, the costs of 
decision-making are greater than in simple decision problems. So 
in a multi-candidate election, and therefore one of greater 
complexity, there would be a greater reliance on cost-reducing 
decision rules. 2 It is suggested, therefore, that for those 
voters in New Zealand local elections who are without very strong 
party identifications, a cost-reducing method of voting is to vote 
a split ballot. For those voters with a strong party identification 
a cost-reducing method of voting is to vote a straight party ticket, 
for using party identification as a guide to action lowers the costs 
1. E.E. Schattschneider, Party Government (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1942); Robert A. Goldwin ed., 
Political Parties, U.S.A. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); 
Committee on Political Parties of the American Political 
Science Association, Toward A More Responsible Party System 
(New York: Rinehart, 1950). 
2. See Blydenburgh, "Ballot Form", P. 54. 
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of voting. The analysis of straight and split ticket voting is a 
good example of how rational choice theory permits political 
participation to be viewed as a problem-solving device induced 
by costs and benefits of particular kinds of activity. 
The Findings 
It has been suggested that the unmotivated, indifferent 
voter who has a low interest in politics and little political 
information will vote a split ticket, because voting a straight 
ticket requires more effort in that the voter has to go through 
the ballot papers marking each candidate of the same party. This 
hypothesis is partly confirmed by Table 7.7 which shows that those 
in the North ward sample who had a low interest in politics were 
more likely to be split ticket voters. However, . those electors 
TABLE 7.7 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY INTEREST IN 
CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL FOLITICS 
STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET INTEREST IN POLITICS 
(MAYORAL AND COUNCIL None/Some Great Deal/ 
ELECTIONS) Quite a lot 
Straight Ticket 46% 56% 
Split Ticket 54 . 44 
100% 100% 
(N=74) (N=45) 
.x2 = l.o3 .30<p<.50 
who were poorly informed about the candidates for the city council 
were more likely to vote straight tickets than split tickets 
(Table 7.8). The split ticket voters were generally more informed 
TABLE 7.8 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY NUMBER OF CITY 
COUNCIL CANDIDATES CORRECTLY NAMED 
Straight or Split Ticket Number of City Council Candidates 
(City Council Election) 0 1 2 3-10 
Straight Ticket 52% 38% 29% 42% 
Split Ticket 48 62 71 58 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
(N=83) (N=26) (N=l4) (N=l2) 
X2 NV 
about who was contesting the election than the straight ticket 
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voters; and the chances of splitting a ticket increased as voters 
could name more and more candidates. It appears that it is the 
influence of candidate personality that is influencing ticket• 
splitting. For these ticket-splitters personalities seem to have 
become more important than parties. That is, it does not make quite 
so much difference to their flow of benefits from the government 
which particular party is elected; it is more a question of which 
candidates will give them the greatest benefits if elected. Those 
who were not well-informed in general about all the candidates and 
the issues were also more likely to vote straight tickets than split 
tickets (Table 7.9). There does not appear to be conclusive evidence 
that indifferent voters were more likely to split their ballots. 
Rather Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show that the more voters were motivated 
into being well-informed about the election, the more likely they 
would split their ballots. Ignorance about the election does not 
seem to be a good explanation for splitting. 
TABLE 7.9 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY POLITICAL 
AWARENESS 
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Straight or Split 
Ticket (Mayoral and 
Council Elections) 
Score on Scale of Political Awareness* 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Straight Ticket 54% 48% 38% 
Split Ticket 
x2 = 
* 
46 52 62 
100% 100% 100% 
{N=57) (N=46) {N=l6) 
l .• 51 .20<p<.30 
Each respondent's score on this scale is the sum of 
the number of mayoral candidates, city council 
candidates and issues that he/she could name. 
Paradoxically it appears from Tables 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 that 
while some people may have voted a split ticket because they were 
not highly politically motivated, others voted a split ticket for 
the very reason that they were so motivated. In order to test this 
latter proposition more adequately, further measures of political 
motivation need to be constructed. According to the social-psychological 
school, the three main political motives which influence voting are: 
party identification, candidate orientation and issue orientation.
1 
(Since the North ward survey did not contain questions designed to 
test respondents' concern with issues and the association of one or 
other party or candidate with these issues in a favourable or un-
favourable way, issue orientation as a measure of motivation will not 
be examined) . The political motive of candidate orientation amongst 
the North ward sample was assessed by the extent to which respondents 
1. See, for example, Campbell et al., American Voter. 
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reacted to the personal qualities of the two mayoral candidates 
and the relative attractiveness of one over the other. Respondents 
answers to the open-ended question: "Why do you think you'll vote 
that way [for mayor]?" were used. Candidate orientation as a 
political motivation was associated with both straight and split 
ticket voting (Table 7.10). The tendency to vote a straight party 
TABLE 7.10 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY CANDIDATE 
ORIENTATION 
STRAIGHT OR SPLIT 
TICKET (MAYORAL AND 
COUNCIL ELECTIONS) 
Straight Ticket 
Straight Ticket except for 
one council candidate 
Split ticket 
x2 = 3.s8 .30<p<.50 
CANDIDATE ORIENTATION 
Pro-Hay or 
Anti-Pickering 
40% 
38 
22 
100% 
(N=45) 
Pro-Pickering 
or Anti-Hay 
60% 
23 
17 
100% 
(N=40) 
ticket increased amongst those who felt either favourably or un-
favourably towards the mayoral candidates. However, there were more 
pro-Hay or anti-Pickering split ticket voters than there were 
straight ticket voters. 
When the two motives of candidate orientation and party 
identification are used together to investigate straight and split 
ticket voting some interesting findings result (Table 7.11). Where 
TABLE 7.11 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY CANDIDATE 
ORIENTATION BY LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
CANDIDATE ORIENTATION PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Citizens Independent Labour 
% (N) % (N) % (N) 
PERCENTAGE VOTING A 
STRAIGHT TICKET* 
Pro-Hay or Anti-Pickering 57 (13) 16 (3) 0 (0) 
Pro-Pickering or Anti-Hay 0 (0) 29 (4) 80 (25) 
PERCENTAGE VOTING A 
SPLIT TICKET* 
Pro-Hay or Anti-Pickering 43 (10) 84 (16) 0 (O) 
Pro-Pickering or Anti-Hay 0 (O) 71 (10) 20 (5) 
* In mayoral and council elections 
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the two vote-supporting motives intersect, straight ticket voting 
was highest and split ticket voting was lowest. Where there was no 
party motivation (i.e. the Independents) straight ticket voting was 
lowest and ticket-splitting was highest. "Motivated straight ticket 
voting appears to reflect an intention on the part of the voter to 
. 1 
accomplish his political purpose as fully as possible." Such 
voters did not scatter their choices casually; they seemed to have 
a political direction in mind and implemented it through the choice 
of one party or the other. It would also seem that the costs of 
voting would be lowest for those whose party identification and 
1. campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", p. 303. 
228. 
candidate orientation coincided. For those people a straight ticket 
vote is the choice with the least cost. 
Table 7.11 suggests that party identification was an 
important variable in influencing the proportions of straight and 
split ticket voting. Campbell and Miller point out that: 
"There are both rational and empirical reasons to 
expect that party identification would prove to 
be the key factor in the explanation of the 
motivated straight ticket. A straight ticket is 
after all a straight party ticket, not a 
candidate ticket or an issue ticket." 1 
TABLE 7.12 STRAIGHT OR SPLIT TICKET VOTING BY STRENGTH OF 
LOCAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
STRAIGHT OR SPLIT 
TICKET (f.11_1\.YORAL & 
COUNCIL ELECTIONS) 
STRENGTH OF PARTY IDENTIFICATION 
Straight Ticket 
Split Ticket 
x 2 = 28.s6 
Very 
Strong 
78% 
22 
100% 
(N=23) 
p<.001 
Fairly 
Strong 
71% 
29 
100% 
(N=35) 
Not Very 
Strong 
27% 
73 
100% 
(N=ll) 
Independent 
24% 
76 
100% 
(N=46) 
Party identification does not prove to be an important influence on 
straight and split ticket voting (Table 7.12). Straight ticket 
voting was very high among very strong identifiers, and ticket-
splitting was very high among not very strong identifiers and 
1. Ibid., p. 305. 
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Independents. This would appear to confirm the hypothesis that 
the motivated voter with a large party differential will make the 
effort to vote a straight party ticket. Having a large party 
differential means it will make a big difference to the voter's 
expected utility stream if his party's candidates are not elected. 
The cost of this happening would be greater than the cost of 
organising his ballot in the form of a straight party ticket. By 
voting a straight ticket he is minimising his costs. For those 
without a large party differential, it does not make quite as much 
difference to their expected utility stream which party is elected. 
Therefore, organising their ballot in the form of a straight ticket 
would be irrational. 
The Independent voters provide a useful test of what happens 
when party attachment is not present. As their name implies, the 
Independents appear to be relatively free of party discipline, with 
a high level of ticket-splitting. However one-quarter of the 
Independents intended to vote a straight ticket. Some of them may 
have no party differential and are not concerned with the election 
outcome, but are voting a party ticket because that alternative 
appears to be the least costly. Some of the Independents may be 
using their straight ticket vote to support an issue position or a 
candidate preference they may have. While some of them are probably 
not as independent of the parties as they say they are. "The 
lifetime party follower who calls himself an Independent is not an 
1 
unfamiliar phenomenon." 
To summarise the findings, split ticket voters were: less 
1. Ibid., p. 307. 
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interested in politics, more informed about the candidates and 
issues, less likely to have positive or negative feelings towards 
the mayoral candidates, more likely not to have both party ident-
ification and candidate orientation intersecting as vote-supporting 
motives, and more likely to be weak party identifiers and 
Independents. Straight ticket voters were: more interested in 
politics, not very well-informed about the candidates and issues, 
more likely to have positive or negative feelings towards the mayoral 
candidates, more likely to have both party identification and 
candidate orientation intersecting as vote supporting motives, and 
more likely to be strong party identifiers. 
There appear to be two types of motivated voter. Those who 
were strongly motivated towards the political parties contesting the 
election were more likely to vote a straight ticket than those less 
motivated. That is, the voter with a large party differential was 
prepared to go through his ballot and organise it into a straight 
ticket. The costs of organising his ballot into a straight ticket 
are less than he would incur if his favoured party's candidates were 
not elected. The second type of motivated voter was not motivated 
by party identification, rather he was motivated by his knowledge 
of the candidates and issues into voting a split ticket. Since this 
voter had a low party differential,he would be wasting his resources 
by voting a straight ticket as it mattered little to him which party 
was elected. This voter was using his knowledge of the candidates 
and issues in implementing his vote. The influence of personality 
was more important than party. There is also evidence that the 
m:>tivated split ticket voter has conflicting motivations. Those 
who were independent with regard to city council politics and felt 
favourably or unfavourably towards either of the mayoral candidates, 
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were more likely to vote a split ticket, than those who identified 
with a party and felt favourabJ.y towards that party's mayoral 
candidate or unfavourably towards the other party's mayoral 
candidate. 
There also appear to be two types of indifferent voter. 
Those who were indifferent towards the parties tended to vote 
split tickets. These voters have small party differentials and, 
considering the form of the ballot, it would be too costly for 
them to go through and vote for each candidate of the one party, 
since it matters little to them which party is elected. In 
Campbell and Miller's words they make their selections on a 
1 
"capricious quasi random basis" The second type of indifferent 
voter is the one who is indifferent to the candidates and issues. 
He has little knowledge of either. However he is sufficiently 
motivated into voting a straight ticket. He may have a party 
differential and is influenced by this, or he may have no party 
differential and is voting a straight ticket because that alternative 
appears the least costly. Since he has little knowledge of 
candidates or issues he is unlikely to be voting a straight ticket 
to support an issue position or a candidate preference. 
The four types of voter distinguished by Campbell and Miller 
in their study of straight and split ticket voting can be distinguished 
amongst the voters in the North ward sample. As well, Campbell and 
Miller's three underlying generalisations about goal-directed 
motivation are appropriate to an understanding of the straight and 
split ticket voters in the 1974 Christchurch City Council election. 
1. Ibid., p. 300-
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Rational choice theory with its assumptions of rational political 
behaviour and self-interest on the part of the elector has 
provided a different and helpful insight into the theoretical 
problems involved. The findings support both rational choice 
theory - by showing that voters act so as to maximise their expected 
utility - and social-psychological theory - by showing that the 
psychological variable of motivation can be related to voting 
behaviour. The analysis of straight and split ticket voting is 
a good example of how social-psychological and rational choice 
theories can complement each other in the search for explanations 
of political behaviour. 
COATTAIL VOTING 
Coattail voting is caused by the personal appeal, magnetism 
or charisma of the party leader when this can be translated into the 
sort of allegiance which influences voters to give support to his 
team mates on the ballot. It is a direct expression of candidate 
partisanship; the party leader contributes the unique component of 
his own personality to the influences on the voters. In New Zealand 
coattail voting can only occur at local elections where the voter can 
vote for the party leader and the other members of his ticket. Thus 
this study of the 1974 Christchurch City Council election is a good 
opportunity to investigate coattails in New Zealand. 
warren E. Miller of the Survey Research Centre has pointed 
out that: 
"The crucial point to be noted about the existence 
of coattail influence is that it means that 
congressional candidates of Party A, for example, 
receive votes which they would not have received 
if it had not been for the candidacy of their 
presidential nominee." 1 
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It then follows that coattail influence must be reflected in straight 
ticket voting: 
"Coattail influence can only exist where straight 
ticket voting prevails; its incidence cannot 
reasonably be equated with deviations from that 
behaviour." 2 
Miller correctly points out that of course not all straight ticket 
voting can be attributed to the influence of coattails. There are 
many other factors that could lead to straight ticket voting. The 
problem is, therefore, to isolate from all behaviour consonant 
with coattail influence (all straight ticket voting), that behaviour 
uniquely related to such coattail influence rather than to the 
influence of party, issues, or other potentially confounding factors. 
Thus to identify and analyse the vote-pulling power of the mayoral 
candidates the question becomes what proportion of all straight ticket 
voting for the mayor and council is attributable to the coattail 
effect? 
Previous Studies 
Miller's study investigates the relationship between political 
motivations, voting behaviour and coattails. Miller's method of 
1. 
2. 
warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political 
Myth and Methodology", Public Opinion Quarterly XIX (1965) , 
p. 354. 
Ibid., p. 357. 
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measuring coattails relies on two sets of survey interviews with 
which he is able to identify those straight ticket voters who made 
their voting decision for president before their voting decision 
for congress. It can then be inferred that the motivations leading 
to the presidential decision played a significant role in the 
congressional decision. Once the people who voted a straight ticket 
and made their congressional decision after their presidential 
decision have been identified, their motivations need to be examined 
to see whether parties or issues may have promoted the development of 
candidate partisanship. The presidential candidate's appeal may be 
a product of his party affiliation or his stand on the issues and, 
according to our definition, this would not produce coattail voting. 
Miller constructs a distribution of motivational factors among possible 
coattail voters. The extreme test of coattail influence is where 
candidate partisanship is the only factor consistent with the vote. 
Coattail influence is also possible where candidate partisanship and 
party or issue orientation,or both are consistent with the vote. 
Campbell and Miller} using survey research data, point out that 
coattail voters are voters who defect from their preferred party (that 
is, the party they identified with) in the presidential election because 
of the personality of the other party's candidate, and who also deviate 
at the congressional level. In the 1956 presidential election many 
Democratic identifiers voted for Eisenhower because of his personal 
attractiveness, and one-third of these voters also voted Republican 
for congress. It seems that for these Democratic identifiers, their vote 
for president influenced their vote for congress; and this is evidence 
1. Campbell and Miller, "Motivational Basis", pp. 309-310. 
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of a visible coattail effect. The authors note that there are other 
coattail effects which cannot be easily assessed. The ab3-lity of a 
presidential candidate to hold supporters of his own party in line 
is an important aspect of his influence on the vote. His success in 
winning the votes of Independents to his ticket may be more 
significant than the defectors he may attract from the other party. 
Charles Press re-examined the Campbell-Miller survey research 
data from the 1956 election. 1 He deduces a trend, which is quite 
consistent with our findings this far, that presidential-coattails 
are apparently most operative where the influence of party 
identification is weakest. It is the weak identifiers who were first 
attracted by the presidential candidate, and then because of his 
personal qualities they decided to cross over party lines completely 
and vote a straight ticket. Press suggests that since many marginal 
seats lie within areas where party identification is traditionally 
weak, coattail influence may be significant in determining the outcome 
of those elections. He tries to find any special factors peculiar to 
the districts or candidates which were associated with success in 
coattail riding, and concludes that the seniority of the sitting 
member and the statewide voting pattern have some, but only limited, 
influence. 
1. 
Stan Kaplowitz used aggregate data to measure presidential 
Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails", 
American Political Science Review LII (1958), 1041-1050. 
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coattail effects. 1 If the short-term forces associated with the 
presidential contest such as the presidential candidates' 
personalities influenced the congressional contests, then where a 
presidential candidate received many votes attributable to short-term 
forces, the congressional candidate of his party should have also 
received many votes attributable to short-term forces. This suggests 
that coattails could be measured by some measure of association between 
that part of the presidential vote attributable to short-term forces 
and that part of ~he senatorial vote also attributable to short-term 
forces. A statistic is computed which is the correlation between P-N 
and S-N, where P is the proportion Democratic of the total presidential 
vote in a state, s the proportion Democratic of the senate vote, and N 
an index of the normal Democratic vote in that state. A high correlation 
indicates a clear coattail effect. However the correlation does not 
measure ho~ much difference the presidential contest made in the outcome 
of any senate race. 
Gary Jacobson examines the length of Richard Nixon's coattails 
in the 1972 presidential election. 2 He uses several kinds of evidence 
to suggest that Nixon's pulling power had been underestimated. The 
most relevant evidence (to this study) is his survey research data 
showing that voters who defected from their preferred party (that is, 
1. 
2. 
Stan Kaplowitz, "Using Aggregate Voting Data to Measure 
Presidential Coattail Effects", Public Opinion Quarterly 
xxxv (1971), 415-419. 
Gary c. Jacobson, "Presidential Coattails in 1972", Public 
Opinion Quarterly XL (1976), 194-200. 
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the party they identified with) in the presidential election were 
significantly more likely to deviate at the congressional level as 
well. However Jacobson does not say whether these voters were 
influenced into defecting by the personality of the presidential 
candidate which is a crucial part of coattail influence. 
A Rational Choice Explanation 
Rational choice theory can provide some answers to the 
question: Why are people influenced by the party leader into voting 
for at least some of the members of his ticket? The costs of 
political information are generally high, but the costs of obtaining 
information about party leaders is very often less than that for the 
other members of his ticket. Therefore, electors are likely to know 
more about the leaders than about the other candidates. The leaders 
are the focus of attention during an election campaign, and their 
views on the issues are communicated to the electors far more 
effectively than the opinions of the rest of the ticket. The leader 
is the main image of the party projected on to the electorate. Malcolm 
Moos argues that: 
in the leader 11 • 1 
"In a sense the party as a whole is personified 
Since electors know more about the party leader, they may be 
likely to make their voting decisions based on this knowledge. Once 
the vote for leader has been decided, for those without much knowledge 
of the candidates for lower office and for those without a strong party 
1. Malcolm c. Moos, Politics, Presidents and Coattails 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 136. 
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loyalty to influence them into voting a straight ticket, a cost-
reducing choice is to vot(l for the remaining members of the 
leader's ticket. The rational voter is allowing his positive 
feelings towards the party leader to determine his vote for the whole 
ticket. For the voter coattail voting is a rational means of saving 
time and effort in making individual decisions for each of the other 
candidates. 
Coattail Voting in Christchurch City 
The 1974 Christchurch City Council election was centred on 
the personalities of the mayoral candidates. As the Christchurch Star 
commented: 
"Hay or Pickering? That is the inevitable -
in fact almost the only - question that arises 
when the local body elections are discussed." 1 
It is possible therefore that there was some coattail voting in the 
election. The method used to identify ~ of the coattail voting 
is that used by Campbell and Miller, and Jacobson. Coattail voters 
are defined as: identifiers of Party A or Independents who cross 
party lines to vote for the mayoral candidate of Party B because 
of his personal qualities, and decide to vote for city council 
candidates of Party B because of the mayoral candidate. In the 
multi-candidate election for Christchurch City the voter does not have 
to vote a completely straight ticket for mayor and council for there 
to be coattails operating. A mayoral candidate's personality could 
influence a voter to vote for only one out of the four possible 
1. Christchurch Star, 10 October 1974, p. 8. (Emphasis added}. 
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candidates for council. This is still coattail-influenced voting. 
Since coattail voters are also mayoral personal voters, 
and since it was pointed out earlier in this chapter that there 
were very few mayoral personal voters who defected from their 
preferred party, it could be expected that there would be very 
few coattail voters who defected from their preferred party. This 
expectation is exceeded. In fact there were no Citizens or Labour 
identifiers in the North ward sample who crossed party lines to 
vote for the mayoral candidate of the other party because of his 
personal qualities, and also voted a straight council ticket for 
that party or a straight council ticket except for one candidate. 
However, when the Independents are examined some coattail influence 
is visible. Doubts have been cast elsewhere in this thesis about the 
'independence' of the self-proclaimed independents. We do not know 
whether they have truly made an independent judgement or whether 
they are influenced only by party. The following findings, therefore, 
must be considered with these thoughts in mind. 1 
A number of Independents voted for Hay because of his 
personal attractiveness as a candidate (N = 9). Many of these 
Independents split their ballots, but 22 per cent of the Independents 
who voted for Hay because they liked him voted a straight Citizens 
ticket for the council. As well, 33 per cent of these Independents 
voted a straight Citizens ticket except for one candidate. (That is, 
Hay's personality influenced voters to vote for all the members of 
1. As the number of cases in this analysis is small, the 
conclusions can only be tentative. 
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the Citizens ticket except one} • These I .ndependents who voted 
Hay because they liked him and voted a straight Citizens ticket 
for the council constituted 2 per cent of the total number of Hay 
voters (N = 83). As well the Independents who voted Hay because 
they liked him and voted a straight Citizens ticket except for 
one candidate constituted 4 per cent of the total number of Hay 
voters. Adding these two figures, we can say that 6 per cent of 
Hay's voters were coattail voters. 
Pickering's coattails were far less visible. There were 
no Independents in the sample who voted Pickering because of his 
personal attractiveness and voted a straight Labour ticket for the 
council. However, 13 per cent of the Independents who voted 
Pickering because they liked him (N = 16) voted a straight Labour 
ticket except for one candidate. These Independents constituted 
3 per cent of the total number of Pickering voters (N = 81). 
From this analysis it seems that Hay's coattails were 
longer than Pickering's. Hay's personality appears to have 
influenced a visible proportion (6 per cent) of his voters into 
voting a straight or nearly straight council ticket for Citizens. 
In contrast Pickering's personality influenced only half as many 
of his voters into voting a nearly straight Labour ticket for the 
council. Although rational choice theory provides an explanation 
for coattail influence, it would seem that only a few voters 
allowed their positive feelings toward the party leaders to 
determine their vote for the whole ticket. These people were 
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Independents and not party identifiers. It has been assumed that 
they are relatively free of the influence of party and they are 
voting a straight or nearly straight ticket because it is a cost-
reducing choice. 
Although it has been shown that a number of Independents 
liked a mayoral candidate, voted for him and voted for all or 
nearly all the other members of his ticket, it cannot be shown 
that there is a causal relationship in any one direction. That 
is,we cannot tell whether the mayoral candidates' personalities 
influenced voting in the council election or whether the council 
candidates' personalities influenced the mayoral election. However, 
the mayoral candidates were the focus of attention in the 1974 
election. They were the most salient aspects of the whole election, 
and they were extremely well-known to the North ward sample compared 
to the city council candidates, as was shown earlier in this chapter. 
Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the mayoral race influenced 
the council election. 
CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are 
types of voting behaviour where the personality of the candidates is 
presumed to be the dominant influence on the voting decision, while 
party identification is presumed to be of relatively minor importance. 
Rational choice theory contends that where information about the 
candidates' personalities is available at low cost and where the 
voter's party differential is small, the rational voter will 
give a personal vote, split his ticket,or give a coattail vote 
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to the candidate or candidates whom he believes will increase his 
utility stream from the government. 
Given the popular image of local elections where voters 
are supposed to vote for the person rather than the party it was 
surprising that there was little personal voting for the mayoral 
candidates. Hay was the only mayoral candidate to receive a personal 
vote from the North ward sample and this amounted to four per cent 
of his total vote. Personal voting for only one council candidate 
was clearly evident. Of the voters who intended to split their 
tickets for the city council, 12 per cent said they would vote for 
Caygill,a Labour candidate. It is significant that Caygill was the 
only Labour candidate elected in North. 
There were four types of straight and split ticket voters. 
The motivated straight ticket voter was strongly motivated by his 
party differential into voting a straight ticket because the costs 
were less than he would incur if his favoured party's candidates 
were not elected. The motivated split ticket voter was knowledgeable 
about the candidates and issues and often had conflicting motivations. 
He tried to satisfy the components of the conflict by supporting 
candidates from both parties. The indifferent split ticket voter had a 
small party differential and split his ballot because it would be too 
costly to organise his ballot in the form of a straight ticket, since 
it mattered little to him which candidates were elected. The indifferent 
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straight ticket voter knew little of the candidates and issues, 
but voted a straight ticket either because this appeared to be 
the least costly alternative or because he was influenced by 
party. 
There were no party identifiers who were influenced by 
mayoral coattails, but there were Independents who appeared to be 
influenced by coattails. Six per cent of Hay's voters were 
Independents who were voting for him because they liked him and 
who voted a straight or nearly straight Citizens ticket for the 
council. Three per cent of Pickering's voters were similarly 
coattail influenced. In short, Hay's coattails were longer than 
Pickering's; Hay was more of an asset to the other members of his 
party ticket than Pickering was to the other members of the Labour 
ticket. 
The problems of personal voting, ticket-splitting and 
coattail voting were first investigated by advocates of the social-
psychological approach to electoral behaviour. They suggested 
explanations for the problems mainly in terms of psychological 
variables such as candidate orientation, political motivation and 
party identification. Rational choice theory with its assumptions 
of rational political behaviour and self-interest on the part of the 
voter has suggested explanations centering on economic variables 
such as the costs of information, the costs of voting, utility 
stream and party differential. This chapter has tried to show 
that the approaches do not conflict; rather they can both be used 
in a mutually helpful and complementary way to further our under-
standing of electoral behaviour. 
CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION 
This thesis has considered two general theories of voting - the 
'social and psychological determinism' and 'rationality' theories 
of voting. Theories of social and psychological determinism 
imply that to a large extent social and psychological characteristics 
structure the vote, while rationality theories imply that 
individuals are free to use individual perception and motivation 
in making their voting decisions. Early voting studies attempted 
to predict preferences by relying on either socio-economic 
variables, or psychological variables or a combination of social, 
psychological and political variables. Later writers questioned 
the adequacy of the social-psychological model and suggested 
economic explanations for voting behaviour using the notions of 
choice and rationality. This thesis has applied the theoretical 
concepts of rationality to some specific problems of electoral 
behaviour which have important influences on individual voting 
choices and election outcomes. The problems that have been investigated 
are voter turnout, the surge and decline of turnout, the role of 
party, personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting. 
Although the problems were initially studied by advocates of the social-
psychological approach, rational choice theory was employed to provide 
a different perspective to the same problems. These problems are 
particularly relevant to the study of New Zealand local elections 
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mainly because local elections provide the only opportunity for 
the New Zealand voter to vote for the party leader and the other 
members of his ticket. . The study of local elections is important 
if we are to further our understanding of who gets elected to 
local government in New Zealand and why. 
Survey research complemented by aggregate statistics are 
the main sources of data for this study. The North ward survey 
consisted of interviews carried out just prior to the election using 
a prepared questionnaire. The master roll survey was an analysis 
of the electoral roll to find out more about voter turnout. The 
accuracy of both surveys was demonstrated, although the small size 
of the North ward sample meant that some conclusions from the 
survey 's data had to be tentative. 
The study of voter turnout revealed that a number of social 
characteristics (neighbourhood, occupation, age, marital status and 
length of residence) were related to turnout although none of the 
relationships were very strong. Measures of psychological involvement 
(interest in politics, politicalawareness, cross-pressures) had 
stronger relationships with turnout. The political considerations of 
type of election and electoral qualification were also found to be 
related to turnout. The rational choice model was not very successful 
in explaining the different rates of voting participation among 
different social groups and categories. The investigation into 
psychological involvement and turnout supported both rational choice 
theory - by showing that people act so as to maximise their expected 
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utility - and the social psychological model - by showing that 
psychological involvement in politics was related to voting 
behaviour. Political factors and rational choice theory were 
partially successful in accounting for different rates of turnout. 
The study of turnout did not provide a clear answer to the question 
'Who participates in elections and why?' but some possible answers 
were suggested. 
The model of surge and decline was developed by a leading 
scholar of the social-psychological school using psychological 
variables such as political stimulation, political interest and 
party identification. It is proposed that fluctuations in turnout 
and partisanship result from a combination of short-term political 
forces superimposed on the underlying level of political interest 
and on the long-term party identifications of the electorate. A 
rational choice approach emphasises the cost of political information 
at high and low-stimulus elections. Both explanations help us to 
understand the surge and counter-surge that occurred in Christchurch 
in the 1971 and 1974 elections respectively. The surge in partisan-
ship between 1968 and 1971 which gave Pickering his victory was 
mainly due to Independents who swung to Labour, presumably having 
voted for Guthrey in 1968. The counter-surge in partisanship 
between 1971 and 1974 which favoured Hay came mainly from new voters 
and switchers, who were mostly Independents and who also were more 
likely to split their tickets. The increases in turnout in 1971 and 
1974 were brought about by high-stimulus elections which reduced 
the costs of obtaining information and thus the costs of voting. 
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The swings in partisa.nship in 1971 and 1974 occurred because the 
low cost information available favoured one party at the expense 
of the other, and this resulted in a surge of support for the 
favoured party. 
The key concept of psychological identification with a 
political party has been found to be of vital importance in overseas 
studies in influencing both electoral behaviour and people's 
perceptions of politics. The economic theorists view party 
identification as a problem-solving device that is instrumental in 
advancing the voters own particular set of values. Party affiliation 
assists the elector in simplifying the election for it enables him 
to behave consistently with his basic political predispositions with-
out spending great efforts in seeking information or reaching a 
voting decision. A party affiliation with regard to local politics 
in Christchurch City was accepted by a substantially smaller 
proporation of the North ward sample compared to the proportion that 
felt an attachment to a parliamentary party. The economic model 
suggests that this is because of the lesser importance of the issues 
decided on at the local level in New Zealand. Party identification 
was of major importance in influencing voting behaviour in the 1974 
mayoral election and of somewhat less importance in the city council 
election. That so many party identifiers split their tickets in the 
city council election suggests that their party differentials with 
regard to the city council were not large. That is, their expected 
difference in utility income was not so great. The flow of benefits 
from the city council as a whole seemed to depend more on which 
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party's mayoral candidate was elected rather than on which party's 
council candidates were elected. In general, voting in the 1974 
election and voting in a future general election were closely 
related, but there were some exceptions. Only half of the 
parliamentary identifiers felt loyal to the corresponding local 
party. Parliamentary loyalties were quite closely related to voting 
in the mayoral election, but distinctly less so in the council 
election. Voting in the mayoral election and in a future general 
election were not closely associated because quite a few voters 
intended to switch party votes between the two elections. Party 
identification can be viewed both as a psychological attachment 
to a party and as a rational means of reducing the costs of voting. 
The rational choice model is quite successful in explaining the 
high relationship between party identification and voting behaviour in 
the 1974 election. Social-psychological theory is also important 
because of its emphasis on partisanship. Both perspectives assist 
in the explanation of voting behaviour. 
Personal voting, ticket-splitting and coattail voting are 
types of voting behaviour where the influence of party is presumed 
to have been overtaken by the influence of personality. Rational 
choice theory contends that where information about the candidates' 
personalities is available at low cost and where the voter's party 
differential is small, the rational voter will give a personal 
vote, or split his ticket, or give a coattail vote to the candidate 
or candidates whom he believes will increase his stream of benefits 
from the government. Hay was the only mayoral candidate to receive 
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a personal vote and this amounted to four per cent of his total 
vote. Personal voting for only one council candidate was clearly 
evident. There were four types of straight and split ticket 
voter who were influenced by motivations relating to candidates 
and parties. When there was specific goal-directed motivation, 
behaviour tended to be organised toward the achievement of the goal; 
when there was conflict between motives, split ticket voting 
tended to result; and when there was no goal-directed motivation, 
behaviour tended to be governed by the principle of least effort. 
There were no party identifiers who were influenced by mayoral 
coattails, but there appeared to be some Independents who were 
coattail influenced. Hay's coattails turned out to be longer than 
Pickering's, and we can conclude that Hay was more of an asset to the 
other members of his party ticket than Pickering was to the other 
members of the Labour ticket. 
Some of the more important empirical findings from this 
thesis from the perspective of Christchurch City Council politics 
are listed below. (1) The swing to Pickering and Labour in the 
1971 mayoral election did not come from those 1968 non-voters who 
surged to the polls in 1971. Rather the swing came from those 
who had apparently voted Guthrey in 1968. (2) The swing to Hay and 
Citizens in the 1974 mayoral election was brought about by a combination 
of 1971 non-voters who were attracted to the polls and 1971-74, 
Pickering-Hay vote switchers. (3) Only half the North ward sample 
identified with any of the parties contesting the 1974 election. (4) 
Very few of the party identifiers did not intend to vote for their 
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party's mayoral candidate in the mayoral election, while the 
Independents divided about evenly between the candidates. Two-
thirds of those who had a party identification and one-quarter of 
those who did not (the Independents) intended to vote straight 
party tickets in the 1974 mayoral and council elections; the 
remainder in each case intended to vote split tickets. (5) 
The local Independents were not all National Party supporters in 
disguise; in fact 10 per cent more of the local Independents 
identified with the Labour Party at the parliamentary level than 
identified with National. (6) Almost one-third of those who 
intended to vote Citizens in the mayoral election said they would 
vote Labour if a general election were held soon. (7) Hay received 
a small personal vote in the election but Pickering received no 
discernible personal vote. In fact Pickering's personality was more 
likely to repel voters away from himself towards Hay. {8) In 
addition Hay's coattails were more effective than Pickering's. His 
personality assisted the members of his council team more than 
Pickering's personality assisted the members of his ticket. 
Some of the more important findings from a theoretical 
perspective are now listed. {l) The turnout for electors with low 
occupational status was higher if they lived in a higher status area 
than if they lived in a lower status area. Explanations for this 
phenomenon centred around the roles of spatial influences and 
party organisation. (2) The turnout for those who had two different 
party identifications (one for the local level and one for the 
parliamentary level of politics} was considerably less than the turnout 
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for those who had correspondingly similar party identifications. 
It is suggested that psychological cross-pressures between the two 
different party identifications were responsible for the lower 
turnout. (3) The model of surge and decline predicted that the 
increase in the motivation to vote in the 1971 election would 
generate a surge of electors into voting and would also swing the 
partisan division of the vote to the advantaged party (Labour) . 
However this increase in the motivation to vote in 1971 did not 
swing the partisan division of the vote to Labour. While the surge 
in turnout did not contribute to Pickering's victory, the political 
circumstances that created the surge did swing the vote. The 
conclusion to be drawn from this is that a surge in turnout does 
not always on its own contribute to a swing in partisanship. (4) 
The complexity of the multi-candidate election could be expected 
to lead voters to rely heavily on party identification as a cost-
reducing choice. Yet the greater the number of choices, the less 
voters used party identification as a guide to votin~. Party loyalty 
was not as strong when there was a large number of choices. (5) 
Identifiers of one party were more likely to know the names of their 
party's candidates than the names of candidates of the opposing 
party. This finding supports rational choice theory which contends 
that party identification is a device which electors use to lower the 
costs of being informed about the candidates. The identifiers of 
one party knew more of the candidates for their party than any other 
electors because the costs of finding out were less than for the other 
electors. 
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While social-psychological and rationality theories of 
voting are often thought of as being in conflict, this thesis has 
shown that, far from conflicting, both theoretical perspectives can, 
in conjunction with each other, contribute much to the understanding 
of political behaviour. Many of the findings in this thesis support 
both social-psychological and rational choice theories. This is a 
good indication of their joint applicability to the study of electoral 
behaviour. It has been shown that a series of problems that were 
first investigated using one theoretical perspective can be re-
examined using both the old perspective and a different, relatively 
new one. The result is a greater understanding of why people behaved 
in the ways they did in the 1974 election. The social-psychological 
model emphasises the role of partisanship in voting, but says little 
about the rationality of the voting act. The economic models 
emphasise the rationality of voting, but say little about the role of 
partisanship as a rational means of reducing the costs of voting. 
This thesis has shown that both perspectives are essential for a more 
complete understanding of electoral behaviour. It has been shown that 
further research into electoral behaviour, especially research into 
New Zealand local elections, must take account of social-psychological 
and rationality theories of voting. 
A P P E N D I C E S 
APPENDIX A 
A SUMMARY OF STATISTICS 
RELATING TO THE 
1974 CHRISTCHURCH CITY COUNCIL ELECTION 
Compiled by 
Andrew MacKenzie 
Department of Political Science 
University of Canterbury 
December 1976 
TABLE 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Fig 1 
8 
9 
Fig 2 
10 
Fig 3 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Fig 4 
15 
CONTENTS 
Introduction 
MAYORAL ELECTIONS 
1974 
1974 
1971 
1968 
By Candidate 
By Ward 
By Candidate 
By Candidate 
1968-1974 : Two-party Vote 
COUNCIL ELECTIONS 
255. 
PAGE 
256 
258 
259 
260 
261 
262 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1974 
1975 
By Candidate 263 
By Party 264 
Map of Ward Boundaries 265 
Mayoral and Council Electicnsby Ward 266 
Pegasus By-election 267 
1971-1974 
1971-1974 
1971-1977 
1968-1974 
VOTER TURNOUT 
By Candidate, Party and Ward 
By Party 
Two-party Swing 
Two-party Vote 
1974 
1974 
1974 
By Ward 
By Electoral Qualification 
By Time of Voting 
1950-1974 
NUMBER OF ELECTORS 
268 
2170 
271 
272 
273 
273 
274 
274 
1974 : By Ward and Electoral Qualification 275 
256. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 1974 Christchurch City Council election was the first 
to be conducted under a ward system for over fifty years. For 
the purposes of the election the city was divided into five 
wards: four of which elected four councillors and the fifth 
elected three councillors. The mayoral election was unaffected 
by the ward system and was conducted over the entire city area 
as before. 
A number of tables that follow refer to the "two-party 
swing" that occurred in an election or the "two-party swing 
required to lose" an election. 
The two-party swing occurring in a mayoral or council 
election is a simple statistic that describes the change in either 
major party's share of the two-party vote. Put another way it is 
the net gain by one party over another, or the average of the 
Citizens per cent gain and the Labour per cent loss. 
"Two-party" swing is used because a vote for a minor party 
or an Independent - in what is essentially a two-party political 
system - has the same effect on the immediate fortunes of the 
two main parties as a decision to abstain. However unpalatable 
it may be to supporters of Independent or Values Party candidates, 
there is no reason why a decision to vote Independent or Values 
should appear as a swing to Citizens or to Labour, when a decision 
by the same people to abstain gives rise to no swing at all.* 
In mayoral elections the two-party swing required for 
the sitting mayor to lose is the reduction in his percentage share 
of the two-party vote which would bring it to 49.9 per cent. For 
example, Mr Hamish Hay the present Mayor gained 52.0 per cent of 
the two-party vote in 1974. The swing required against him for 
him to lose the mayoralty is only 2.1 per cent. This means that 
if just over 2 in every 100 of those who voted for Hay in 1974 vote 
Labour in 1977, then Christchurch will have a new mayor. 
In council elections the "swing required to lose" figures 
for each ward do not show the swing required for the leading 
party to lose all its seats. Since a party does not need 50 per 
cent of the vote to win a seat, the swing figures can only show the 
swing required for the leading party in the ward to lose its 
majority of the vote. 
* For more on two-party swing see Hugh Berrington, "The General 
Election of 1964", Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 
vol. 125 (1965), 17-66; Malcolm r1ackerras and Nigel S. 
Roberts, "The Utility of Swing in the Analysis of General 
Elections in New Zealand", Landfall vol. 24 (March 1975), 56-68. 
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For example, in 1974 the four Citizens candidates in 
North ward together gained 54.9 per cent of the two-party vote 
and 3 seats. The swing required against Citizens (and to 
Labour) for Citizens to lose their majority of the vote is 5.0 
per cent. That is, if 5 in every 100 of those who voted Citizens 
in 1974 vote Labour in 1977 then Labour would become the 
majority party in terms of votes. However, this is no guarantee 
that Labour would become the majority party in terms of seats. 
But they would be sure to win at least one seat from Citizens. 
Figures 2, 3 and Table 10 contain results of the 1971 
council election classified by ward. These figures were obtained 
by examining results at the level of individual polling booths 
for the 1971 'at-large' election and reworking them into 1974's 
ward boundaries. 
This redistribution of the 1971 booth figures results in 
a few minor discrepancies between the tables. The total two-
party vote figures for 1971 given in Table 10 are slightly 
different from those given in Table 11 because the Table 10 
figures for 1971 exclude special votes and early votes. The 
swing figures given in Tables 7, 10 and Figure 3 vary because 
special votes are excluded from consid~ration in Figure 3. 
For comparative purposes results of the 1968 and 1971 
elections are included. 
Abbreviations 
C Citizens 
I Independent 
L Labour 
v Values 
TABLE 1 
1974 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE 
CANDIDATE PARTY 
Hay, H.G. 
Pickering, N.G. 
Williams, G.J. 
Hansen, C.M. 
Informal 
Total two-party 
Total valid votes 
Total votes recorded 
Majority for Hay 
c 
L 
v 
I 
Two-party swing to Citizens 
VOTE 
29 482 
27 237 
2 068 
325 
212 
56 719 
59 112 
59 324 
Two-party swing (to Labour) required to lose 
No. of electors on roll 
% of electors who voted 
% 
49.9 
46.1 
3.5 
0.5 
100.0 
258. 
% TWO-PARTY 
52.0 
48.0 
100.0 
2245 
4.0% 
2.1% 
98039 
60.5% 
HANSEN 
% N 
West 0.4 42 
North 0.5 57 
Pegasus 0.6 57 
East 0.5 62 
South 0.7 86 
Total 0.5 304 
Special Votes 0.5 21 
GRAND TOTAL 0.5 325 
TABLE 2 
1974 MAYORAL ELECTION BY WARD 
HAY PICKERING WILLIAMS 
% N % N % N 
68.1 6 653 27.5 2 685 4.0 391 
50.3 5 315 45.6 4 821 3.5 381 
35.8 3 673 60.2 6 173 3.4 347 
47.6 5 601 48.5 5 703 3.4 405 
48.0 5 918 47.5 5 853 3.8 468 
49.7 27 160 46.2 25 235 3.6 1 992 
52.5 2 322 45.3 2 002 1. 7 76 
49.9 29 482 46.1 27 237 3.5 2 068 
INFORMAL 
27 
40 
33 
48 
42 
190 
22 
212 
TOTAL VALID 
VOTES 
9 771 
10 574 
10 250 
11 771 
12 325 
54 691 
4 421 
59 112 
I\.) 
lJ1 
l.O 
• 
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TABLE 3 
1971 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE 
CANDIDATE PARTY 
Pickering, N.G. 
Guthrey, A.R. 
Hansen, C.M. 
Informal 
Total two-party 
Total valid votes 
Total votes recorded 
Majority for Pickering 
Two-party swing to Labour 
L 
c 
I 
VOTE 
25 121 
23 212 
618 
359 
48 333 
48 951 
49 310 
Two-party swing (to Citizens) required to lose 
No. of electors on roll 
% of electors who voted 
% % TWO-PARTY 
51.3 52.0 
47.4 48.0 
1. 3 
100.0 
100.0 
1 909 
16.3% 
2.1% 
84 273 
58.5% 
TABLE 4 
1968 MAYORAL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE 
CANDIDATE 
Guthrey, A.R. 
Mathison, J. 
Informal 
PARTY 
c 
L 
VOTE 
23 273 
12 910 
263 
% 
64.3 
35.7 
Total two-party 
Total valid votes 
36 183 
36 183 
36 446 
100.0 
Total votes recorded 
Majority for Guthrey 
Two-party swing to Citizens 
Two-party swing (to Labour) required to lose 
No. of electors on roll 
% of electors who voted 
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% TWO-PARTY 
64.3 
35.7 
100.0 
10 363 
29.4% 
14.4% 
85 470 
42.6% 
TABLE 5 
1968-1974 MAYORAL ELECTIONS 
CITIZENS 
1968 23 273 64.3% 
1971 23 212 48.0% 
1974 29 482 52.0% 
TWO-PARTY VOTE 
LABOUR 
12 910 35.7% 
25 121 52.0% 
27 237 48.0% 
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TWO-PARTY 
SWING 
-16.3% (to 
Labour) 
+ 4.0% (to 
Citizens) 
263. 
TABLE 6 
1974 COUNCIL ELECTION BY CANDIDATE 
WARD RANK CANDIDATE PARTY VOTE 9o ELECTED MAJORITY 
West 1 Garrett Mrs HL c 6 747 24.2 c 
2 Carter, M.R. c 6 678 23.9 c 
3 Hattaway, N.G. c 6 506 23.3 c 3908 
4 Orme, A.F. L 2 598 9.3 
5 Gavigan, J.P. L 2 326 8.3 
6 Mahoney, L.A. L 2 061 7.4 
7 Jack, J.C. v 1 019 3.6 
TOTAL 27 935 100.0 
North l Dodge, N. c 6 246 13.8 c 
2 Blaxall ,P.N.G. c 6 235 13.8 c 
3 Burn, J.F. c 5 824 12.8 c 
4 Caygill, D.F. L 5 800 12.8 L 502 
5 Hawkey, W.R. c 5 298 11. 7 
6 Drayton, M.G.R. L 5 226 11. 5 
7 Jackson , D.I. L 4 256 9.4 
8 Marshal~ M.C.T. L 4 113 9.1 
9 Wright, H.M . v 1 239 2.7 
. 10 Wilkes , C.D. v 1 096 2.4 
TOTAL 45 333 100.0 
Pe2asus 1 Batchelor, Mrs MDL 6 131 14.6 L 
2 Dunbar , P.D. c 5 958 14.2 c 
3 Massey , w. L 5 700 13.6 L 
4 Anderson, P.W. L 5 652 13.5 L 125 
5 Buck, Ms V. S. L 5 527 13.2 
6 Cockburn, A. S. c 4 076 9.7 
7 Evans , Mrs c. J. C 3 836 9.2 
8 Hogue , A.D. c 3 250 7.8 
9 Clarkson, R.S. v 1 180 2.8 
10 Easterbrook, A.C.I 580 1.4 
TOTAL 41 890 100.0 
East 1 Skellerup, P. J. R.C 7 114 14.9 c 
2 Bri ttenden, W. J. Ar; 6 596 13.9 c 
3 Alderdice,B. L 5 730 12.0 L 
4 Arbuckle, R.H. c 5 472 11. 5 c 129 
5 Ansel, A.E. c 5 343 11. 2 
6 Davidson, J.F. L 4 780 10.1 
7 Todd, R.J. L 4 702 9.9 
8 Power, J.G. L 4 542 9.5 
9 TePuke-Watson,T.I 1 241 2.6 
10 Lea, A. v 1 150 2.4 
11 Taylor, L.F. v 964 2.0 
TOTAL 47 634 100.0 
South 1 Clark, M.M. L 6 679 14.4 L 
2 Britten, B.J. c 6 587 14.2 c 
3 Macfarlane,R.M. L 6 147 13.2 L 
4 Sutherland,NMW L 5 518 11.9 L 252 
5 Clark, H.A. L 5 266 11.4 
6 Doyle, D.A. c 5 080 10.9 
7 Tutengaehe, H. c 5 035 10.8 
8 Crawford, C.E. c 4 758 10.2 
9 Heal, P.J. v 1 404 3.0 
TOTAL 46 474 100.0 
West 
North 
Pegasus 
East 
South 
CITY 
TOTAL 
TABLE 7 
1974 COUNCIL ELECTION BY PARTY 
Labour 6 
Citizens 19 
Values 1 
Total vote 27 
Total 2-party 26 
Labour 19 
Citizens 23 
Values 2 
Total vote 45 
Total 2-Party 42 
Labour 23 
Citizens 17 
Values 1 
Independent 
Total v ·ote 41 
Total ;2-p arty 40 
Labour 19 
Citizens 24 
Values 2 
Independent 1 
Total vote 47 
Total 2-p arty 44 
Labour 23 
Citizens 21 
Values 1 
Total vote 46 
Total 2-p arty 45 
Labour 92 
Citizens 106 
Values 8 
Independent 1 
Total V:>te 209 
Total 2-p arty 199 
Vote 
985 
931 
019 
935 
916 
395 
603 
335 
333 
998 
010 
120 
180 
580 
890 
130 
754 
525 
114• 
241 
634 
279 
610 
460 
404 
474 
070 
754 
639 
052 
821 
266 
393 
% Total 
vote 
25.0 
71.4 
3.6 
100.0 
42.8 
52.1 
5.1 
100.0 
54.9 
40.9 
2.8 
1.4 
100.0 
41.5 
51.5 
4.4 
2.6 
100.0 
50.8 
46.2 
3.0 
100.0 
44.3 
51. 0 
3.8 
0.9 
100.0 
% Two-party 
vote 
26.0 
74.0 
100.0 
45.1 
54.9 
100.0 
57.3 
42.7 
100.0 
44.6 
55.4 
100.0 
52.4 
47.6 
100.0 
46.5 
53.5 
100.0 
Seats 
3 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
8 
11 
* Percentage swing required to lose the majority 
of the votes. 
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Two-party 
swing (%)* 
24.1 
5.0 
7.4 
5.5 
2.5 
3.6 
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FIGURE 1 
1974 COUNCIL ELECTION - WARD BOUNDARIES 
\ 
-Fir/Gli'.A/D Ml 
SOUTH 
EAST 
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TABLE 8 
1974 MAYORAL AND COUNCIL ELECTIONS BY WARD 
CITIZENS LABOUR 
Mayor Council Mayor Council 
% % % % 
West 71 74 29 26 
North 52 55 48 45 
Pegasus 37 43 63 57 
East 50 55 50 45 
South 50 48 50 52 
CITY 52 54 48 46 
TABLE 9 
1975 PEGASUS BY-ELECTION 
CANDiDNfE 
Buck, Ms v.s. 
Cockburn, A.S. 
Clarkson, R.S. 
Crawford, D.J. 
TOTALS 
PARTY 
L 
c 
v 
I 
Majority for elected candidate 
Two-party swing to Labour 
Number of electors on roll 
% of electors who voted 
'VOTE 
3 484 
2 381 
162 
82 
6 109 
% 
57.0 
39.0 
2.7 
1.3 
100.0 
% TWO-PARTY 
59.4 
40.6 
100.0 
1 103 
2.1% 
20 780 
29.4% 
267. 
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FIGURE 2 
1971 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS 
BY CANDIDATE, PARTY AND WARD 
.19 71 1974 
% VOTE 
25 
---
20 
15 
WEST 
10 / 
5 
0 
25 
20 
. 
NORTH 
15 
10 ~/ 
5 
0 
25 
20 
15 ~ 
PEGASUS / / 10 
5 
0 
RANK 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 4 3 2 1 
LABOUR CITIZENS LABOUR CITIZENS 
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FIGURE 2 CONTD. 
1971 1974 
% VOTE 
25 
20 
15 / EAST ~ / 10 .----;-
5 
0 
25 
20 
15 
SOUTH 
10 
5 
0 
RANK 43214 321 43214321 
LABOUR CITIZENS LABOUR CITIZENS 
These scattergrams give a visual impression of the strength of the 
two main parties in each ward for 1971 and 1974. They are compiled 
from the figures in Table 6 that give each candidate's percentage of 
the total vote in the wards. Each candidate is represented by a dot, 
and each party's candidates are grouped together: Labour on the 
left and Citizens on the right. Candidates are ranked within the 
party grouping. The vertical axis shows each candidate's percentage 
of the total ward vote. 
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1971 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS BY PARTY 
Total vote ( 9.;) Two-party vote (%) 
1971 1974 1971 1974 Two-party swing to Citizens (%) 
West Labour 32.7 25.0 34.0 26.0 
Citizens 63.7 71.4 66.0 74.0 8.0 
Values 3.6 
Independent 3.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
North Labour 48.8 42.8 48.8 45.1 
Citizens 51.2 52.1 51. 2 54.9 3.7 
Values 5.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Pe~asus Labour 60.9 54.9 60.9 57.3 
Citizens 39. l 40.9 39.1 42.7 3.6 
Values 2.8 
Independent 1. 4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
East Labour 47.3 41.5 50.9 44.6 
Citizens 45.5 51. 5 49. l 55.4 6.3 
Values 4.4 
Independent 7.2 2.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
South Labour 51.0 50.8 57.7 52.4 
Citizens 37.4 46.2 42.3 47.6 5.3 
Values 3.0 
Independent 11.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
CITY Labour 49.2 44.3 51.8 46.5 
-TOTAL Citizens 45.7 51.0 48.2 53.5 5.3 
Values 3.8 
Independent 5.1 0.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
CITIZENS 
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FIGURE 3 
1971-1977 COUNCIL ELECTIONS TWO-PARTY SWING 
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North (1. 3) 
East 
City 
(1. 0) 
(1. 9) 
South (7.8) 
Pegasus (11.0) 
/ / . 
East (5.5) 
North(4.8) 
City (3. 6) 
South (2.5) 
Pegasus (7.4) 
(0. 4) 
co. 7) 
(no change l 
(no change) 
East (5.9) 
North(4.l) 
City (3.6) 
South (2.5) 
Pegasus (8.5) 
· 1 votes except for South and All figures exclude specia 
the city in 1974 and 1977. 
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TABLE 11 
1968 - 1974 COUNCIL ELECTIONS TWO-PAR'rY VOTE 
CITIZENS LABOUR TWO-PARTY 
Votes % Seats Votes % Seats SWING(%) 
1968 337 973 56.5 16 260 213 43.5 3 
1971 380 877 49.0 8 397 184 51.0 11 7.5 
(to Labour) 
1974 106 639 53.5 11 92 754 46.5 8 4.5 
(to Citizens) 
TABLE 12 
VOTER TURNOUT 1974 
West 
North 
Pegasus 
East 
South 
BY WARD 
Total - Ordinary 
Voters 
Special Voters as 
percent of total 
no. of electors 
Total - All Voters 
% 
65.5 
52.3 
50.7 
55.4 
58.3 
56.0 
4.5 
60.5 
These are not exact tucnout 
figures for the wards 
because: (1) they are 
calculated from polling 
booth returns, (2) electors 
did not always vote at 
polling places within their 
ward, and (3) special votes 
are excluded from the ward 
figures. 
TABLE 13 
VOTER TURNOUT 1974 
BY ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION 
Resident 
Ratepayer 
% 
54.4 
61. 4 
273. 
274. 
'l'ABLE 14 
VOTER 'I'URNOUT 1974 BY 'l'IME OF VOTING 
% of Electors % of Voters (N) 
Special 4.5 7.5 (4 421) 
Early 8.7 14.3 (8 482) 
Saturday 47.3 78.2 (46 421) 
Non-voters 39.5 (38 715) 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 (98 039) 
Special - from 30 Se ptember 
Early - 9 October to 11 October 
Saturday- 12 October (polling day) 
FIGURE 4 
VOTER TURNOUT 1950-1974 
61 
60% 59 
44 43 
40 38 37 
34 34 
20 
0 
1950 '53 '56 '59 '62 '65 '68 '71 • 74 
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TABLE 15 
NUMBER OF ELECTORS (1974) 
BY WARD AND ELECTORAL QUALIFICATION 
RESIDENT RATEPAYER NOMINEE TOTAL 
% N % N % N 
West 60.3 9 019 39.2 5 868 0.5 69 14 956 
North 60.4 12 253 39. 4 7 979 0.2 45 20 277 
Pegasus 52.5 10 649 47.4 9 612 0.1 12 20 273 
East 53.9 11 502 45.4 9 686 0.7 144 21 332 
South 53.7 11 394 44.2 9 359 2.1 448 21 201 
TOTAL 55.9 54 817 43.4 42 504 0.7 718 98 039 
APPENDIX B 
SAMPLE DESIGNS 
NORTH WARD SURVEY 
Description of the Universe 
Adult population of Christchurch City aged 18 years and over. 
(Population size: 170 600, 1974 estimate). 
Sample Population 
Adult population of North ward aged 18 years and over. 
Population Size 
No. of registered electors 
Total population 
20 277 (1974 election) • 
34 366 (1971 census). 
34 425 (1976 census) • Total population 
Sample Size 231 
Sampling Fraction 1% (1 in 100) approximately. 
Sampling Method Random-cluster-quota sampling. 
Selection Method 
Three stage systematic selection: 
1st stage : Random selection of starting points. 
interviewing is to commence) . 
(Addresses where 
2nd stage 
3rd stage 
Selection of dwelling places. (Random-walk pattern: 
every third house beginning from the starting point 
until five interviews are completed) . 
Quota sampling of respondents by sex. (i.e. alternating 
male/female etc.). 
Sampling Error 
Unknown - due to sampling method used. Could be as high as + 7 per 
cent, but the results of the survey show that it seemed to be 
extremely accurate. For example, Hay (Citizens) won 52.4 per cent of . 
the two-party vote in North, and over the whole city he won 52.0 per 
cent. In the sample 50.6 per cent of those intending to vote for 
either two main parties said they would vote for Hay. 
Date of Interviewing 
Date of Election 
Pretesting 
28 September 1974. 
9 to 12 October 1974. 
Pegasus ward, 14 September 1974. 
Sample size: 20. 
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MASTER ROLL SURVEY 
Description of the Universe 
District Electors' Roll (Master Copy) for the City of Christchurch 
compiled for the election of the City Council held from October 9 
to October 12 1974. Contains the combined rolls for the five 
electoral wards ordered alphabetically. Total number of registered 
electors : 98 039. 
Sample Population 
1. District Electors' Roll for West ward 1974. 
Population size: 14 956. 
2. District Electors' Roll for Pegasus ward 1974. 
Population size: 20 273. 
3. Total population size: 35 229. 
Sample Size 
Total sample 
West subsample 
Pegasus subsample 
Sampling Fraction 
1 769 
751 which is 5% 
population. 
1 018 which is 5% 
population. 
5% (1 in 20) 
<14 
751) 
956 
1 018) 
<20 273 
of the ward 
of the ward 
Sampling Method Proportional stratified random probability 
sampling. 
Selection Method 
Three stage systematic selection: 
1st stage 
2nd stage 
3rd stage 
Sampling Error 
page selection. 
electors in the ward on that page. 
respondent selection from the electors in the ward on 
that page. 
+ 3% 
Confidence Limits 'Very sure': 99 chances in 100 of accuracy 
to within the specified limits of error (+ 3%) 
Date of Sampling September 1976. 
Information Retrieved 
For each respondent: ward, sex, marital status (females only), 
occupational status, age (students and retired only), electoral 
qualification, voted?, polling booth where voted, time of voting 
(early (Wednesday to Friday) or on polling day (Saturday)), special 
vote? 
APPENDIX C 
NORTH WARD QUESTIONNAIRE 
Below is the text of the questionnaire administered in North 
ward. Where possible the percentage distributions of replies have 
been interspersed in the text of the questions. Since a great deal 
more room would be needed to give the distributions of replies coded 
from the 'open-ended' questions, the percentages have been limited 
to the 'closed' questions. In each case the distribution refers to 
the replies given by the whole sample. The proportion who 'don't 
know' is listed (where applicable), but the proportion 'not 
ascertained' or 'no answer' or 'not applicable' is not. Thus where 
the sum of percentages given for any question is not 100 per cent, the 
difference can usually be accounted for by the 'not ascertained' etc. 
THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Good day. I am working on some research being conducted by the 
Political Science Department at the University of Canterbury. I would 
be most grateful if you could help me. 
I have to interview one of the men/women in this household aged 18 
years and over. 
I can assure you that all answers and views will be regarded as fully 
confidential. Thank you very much. 
Respondent Selection: 
Would you tell me how many men/women there are in this household aged 
18 years and over? 
1 : Interview. 2 or more : List the actual number here:~~~ 
THEN SAY: Well, of the ••• (GIVE NUMBER), I'd be most grateful if 
I could interview the one whose birthday comes next after today. 
Thank you. 
The Interview Schedule: 
1. First of all, I would like to ask roughly how long have you 
been living in Christchurch? (Moved into Christchurch during 
1974 8%, moved in during 1973 and 1972 6%, 3 to 15 years 22%, 
16 to 21 years 13%, 22 years or more 28%, "All my life" 23%) 
2. Generally speaking, how much interest do you have in what goes 
on in politics - a great deal (10%), quite a lot (28%), some 
(53%), or none at all (9%)? 
279. 
3. And what about local body politics : how much interest do 
you generally have in what goes on in Christchurch City 
Council politics - a great deal (10%), quite a lot (21%), 
some (56%), or none at all (13%)? 
4. I know it's a long time ago, but thinking back to the last 
Christchurch City Council elections in 1971, I was wondering 
if you could tell me what you thought the issues were at that 
election? 
IF RESPONDENT ASKS "WHAT ARE 'ISSUES'?", REPLY: Oh, by issues 
I mean the points of conflict between the parties, or the 
factors that made people cast their votes in one way or 
another. 
5. How much interest did you have in that election - a great deal 
(13%), quite a lot (23%), some (37%), or none at all (18%)? 
6. And what about this time : Would you say that you have more 
interest (39%) or less interest (13%), or about the same 
amount of interest (40%)? (DK 1%) 
7. And what do you think the issues are at this election? 
IF LATER IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERVIEW THE RESPONDENT 
SPONTANEOUSLY MENTIONS MORE ISSUES OR ISSUES FOR THE FIRST 
TIME, RECORD THEM BELOW:-
8. With regard to politics throughout the country as a whole, do 
you usually think of yourself as National (32%), Labour (46%}, 
Social Credit (1%), Values (4%), or what? (Other 1%, 
Independent 10%, DK 4%) 
9. IF PARTY CHOSEN : Well, how strongly (chosen party) do you 
feel - very strongly (18%), fairly strongly (43%), or not 
very strongly (22%)? 
10. And getting back to local body politics, do you usually think 
of yourself as Labour (27%) or Citizens Association (22%), or 
dent you think of yourself in these terms (39%)? (Other party 
2%, Independent 8%, DK 1%) 
11. IF LOCAL PARTY CHOSEN : And how strongly (chosen party) do you 
feel - very strongly (15%) , fairly strongly (24%) , or not very 
strongly (12%}? 
12. Getting back to the last Christchurch City Council elections 
in 1971, I was wondering if you could tell me whether or not 
you voted in those elections? (Yes 57%) 
13. IF DIDN'T VOTE: Could you say why? 
14. IF DID VOTE IN 1971: Well, you'll remember that Mr Guthrey 
was the Citizens Association candidate for Mayor, and Mr 
Pickering Labour's candidate. I was wondering if you could 
tell me who you voted for? (Guthrey 26%, Pickering 28%, DK 
0%, Did not vote 46%) 
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15. And what about the City Council - did you vote mainly for 
Citizens Association candidates (16%) or mainly for Labour 
candidates (25%)? (Neither 8%, DK 6%) 
16a. 
16b. 
17. 
IF CITIZENS: Did you vote for any Labour candidates? (Yes 
6%, No 7%, DK 4%) 
IF LABOUR: Did you vote for any Citizens candidates? (Yes 
5%, No 17%, DK 5%} 
And what about City Council elections before 1971 
vote in any of them? (Yes 44%) 
did you 
18. IF NO: Could you say why? 
19. IF YES: Which ones did you vote in? 
20. AGAIN, ONLY FOR THOSE WHO ANSWERED 'YES': Could you tell me 
why you have generally voted in City Council elections? OR, 
IF MORE APPROPRIATE, ASK: Could you tell me why you voted 
in that election? 
21. Well, let's discuss this year's election: Do you know the 
name of the Citizens Association's candidate for Mayor? 
(Hay 81%) 
22. And what about the Labour Party's candidate for Mayor: do 
you know his name? (Pickering 86%) 
23. And do you perhaps know the name of the Values Party candidate 
for Mayor? (Williams 13%) 
IF RESPONDENT DOESN'T KNOW ANY/SOME NAMES: Well, names aren't 
too important, of course, but Mr Hamish Hay is the Citizens 
Association candidate; Mr Neville Pickering the Labour 
candidate; and Mr Gary Williams is the Values candidate. 
24. Do you intend to vote in this year's Mayoral election? 
(Yes 81%) 
25. IF NO: Could you say why? 
26. IF 'YES' OR 'DON'T KNOW': Would you mind telling me which of 
the Mayoral candidates you think you'll vote for? (Hay 36%, 
Pickering 35%, Williams 5%, DK 10%) 
27. AGAIN, IF 'YES' OR IF DEFINITE CHOICE GIVEN: Could you say 
why you think you'll vote that way? 
28. no you know the names of any of the candidates for the City 
council in this ward? 
29. And do you intend to vote in the City Council elections? 
(Yes 78%) 
30. IF NO: Could you say why? 
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31. IF YES: Do you intend to vote mainly for Citizens Association 
candidates (23%), Labour candidates (27%), or Values 
candidates (4%)? (Some of each 11%, About 50:50 3%, Other 
2%, DK 8%) 
32. IF MAIN GROUP IS CHOSEN: Do you intend to vote for any other 
candidates - that is, do you intend to vote for any non-
(chosen group) candidates for the City Council? (Yes 17%, 
No 28%, DK 10%) 
33. IF YES: Who? Why? 
34. Are there any comments that you would like to make about this 
year's election? 
DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONS: 
Finally, a few questions for statistical purposes. 
35. SEX -- BY OBSERVATION (Male 50%, Female 50%) 
36a. Would you mind telling me what your occupation is? (PROBE 
FOR SPECIFICS IF NECESSARY) 
36b. IF NECESSARY, ADD: And your husband's (OR,IF NECESSARY, 
"father's") occupation? (PROBE FOR SPECIFICS IF NECESSARY) 
37. How old were you when you left school? 
38. Did you have any full-time or part-time education after 
leaving school? (Yes 52%) 
39. IF YES: Full-time (28%) or part-time (25%) 
40. AGAIN, IF YES: What further education was that? (PROBE 
FOR SPECIFICS) 
41. Did you vote at the last general election? (Yes 78%) 
42. IF YES: Which party did you vote for? (National 27%, Labour 
46%, Social Credit 2%, Values 0.5%) 
43. IF NO(i.e. IF DID NOT VOTE): Could you tell me why? 
44. would you mind telling me how old you are? 
45. There's quite a bit of talk these days about different social 
classes. If you had to make a choice, would you describe 
yourself as working class (48%) or middle class (41%)? (DK 4%) 
46. What is your religion? (AS SPECIFIC AS POSSIBLE, PLEASE) 
47. UNLESS 'NO RELIGION' (OR 'AGNOSTIC', ETC.): How often do you 
attend church? (FOR JEWS, "Synagogue") 
282. 
48. And, finally, if there were a general election in the near 
future, which party do you think you would vote for? 
(National 28%, Labour 49%, Social credit 0.5%, Values 6%, 
DK 13%, would not vote 2%) 
(Remember to thank the respondent, and - if necessary -
assure him/her of the confidentiality of the interview.) 
49. GIVE THE EXACT AND FULL ADDRESS OF THE INTERVIEW HERE: 
50. GIVE HERE ANY COMMENTS WHICH YOU FEEL COULD HELP WITH THE 
INTERPRETATION OF THIS INTERVIEW. FOR EXAMPLE, A BRIEF 
PERSONAL DESCRIPTION OF THE RESPONDENT, THE TYPE OF HOUSE, 
CONSUMER DURABLES, ETC. ETC.: 
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